What exactly are Gadamer's grounds for denying the existence of a uniquely correct interpretation of a text, object, or event? I begin by showing the inadequacy of two arguments for his position. I then turn to a third more promising argument that objectivity is not possible because the object of understanding is not determinate, but rather constituted anew by each act of understanding. My goal in this paper is to provide a fuller justification for the third argument and thereby defend Gadamer's position. I do so by reformulating this third argument in terms of relational properties so as to establish that the knower's situatedness plays, as Gadamer himself insists, a positive, constitutive role in the process of understanding.
Dialectics of Internal and External ABSTRACT: The central topic of this paper is the analysis of the dialectical interdependency of internal and external in the theory of language as a symbolic system. Referring to and analyzing the philosophic legacy of W. von Humboldt, B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein, F. de Saussure and G. Spet, the author concludes that the dialectics of internal and external is not an accidental and episodic phenomenon of language. It rather is an intrinsic, ontological trait apart from which an adequate cognition of the essence of language is impossible. Taking the internal form as a logical structure, it is possible to view it as something "higher and fundamental" in language, something that is attainable more by intuition than by research. The internal intellectual base of this grammatical stability lies in the sphere of purely logical forms.
This is the characteristic of language that Wittgenstein is clearly alluding to when he tells us that “A proposition must use old expressions to communicate a new sense” (TLP 4.03). The conflict between compositionality and the context principle is the matter of how we are able to form meaningful sentences out of words when words, when they stand on their own, do not have any meaning. Since Wittgenstein asserts a version of the context principle while acknowledging compositionality, it would seem that he is holding on to a problematic account of meaning. In this paper I will explain why Wittgenstein claims statement 3.3, and show that it is in fact possible to maintain his context principle in light of compositionality. I will argue that this statement is entailed by Wittgenstein’s account of meaningful propositions as pictures of facts.
Metaphors With the possible exception of completely formal exercises in logic, philosophy is thoroughly metaphorical and largely conditional. Moreover, the purposes served by metaphors and conditionals in it are similar. Metaphors ask us to imagine the world in a new way, while conditionals may ask to imagine a new world. Yet some conditionals and metaphors are incompatible. There are limits to how metaphors can occur in conditionals, and how conditionals can themselves be metaphors.
Goodman's hypothesis of 'grue' is quite different from the above two indeterminacy in terms of both objective of introducing the concept and the usage of it. Goodman's issue is to search for the rules in screening out 'bad' assumptions in induction. This induction issue is not indeterminacy of Wittgenstein's skeptic arguments or Quine's radical translation. Wittgenstein and Kripke's conclusion that that rules are brute facts seems to be questionable. Form of life is one of Wittgenstein's key concepts in his theory on rules and is linked to rules in some crucial ways.
In Defense of Direct Perception ABSTRACT: My goal in this paper is to defend the claim that one can directly perceive an object without possessing any descriptive beliefs about this object. My strategy in defending this claim is to rebut three arguments that attack my view of direct perception. According to these arguments, the notion of direct perception as I construe it is objectionable since: (1) it is epistemically worthless since it leaves perceived objects uninterpreted; (2) it cannot explain how perceived objects are identified; and (3) it is ill-prepared to assign objective content to perceptual states. What is involved in the claim that one directly perceives an object? The notion of direct perception that I propose to defend in this paper is this: that one 'directly' perceives an object if one's perception of this object is not mediated by beliefs.
This analytical strategy “analyses the boundaries of communication and the paradoxes that communication unfolds when it connects with one particular distinction” (Andersen 2003:78). Two questions are central: (1) What must necessarily follow the shaping of this very distinction? and (2) What are the restrictions on communication due to this distinction? Ii is the precisely question of the unity of the distinction (Anderson
But, often they contain numerous implications with value for innovation, as they can anticipate holistic projections which are not yet fulfilled by theoretical analysis. This paper deals with the question, of whether the cognitive content of metaphors can be put to use in philosophy, and, if so, what cognitive or methodological place metaphors have within philosophical discourse. Three philosophical attitudes toward metaphors can be distinguished: First, the various arguments for rejection of metaphors in philosophy. Second, the unrestricted affirmation of metaphors, taking "absolute metaphor" as the replacement of metaphysics. The third position can be described as the restricted affirmation of metaphors.
Wittgenstein's Dilemma Either language can be defined or it can be investigated empirically. If language is defined then this will be mere tautology. If language is investigated empirically then this will lead to a substantial yet contingent truth. The cure for this dilemma for Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was to submit the doctrine that the structure of language cannot be said but only shown. This doctrine is vague and misconceived.
Based on those semiotic elements, Morris proposes a definition of language: “a language is . . . any inter-subjective set of sign vehicles whose usage is determined by syntactical, semantical, and pragmatical rules” (Morris:48). An objection for this definition of language might be that by extending the four semiotic elements into linguistics and language, Morris’s definition of sign will be problematic since all objects that are symbolically and linguistically associated with other objects are defined as signs.