Incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the Capitalist World-Economy, 1750-1839
In 1977, Immanuel Wallerstein proposed a research agenda to answer the question: When and by what process did the Ottoman Empire become incorporated into the capitalist world-economy? He also asked whether incorporation was a single event or a series of events for the different regions of the Empire--Rumelia, Anatolia, Syria, and Egypt. He suggested the answer be sought in Ottoman production processes and trade patterns between 1550 and 1850.
By 1980, Wallerstein had answered his own question. When the European base of the capitalist world-economy began to develop its boundaries in the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire remained outside the system. Between 1750 and 1839, the process of incorporation into the capitalist world-economy was complete and the Ottoman Empire had been peripheralized. Wallerstein did not comment whether incorporation was a single event or a series of events.
In this paper, I argue that current scholarship fails to support Wallerstein's version of incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the capitalist world-economy. I examine Wallerstein's arguments and critique his discussion based on my own interpretation of recent work by Ottoman and Balkan historians pertaining to Rumelia (Southeastern Europe).
According to Wallerstein, a world-economy is a single social economy containing multiple state or political structures that operates on the basis of a capitalist mode of production and in which ceaseless accumulation of capital guides the system. Wallerstein recently added the word "ceaseless" (his italics) to his definition in order to distinguish his paradigm of the capitalist world-economy with its origins in the sixteenth century from other paradigms that trace the origins to earlier points in history.
The capitalist world-economy comprises a core, a periphery, and a semiperiphery. Nation-states reach the core by successfully exploiting other geographic areas in the periphery. The semiperiphery forms a buffer zone, where geographic areas can move up into the core or down into the periphery. Geographic areas outside the world-economy are relegated to the external arena. They are eventually and inevitably incorporated into the system, however.
Shaw, Stanford Jay, and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Cambridge University Press
From the 18th century through the beginning of the 19th century, European influence was a significant force in various aspects of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Iran. Although the reforms, coined primarily by Gelvin as “defensive developmentalism,” were initially intended to centralize governmental control and strengthen the military, the actual effects were much broader. Based on varying pre-existing conditions and unique approaches to governorship, this process of modernization affected each region differently. This essay will explore the manners in which European influence shaped each territory, the primary areas of civilization, politics and culture that experienced reform, and the degree to which that influence was significant, or in the case of Iran, insignificant.
MCPHEE, PETER. "Jacobins." Europe 1789-1914: Encyclopedia of the Age of Industry and Empire. Ed. John Merriman and Jay Winter. Vol. 3. Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2006. 1205-1206. Gale World History In Context. Web. 27 Mar. 2011.
However these were not the only aspects that saw the emergence of capitalism, there were also other coalescence events hat also saw the emergence of capitalism such as itinerant merchants, who were merchants that traveled long distances to sell good town to town. Itinerant merchants bought commerce and commercial intercourse to Europe which had sunk to trade less memorial stagnation, also allowed economic interdependence to form.
Clow, Kate. "Ottoman Empire." Encyclopedia of Modern Asia. Ed. Karen Christensen and David Levinson. Vol. 4. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002. 398-401. World History in Context. Web. 30 Apr. 2014.
For hundreds of years before European intervention, the Ottoman Empire had controlled or annexed most of the Arabic people. However; few states did exist, mostly on the Saudi Arabian peninsula, they possessed minimal forms of government and rule, existing in small tribal states. Despite the immense territorial possessions of the Ottoman Empire, it began to decline with a series of military defeats beginning in the 16th century. Most of their fleet was wiped with a loss of 210 ships and 30,000 men killed1, and the event is often cited by Historians as the ‘end of Turkish supremacy in the Mediterranean’2, and the turning point of Ottoman conquest and rule. It wasn’t until the end of the 19th century that the Ottoman Empire became the ‘sick man’ of Europe. The dynasty had long suffered from corruption, inflation, and its territorial possessions began to reject Ottoman rule. One area where this is most relevant is in the Arabic peninsula. Following nationalist trends in Europe, and especially the Ottoman Empire, Arab nationalism grew in the beginning of the 20th century. The ideology believed ‘that nations from Morocco to the Arabian Peninsula are united by their common linguistic, cultural and historical heritage.’3 The growing anti-Ottoman rule sentiment grew,
Hooker, Richard. "The Ottomans: The 17th and 18th Centuries." Washington State University - Pullman, Washington. 1996. Web. 06 Apr. 2011. .
Ultimately, by the time of Peter Romanov in the late seventeenth century, Russia had done little to keep up with the modernizing European continent. Technologically and culturally, it fell centuries behind. It had no Renaissance, no Reformation, no Scientific Revolution. It’s as if Russia was stuck in the European Middle Ages. Its army and navy lagged miserably behind, its Orthodox clergy govern education, there was no quality literature or art of which to tell, and even no emphasis on maths or science. In Western Europe, the seventeenth century was the time of Galileo and Newton, Descartes and Locke. It was a century of a growing merchant division. Rural peasants moved to growing cities for new work. As serfhood faded off in the West, it was growing in the Russia inherited by Peter Romanov. And while Western Europe, with its numerous warm-water passageways, sailed the seas and brought in unprecedented profits from subjugated colonies, Russia pushed eastward, finding nothing but frigid shore, cold taiga, and the remnants of a deformed Mongolian Empire that had depended more on plunder than infrastructure.
Capitalism can be found in relatively every country and can be characterized in a majority of ways. It’s defined as an economic system based on private ownership of the means of production and their profit. A few features of modern capitalism include market relations, pursuit of a profit and competition. With capitalism controlling the majority of the world’s economy, It’s important to identify the beginnings of this economic system. Capitalism through trade and interaction between empires such as The Ming dynasty, Mughal India and Europe aided in funding and expanding the empires as well as planted a basis of our modern capitalistic society.
The Ottoman Empire reached the peak of its power in the 1500s. While other empires were experiencing their downfalls, the Ottoman Empire’s power seemed to be increasing. In fact, this empire can be ranked as the strongest power due to its tactical internal organization of power, minorities, and religion, due to its physical expansion which provided more resources, more advancements, and more people to support the empire, and due to its large military strength that provided security, reduced rebellion, and challenged the other powers.
While taking the class of Early Modern European History there was two states that really stuck out and peaked my interest the most. They were the Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe. If you compare and contrast both the Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe during the 16th Century through the 18th Century, you will see that there are a number of similarities as well as differences when you look at the expansion of the states. You will also see many of these contrasts as well when you look in terms of each states military and commerce. Although the Ottoman Empire existed before the 16th century and continued to exist past the 18th century and in great decline until the early 20th century, when looking at the state as a whole the time period of 1500’s through the 1700’s is a period of growth and strength. It is perhaps even known as a golden era for the state, when taking in to comparison the Early Modern Europeans where the same time period marks a change in how society thought and how people were treated.
Much like that of the Byzantines before them, the Ottoman Empire served as a link between Europe and Asia, and greatly benefited from the profits of the exchange that was perennially flowing over these geographic boundaries; this era came to be known as the Golden Age of the Ottoman Empire. Although there can be many identifications and definitions for the means by which the Ottoman Empire was able to exert such a powerful degree of influence, military right, and cultural dynamism. It will be the purpose of this analysis to discuss and analyze the means by which a continual process of centralization can ultimately be understood as one defining force, that allowed the Ottoman Empire to thrive throughout this period of the “Golden Age.”
Wallerstein dedicates a large part of his analysis to specify what he thinks are signs of the transformative stage that societies will endure. He states that the world’s scarce resources will eventually limit the capitalist system to few to none options for expansion. There are simply no large new resources to exploit. Secondly, Wallerstein explains the concept of “hegemonic cycles” which he claims is the reason behind the difficultly of establishing a central power in the world to endure capitalism. “What is meant by hegemony in a world-economy is the ability of one state to impose a set of rules in the operation f...
Globalisation goes back as far as the era before the First World War. During that time globalisation’s general tendencies produced a very uneven pattern of global economic development, exposing the limits of global economic integration. For example, the integration of the African economy into the capitalist economy is part of the globalising tendencies of capitalism.
An outstanding mechanism frequently used to interpret ‘Globalization’ is the ‘World Economy’. Back to the colonial age, the coinstantaneous behaviors of worldwide capitals and energy resources flowed from colonies to western countries has been regarded as the rudiment of the economic geography (Jürgen and Niles, 2005). Nowadays, the global economy was dominated by transnational corporations and banking institutions mostly located in developed countries. However, it is apparently that countries with higher level of comprehensive national strength are eager for a bigger market to dump surplus domestic produce and allocate energy resources in a global scale, thus leads to a world economic integration. This module was supported by several historical globalists (Paul Hirst, Grahame Thompson and Deepak Nayyer) ‘their position is that globalization is nothing new but more fashionable and exaggerate, a tremendous amount of internationalization of money and trade in earlier periods is hardly less than today.’ (Frans J Schuurman 2001:64).