Most important is the function that the presumed ancestry plays in maintaining the present for the group-its core myths and beliefs systems that serve to provide cohesion for the present. It may be emphasized that these myths and beliefs systems are not only important to ensure the continuity of the group, but also making the past a living and vital part of the present, where accuracy of the memories of the past are less important than the memories themselves. For example the Khasi Origin Myth of Ki Hynniew Trep (The Seven Huts) is constantly being referred too, in order to build and enhance identity consciousness. The Khasis refer to themselves as the people of the Hynniew Trep, believing and building upon the myth’s believability. These myths or what the Khasis refer to as Khanatang, are important part of what constitutes ‘oral literature’ among the Khasis-having been the building blocks upon which rituals, traditions and the Khasi identity have been constructed upon.
Arguably, since actions are caused by a desire or a specific need, which are derived from our character whilst our character is shaped by our heredity and the environment we occupy, therefore no person can be a first mover ("Freedom and Determinism"). A first mover (primum mobile) refers to a person who does an original act which is independent of any previous action or cause. Determinism argues that any event has a source beyond human control therefore free will does not
However, it is entirely up to the end user, be it an administrator, or a home web-surfer to apply these concepts. The moral and ethical use of information technology is absolutely vital as the rapid expansion of information technology continues. In the words of Richard Mason: “Our moral imperative is clear. We must insure that information technology, and the information it handles, are used to enhance the dignity of mankind. To achieve these goals, we must formulate a new social contract, one that insures everyone the right to fulfill his or her own human potential” (Mason,
Works Cited: Momaday, N. Scott. House Made of Dawn. Harper & Row: New York, 1968. The Man Made of Words. St. Martin's Press: New York, 1997.
The Rule of Evocation It is the goal of this essay to challenge the belief that one never transcends language — that all one knows, indeed all one can meaningfully experience, is defined within language. My challenge lies not in words, but in the use of words to evoke what is beyond language and to invite a lived experience of it. If one accepts this use of language as not only possible, but primary, we ultimately see meaning not within language, but through it. Under the 'rule of evocation' language need not in any way within itself express, reproduce, re-present, or capture what it evokes. It need simply evoke it, and such an evocation is not a re-presentation in language of what is evoked.
It is evident from studies such as Heider and Simmel (1944), that there appears to be an instinctive nature in people to introduce plots structures and narratives into all situations, with an intention to construct meaning to all aspects of life in its entirety. The value of narrative is that it is a tool that allows us to understand what it means to be human and gives us an insight into a person’s lived experience whilst still acknowledging their cultural and social contexts. Narrative is thought to be significance as it is ‘a fruitful organizing principle to help understand the complex conduct of human beings (p.49)’ (Sarbin, 1990) The construction of a person’s narrative is thought to be dependent on each person’s individual awareness of themselves and the circumstances that surround them. However, a debate to whether a person is able to formulate a valid narrative in the face of a mental illness such as schizophrenia has emerged. Sufferer’s symptoms are often thought to interfere with their abilities to perceive within a level deemed acceptable to their society’s norms and therefore the validity ... ... middle of paper ... ...chical concepts of the self affecting the internal dialogue and therefore verbalising second order narratives.
This is because he starts from what he immediately knows, which is our own consciousness and commences his analysis on the nature of the self from this standpoint. As he puts it, we cannot know whether the material world is an illusion created by an evil being. Therefore, starting from our own consciousness, which is what we are most certain of as existing beings, is the most proficient and sure way to arrive at truthful understandings of the self. On the other hand, Hume starts from matter, the truth of which we can never be certain. From this standpoint, he works backwards and concludes that a persistent self cannot exist since the matter he relies on to construct his argument about the self is impermanent and always changing.
Following Hume's recognition that we cannot in principle have any experience of an experience transcending objectivity as such, Husserl's Phenomenological Epoche (1) suspends judgement on whether or not such a realm of "things-in-themselves" exists. Thus our experiences of material objects and descriptions thereof can no more be shown to correspond to such an "objective" standard than can our experiences and descriptions of immaterial objects and conscious states. Consequently interpersonal and intercultural communications concerning the supposedly "public" objects etc. of the material world seem no less problematic than Wittgenstein (2) and others have shown communication concerning the "private" objects of the immaterial world (of fantasies, dreams etc.) to be.