How Private Must an Objectionably Private Language Be?
ABSTRACT: Some philosophers, taking their cue from Philosophical Investigations (PI) 243-315, suppose that a private language is objectionable only when its terms refer to Cartesian mental events. Others (notably Kripke) have focused on PI 201 and the surrounding remarks about rule following, and have explicated the notion of an objectionable private language as (roughly) that of a language used by just one isolated individual unsupported at any time by any source of external or community correction and approval. I attempt to defend Kripke's account against some objections proffered by Simon Blackburn. Blackburn supposes that individuals are no worse off than communities with respect to the difficulties raised by Kripke, and argues that the "paradox" of PI 201 can be avoided by a proper understanding of extended dispositions, and by grasping the possibility of private practices. But Blackburn misconstrues what it is to go on in the "same" way in following a rule, and ignores the place of constitutive rules in practices.
Some philosophers, taking their cue from Philosophical Investigations (PI) 243 - 315, suppose that a private language is objectionable only when its terms refer to Cartesian mental events. In this "strong" sense private languages are very private indeed. Others (notably Kripke, 1982) have focused on PI 201 and the surrounding remarks about rule following, and have explicated the notion of an objectionably private language as (roughly) that of a language used by just one isolated individual unsupported at any time by any source of external or community correction and approval. I think of this as a "weaker" sense of 'private language.'
In sec. 1 I attempt to defend the "Kripke - Wittgenstein" (henceforth 'KW') version of the private language argument against some objections proffered by Simon Blackburn. KW takes languages which are private in the weaker sense to be objectionable, and claims that the later discussion (PI 243 - 315) deals with a "special case" falling under the more general discussion of rule following in earlier sections. In section II I briefly consider some possible objections from Wittgenstein himself to my defense of Kripke.
I
"This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule"(PI 201). According to KW the reason any course of action could accord with the rule is that there is no fact about an individual to which he can point in justifying going on one way (in the application of a word, continuation of a number series, etc.
nature, and what is true of nature is true of action, if nothing prevents it. Now actions are
Rossian Pluralism claims that there are multiple things that we have basic, intrinsic moral reason to do, which he names as the prima facie duties. These duties are not real, obligatory duties that one must follow under all circumstances, but are “conditional duties” (Ross 754) that one should decide to follow or reject upon reflection of their circumstances. This moral theory has faced criticisms, most strongly in the form of the problem of trade-offs. However, I will demonstrate that the problem of trade-offs is an issue that can be neglected as a valid objection to Rossian Pluralism because it is applicable to other theories as well and it is a factor that makes a moral theory more valuable than not.
paradox, leaving no way of escaping from a dilemma. No matter what we do or say we
In the essay Public and Private language, Richard Rodriguez conveys how the English language changed his life and his relationships with others especially his family.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig; G. E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.). Philosophical Investigations. 4th edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Print.
In the article, “Public and Private Language”, Richard Rodriguez argues that bilingual education delays learning a “public language” and developing a public identity”. I can relate to Richard’s story because my family and me moved to America when I was young and we also had the same struggle learning a new language. I agreed with Rodriguez when he expressed that he didn’t feel like a true American until he mastered the English language because English is the first and main language in America.
Pre-conceived opinions are able to make people opposed highly to changing them as well, with the ideas sticking in Maycomb. The hierarchy or ...
The question of what constitutes morality is often asked by philosophers. One might wonder why morality is so important, or why many of us trouble ourselves over determining which actions are moral actions. Mill has given an account of the driving force behind our questionings of morality. He calls this driving force “Conscience,” and from this “mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right,” we have derived our concept of morality (Mill 496). Some people may practice moral thought more often than others, and some people may give no thought to morality at all. However, morality is nevertheless a possibility of human nature, and a very important one. We each have our standards of right and wrong, and through the reasoning of individuals, these standards have helped to govern and shape human interactions to what it is today. No other beings except “rational beings,” as Kant calls us, are able to support this higher capability of reason; therefore, it is important for us to consider cases in which this capability is threatened. Such a case is lying. At first, it seems that lying should not be morally permissible, but the moral theories of Kant and Mill have answered both yes and no on this issue. Furthermore, it is difficult to decide which moral theory provides a better approach to this issue. In this paper, we will first walk through the principles of each moral theory, and then we will consider an example that will explore the strengths and weaknesses of each theory.
Each section of this article will be explained in my own words, with the exception of some of the symbolic logic. Russell's own words are indicated by speech marks.
While maintaining a open look of this moral law, Lewis presents two objections one would present to the moral law: “The moral law is just herd instinct” and “Morality is just social convention. The moral law is not a herd instinct due to man’s choice to suppress stronger instincts in fa...
In his book, The Language of Thought, Jerry Fodor claims that i) Wittgenstein’s private language argument is not in fact against Fodor’s theory, and ii) Wittgenstein’s private language argument “isn’t really any good” (70). In this paper I hope to show that Fodor’s second claim is patently false. In aid of this I will consider Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (243-363), Jerry Fodor's The Language of Thought (55-97), as well as Anthony Kenny’s Wittgenstein (178-202). First I shall summarize Wittgenstein’s argument; then I will examine Fodor’s response and explain why it is fallacious. In my view, Fodor is wrong because he takes Wittgenstein to be a verificationist, and also because he makes a false analogy between people and computers.
Humanism is not a reductive policy which alters the individual viewpoint to fit in with those who have the power in society. Foucault, The Order of Discourse and Identity, inferred power is a technique or action which individuals can engage in. Power is not possessed; it is exercised. By which he meant a uniformity of being and ‘identity’ is communicated to others in your interactions with them, but it is not a fixed entity.’ Generally we accept the norms set by our societies completely without deviation.
Wittgenstein L. On Certainty G. E. M. Anscombe and Denis Paul editors (Oxford Blackwell, 1969)
The first formulation of the Categorical Imperative “act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” seems at face value viable. Nevertheless the lack of guidelines to determine which maxim should be used to describe an action causes problems with the consistency of the Universal Law formulation. Moreover, the abundance of false positives and false negatives suggests a deep problem with the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative that may not be fixable.
HIS essay presents the key issues surrounding the concepts of partiality and impartiality in ethical theory. In particular, it argues that the tension between partiality and impartiality has not been resolved. Consequently, it concludes that the request for moral agents to be impartial does demand too much. To achieve this goal, this essay consists of four main parts. The first part gives an overview of the concept of impartiality. The second deals with the necessity of impartiality in consequentialism and deontology. The third deals with the tension between partiality and impartiality (Demandingness Objection). Specifically, how a duty to perform supererogatory acts follows from impartial morality. The fourth and final part refutes positions that maintain that partiality and impartiality have been reconciled. Therefore, it demonstrates that current ethical theories that demand moral agents to behave in a strictly impartial fashion are unreasonable.