Happy Land Fire
A blaze at a illegal club leads to the arrest of ejected patron; who is a
suspect in setting New York's worst fire since the 1911 fire at the Triangle
Shirtwaist company.
In the early morning of Sunday March 25th 1990 in the Bronx a
devastating arson fire occurred at the Happy Land social club. A man named
Julio Gonzalez entered the happy Land social club located at 1959 southern
Boulevard in the Bronx , New York. At witch time Mr. Gonzalez was one of
estimated ninety patrons at this social club. After arguing with his EX-girl
friend who worked at the illegal social club and having a few adult drinks
he was ejected from the club bye the door men.
When he was ejected he stated that he will return! Know body took his
statement serious and business continued at the club. Mr. Gonzalez gathered
A one gallon plastic container before leaving the social club. At this time Mr.
Gonzalez walked to a near by gas station and filled the one gallon container
with gas. Then he traveled back to the Happy Land social club where he then
re-entered the club with the gasoline, poured it on to the floor and ignited it
with a few matches. Mr. Gonzalez quietly left the club and went to his
apartment a few blocks away.
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Ruben Valladarez A disc jockey for the Happy Land social club was
in the rear of the club on the second floor; playing music when somebody
yelled fire "I tuned on the lights and said in to the microphone that I got a fire
; everybody out". Mr. Valladarez descended a narrow flight of stairs and found
the first floor bar filled with flames. People were trying to get out of a door
but i...
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... I don't think this would have made a difference. Another factor was that the ceiling was lower then required by
code. With this and no windows it filled the area with smoke quicker ; given a less chance to get out.
This establishment was closed several times by the police, fire and building departments but reopened after they new that nobody else was going two come around for another check up to make sure it was still not operating.
In A final thought if the government agencies would have followed up on what there supposed to do ; this might of saved some lives. They also should not take all the blame for this though. If the landlord was having such a problem with tenant. He should of contacted the proper authorities and had him removed or correct the fire hazards. Unfortunately it takes thing like this two happen before laws are enforced or corrected.
The fire lasted only 12-14 minutes and killed 492 and injured 164, the reason for this is the building construction, occupancy, and interior design of the club. For better understanding the structure will be described in great detail.
...afety should have inspected the building prior to issuing permits for further renovation, especially knowing this structure was going to be housing 124 residents. It seems that lack of knowledge from prior owners and lack of responsibility of city officials are responsible for this collapse and sadly, the loss of 9 brave men in the line of duty. The Boston Fire Department could have worked closer with the owner/ construction crew at the Hotel Vendome, and the deficiencies would have been found, and they would have known the instability they were walking into on June 17. At that point, firefighting operations would have more than likely been defensive. The firefighters did not conduct pre-incident planning which would have let them know they were going to face the construction barriers while attempting to lay hose, maneuver hose, and get the hose to a water source.
Due to the size and age of the building (built before 1976), safety regulations said that the nightclub did not have to have a sprinkler system, and it thus did not have one. The fire originating on the stage quickly filled the club with toxic smoke from the burning polyurethane and other building materials. In the shear moment of panic, the people caused a scene of chaotic proportions: stampeding towards the only exit they knew—the way they got in. Over 400 people, all trying to get out one door at the same time, caused a massive pileup trapping the majority of people inside. Just prior to the fire department arriving on scene, the super heated gases trapped in the building ignited, causing what is called a “flashover”.
I think they did the right thing by charging him with manslaughter. His actions on the fire were not acceptable, he was not acting like a IC and was not doing his job at all. He killed four people because his actions and most likely his low level of training. If they had the correct PPE and working Equipment and Knew to follow the ten standard firefighting orders and the eighteen watch out situations they most likely would of all survived and never been in that situation of deploying there shelters.
Because the hotel was designed by Mudgett and not by a professional architect, the construction of the building would be deemed unsafe by inspectors out of pure lack of architectural knowledge; the building would be found to have many hazards to the customers, both intentional and unintentional. His building would have needed to be inspected before it could be used for commercial purposes and would have had a very hard time passing the inspection, thus preventing or at the least delaying it’s opening. The inspectors of the building would have found gas lines running throughout the structure and would have adamantly rejected the commercial use of the building due to its odd safety hazards. Inspectors of the building would also be wary of the surgical tables in an office with no reason behind medical accommodations in a hotel, only deepening their suspicions and increasing the likelihood of disapproving of the building’s commercial use. As if that wasn’t enough to warrant concern; the dynamics of the vault would prove inadequate for glass making purposes, the claimed purpose behind the vault. By the end of the inspection, the building would have a number of safety issues that would have to be resolved before it could be opened and the inspection itself would likely result in contact with the police due to the abnormalities inside the
the fire they moved the rope back and forth so that the wood would get hot and start to burn.
On March 25, 1911, 146 garment factory workers their lives in a fire at the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory in New York City. In less than an hour, these workers died from asphyxiation, burns, or jumping to their deaths in a futile attempt at escape (McGuire, 2011). The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory the eighth through tenth floors of New York City’s Asch building, and employed approximately 700 workers, 500 of them young women and girls (McGuire, 2011). A fire quickly broke out on the eighth floor shortly before the end of the work day. Loose fabric was strewn about the floor and stuffed under equipment, providing kindling for the fire to quickly become an inferno. As women attempted to exit, they were met with locked doors and forced to find other means of escape, including jumping from the eight floor windows, climbing down elevator cables, and scampering down the fire escape - each route of escape tragically failed, costing many their lives. The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire is an example of how quickly dangerous and neglectful conditions can quickly take many lives, but it has also served as the impetus for great changes in workplace and fire safety codes and regulations, including the development of Fire Safety Codes, implementation of state-based worker’s compensation laws, and the formation of New York State’s Industrial Code. The impacts of these changes and many others are still felt today, more than 100 years later. There is, however, still work to be done in the area of workplace fire safety, as evidenced in the Kader Toy Factory fire and the Imperial Chicken Processing Plant fire.
As a result, “half the workers in Manhattan toiled on the seventh floor or above—which was at least one floor higher than the city fire department could easily reach” (48). When the New York Fire Department was unable to save many of the trapped victims of the Triangle fire, blame was placed on the fire department “for failing to insist on adequate safety measures” (179). Though, the NYFD was known for being the one of the top fire departments of the time, and those victims would have had a greater chance of survival if there were more adequate means of evacuation or if evacuation had been practiced in the form of a fire
picked up some dirt from the fire place and threw it up in the air and
got away. he would come back in a better mood to be with his father.
This horrible incident took place in a theater where the audience was cast of 2000 women and children. School had been out for Christmas and that gave incentive to many of them to show up to the Wednesday matinee performance of Mr. Blue beard. Later during half way of the show, a spark from a spotlight fell down onto the curtains which caused the fire to start, having the curtain fall down onto those on the stage. The crowd bolted out in chaos, even though there were 27 exits, only a few were open for the audience and actors to storm out of there. This is because that the doors were locked, and the idea of having exits specifically for this type of situation had only originated after the terrible incident. The flame on the curtain grew due to the excessive amount of fuel it had (the stage). Nearly 600 (above 25%) had died inside the theater because of this faulty emergency escape structuring. Many then later died to severe burn injuries in the hospitals. Apparently, there were no fire detection nor suppression systems installed in the theater; the curtains didn’t close properly, the heat vents weren’t working well, the doors were either locked or didn’t open in the proper direction, and nor did they have any type of indication for those who were further away from the theater to easily look for the door. All these violations have placed the manager’s under indictment. But none of them were ever punished. And because of the mass amount in causalities, doors were then rigged so that they can open from the inside no matter what the situation was, and signs were placed on top of them indicating that doors were this direction ( as law would mandate it).
On the inside of the club door a large notice is pinned up. The notice
It's is still unknown to exactly what caused this fire to start. Due to the ground being dry and the houses and building being constructed of wood, the fire consumed the area rapidly. When the fire broke out and fire fighters were dispatched they were sent to a different location by accident. Fire fights that arrived were exhausted from a large fire from the previous day. The fire had consumed the city and was so wide spread the firefighters were unable to control the fire.
The people soon noticed that not only were there bundles of clothes falling, but those ‘bundles of clothes’ were actually some of the young workers jumping and falling from the window seals. The outburst of the fire was horrible, with women falling through the ceiling while others taking their lives by jumping out the windows. Female workers found themselves in trouble when they tried to open the ninth floor doors to the Washington Place stairs, but the doors appeared to be locked. On the other hand, some of the women on the eighth floor were able to push the open the door to the stairway to escape the fire into a narrow elevator (14).... ...
Near closing time on Saturday afternoon, March 25, 1911, in New York City a fire broke out on the top floors of the Asch Building in the Triangle Shirtwaist Company. One of the worst tragedies in American history it was know as the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire. It was a disaster that took the lives of 146 young immigrant workers. A fire that broke out in a cramped sweatshop that trapped many inside and killed 146 people.