While their support of these nations definitely hurts the West’s security, Russia had no other option after NATO took all of the former Soviet republics under its wing, undermining the Russian influence. NATO also overstepped their bounds during the Kosovo crisis leaving Russia troubled due to their once formidable influence on the UN Security Council being negated by NATO’s unilateral movements. Finally, the military reform of the late 1990’s was defensive in nature as it was meant to be a deterrent to NATO expansion. Looking back historically on Russia, they want collective security and fear isolation and vulnerability. NATO expansion takes away their sphere of influence in Europe and also leaves them boxed in at the corner of the map, forcing them to take a defensive stance.
Russian attempts to consolidate its power in Caucasus proved to be bloody. In 1994, Russia launched its first military assault on Chechnya to prevent its secession from Russia. The first Chechen war lasted for two years and was a military and political defeat for Russia, but it weakened the Chechen government’s authority and left it in a ... ... middle of paper ... ...011 Ariel Cohen, Robert E. Hamilton, The Russian Military And The Georgia War: Lessons And Implications, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 2 Ariel Cohen, Robert E. Hamilton, The Russian Military And The Georgia War: Lessons And Implications, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), iii Lasha Tchantouridzé The New Russian-European Condominium: Re-evaluating Canada’s Defence Commitments to Europe. Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 11, No.
The March 16th referendum is contested, in light of the absence of international monitors. While the West paints Russia’s soft annexation of Crimea as a violation of international law, the Russians posit that Crimea wanted to break from a country they considered hostile. The Ukrainian central government considers this a violation of international law. In the end, with the help of a Russian military intervention, Crimea successfully severed ties. These sort of intrusive actions aren’t necessarily new for Moscow.
The Russian government managed to keep its control of all states apart from Chechnya, which, under the new president Dzhokhar Dudayev, declared independence in October 1991. The Russian Government did not approve this and President Yeltsin declared war against the newborn regime in 1994. Yeltsin feared that if they had not declared war the other Caucasus states may have followed suit, to prevent this they preferred to curb it at the out set. The second Chechen war, which began in September 1999, was a result of the actions taken by Russia in the first war and was a product of the same policies. The fight for independence for Chechnya has been ongoing since the Bolshevik Revolution and is one that will be fought well into the future if something is not done about it now.
The Ukraine is very important to Russia economically, militarily and historically. In recent months, Russia has gone to extreme measures to protect its interests, whether it is persuasion or brute force. Despite Russia’s aggression, the Ukraine should resist moving backward into a murky alliance with Russia and strike out in a new, freer direction by building a stronger alliance with the Europe Union. Before the Ukraine crisis even started, Russia and Ukraine have had an on-going history for over 1000 years. The relationship between these two countries has had its ups and downs including the recent bloodshed where several pro-Russian militants were killed by Ukrainian military forces.
After becoming Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev had plans to “reform” many aspects of communism in Russia as well as its satellite states that jeopardized the Soviet Union 's longevity (Kalashnikov, p.77). Gorbachev would be the first leader of many since Leonid Brezhnev that came before him to critically consider the economic hardships and issues that Russia and its satellite states were facing. It can also be stated that Gorbachev was “unwilling to use military force” to resolve issues as seen in later political conflicts that plagued Russia and its satellite states (Todd, p.198). The consequences that came from Gorbachev’s decisions whether he knew it at the time or not was that they would create more political turmoil for the Soviet Union due to him not using force to maintain his dominance in Russian politics, control satellite states, or display Soviet presence globally similar to previous leaders before him for the self-preservation of the Soviet Union. From the realists’ perspective a connection can be made between Gorbachev’s decisions to not use force over concerns of ethics and morale, and the dismantling of the Soviet Union leaving the USSR vulnerable in various national aspects such as economics, politics, and global influence, along with the global perception of the
The cartoon is a response to Vladimir invading Ukraine and Obama making opposing to Vladimir; however Vladimir doesn't listen and it is becoming explicit that the target of Leah’s cartoon is Russia. Leah puts forward the point of view that, because Russia is big, powerful country, Russia can do anything they want. This message is conveyed mainly through the techniques of visual metaphor, allusion and symbolism. Leah carton works on the assumption that if the conflict of Vladimir and Obama continue, history may repeat itself. A major technique the cartoonist used is allusion.
Therefore the people living in Russia were not heard through the Duma, and ... ... middle of paper ... ... the war and the conditions they were in. This made the demonstration of 1917 different from anything that had happened before because for the first time the Tsar had to fight against his own army. As a conclusion I suggest that the war was the main cause of the Russian Revolution. It is the origin of all the further problems that were facing Russia at the time. If there had not been a war then perhaps the Tsar could have concentrated on the co-operation with the Duma and could have resulted changes for the better in Russia.
The main difference between the two wars was the catalyst for the war, but the underlying reasons for going to war were very similar. President Boris Yeltsin decided to invade Chechnya due to a perceived need to demonstrate that the Russian government was strong and capable of suppressing such an uprising. Yeltsin had a political agenda in which the priority was to institute a federal state where local governments took on a larger role compared to the former soviet state (Hughes, “From Federalisation to Recentralisation,” p. 129). Yeltsin was decentralizing power by granting more legislative powers to the regional governments, but Yeltsin still needed political support from the regional governors in order to pass legislation in the upper house of the Duma (Zhuravskaya, “Federalism in Russia,” p. 61). So Yeltsin started granting selective concessions to carefully... ... middle of paper ... ...r’s position.
(“Lašas”). It was spurred when Georgian forces responded to attacks by secessionists i... ... middle of paper ... ...ernational affairs and government, on his take on the result of the Russo-Georgian War, “Russia's actions have distanced the country from Western institutions. But the deeper worry is that the Kremlin and average Russians can now imagine a world in which they do not have to care.” (“King”) Works Cited King, Charles. "The Five-Day War." Foreign Affairs.