Therefore, when the theory is broken down, mental states are associated with the states of the Turing-machine, which on its own is defined as a machine table that mentions inputs and outputs that are not explored in the mind (Block, pg. 212). Additionally, functionalism empathizes that characterization of mental states ought to include descriptions of inputs and outputs in both it... ... middle of paper ... ...e to claim that objects that were created by humans, including robots, wire and metal structures and series of computer networks could and do possess qualia. Once people have reached the highest nirvana in the limits of consciousness and can create a consciousness device to measure its depths among classes of humans and non-humans, then functionalism can be shelved and rejected if it is the case that a robot does not contain qualia. Until then, however, functionalism needs to be carefully considered and not disregarded for its merits in the problem of mental states.
Thus, token physicalism does not place physical restrictions on the type of substance capable of having mental properties. When the points of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, as described here, are combined, functionalism is the result. The theory of functionalism supposes that a m... ... middle of paper ... ...whether the simulation of mental processes resulting from a computer program are real mental processes? At the end of chapter two, Searle summarizes his criticism of functionalism in the following way. The mental processes of a mind are caused entirely by processes occurring inside the brain.
Functionalists want to individuate mental states causally, but since mental states have mental effects, functionalist advance on behaviorism by acknowledging some similar input and output systems have similar descriptions without entailing similar mental effects. Functionalism, as an advancement of behaviorism, also describes the function of the mental state. The Absent Qualia Argument’s counterexample suggests functionalism is susceptible to similar problems behaviorism faces. The additional requirement functionalism holds, namely functionally equivalent internal states, mental states possibly differ. Block argues it is plausible to not only have type identical behavior states, but also functionally equivalent mental states.
Then only the degree of perception’s independance from consciousness would distinguish his theory from Merleau-Ponty’s. Currently, both theories can account for the substantive, outward, behavior of humans. Only the procedural behavior, the internal process, differentiates the theories. The conundrum of deciding between the theories is resolvable by an empirical critical experiment. While this will require more knowledge of cognitive psychology, current evidence suggests that Merleau-Ponty was correct and the mind is less encapsulated than Fodor's original claim.
Behaviorism believes being in a mental state is the same as a physical state, which is an observable behavioral characteristic. For instance, if one claims they are unhappy, their physical state could include a frowning face or improper posture. On the other hand, the Identity Theory suggests when you experience something; there is a corresponding neurological state. The error with these two theories is Behaviorism fails to incorporate mental states but attempts to by saying the mental state is the observable behavior (Southwell). However, different behaviors can occur from the same stimuli and different stimuli can initiate the same reaction.
Behaviorism believes being in a mental state is the same as a physical state, which is a noticeable behavioral characteristic. For instance, if one claims they are unhappy, there physical state could include a frowning display or inappropriate posture. On the other hand, the Identity Theory suggests when one experiences something; there is a corresponding neurological condition. The error with these two theories is Behaviorism fails to incorporate mental states but attempts to by saying the mental state is the observable behavior (Southwell). However, different behaviors can arise from the same stimuli and different stimuli can initiate the same reaction.
The fact that compulsive behavior rituals often involve cleanliness shows that there is mental fixation during a period of mastering unclean bowel movements. Behaviorists believe that in anxiety disorders the individual is not “fixated” but they have a conditioned fear that does not involve oedipal complexes or displacement. The theory of classical conditioning says that phobias are the result of learned associations of neutral stimuli and frightening events. This also demonstrates why an individual might have a phobia of guns after being shot by one. Biological theorists believe that people with anxiety disorders have unusually responsive autonomic systems that are more easily aroused by environmental stimuli.
As in the case of pain, they are concerned with a mental state called pain, and not of particular pains (i.e. stomach-ache, pin-pricks, etc.). But, according to Putnam, if the Physicalists does indeed attributes the name "physical states" to the enormous number of mental states we humans have, then, I think it would be impossible for them to be concerned only with the type and not the tokens. But once they started to consider each specific pain (token), they will have to ascribe a different physical-chemical state to each token-state. Ultimately, the common thing "to all pains in virtue of which they are pains (Block, p. 172)" cannot be put in terms of a single physical state.
A dualist may respond with a type of property dualism (epiphenomenalism or interacionism) by saying that mental states supervene on brain states. Therefore, if the brain is damaged, particular mental states will have no supervienence base, and the mind will be affected. This seems to save the duali... ... middle of paper ... ...r differences between particular humans and changes within one particular brain. One obvious example of this objection is that stroke victims lose brain function and the mental states associated with them, but in time they are able to relearn mental states using different parts of their brain. This certainly discounts the fact that one mental state is identical to one brain state.
Functionalist theory holds that the condition for being in a mental state should be given by the functional role of that state, this is, in terms of the standard causal relationships, rather than by supposed intrinsic functions of that state (Honderich, 1995). The role is normally visualised as being specified in terms of which mental states typically produce it and which other states and behavioural outputs will typically be produced by it when the state interacts with further mental states and perceptual inputs (Honderich, 1995). For example; Different pains we experience are normally caused by some sort of sustained bodily damage, and tend to result in avoidance behaviour (Routlege, 2000). The theory forged by David Armstrong and Hilary Putnam, improves on behaviourism as it identifies that behaviour results from mental states, it allows that the term for the state, for example ‘S’s pain’, to refer to a real condition that has a functional role (Honderich, 1995). The first formulation of a functionalist theory of the mind was proposed by Putnam, it was inspired by thought of the mind in rel... ... middle of paper ... ...ates, means the mind is multiply realisable in not only biological living organisms as discussed earlier, but within non biological-systems such as computers as argued by Putnam.