Frederick II, the Great of Prussia

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Frederick II, the Great, overcame the resource limitations within Prussia by mastering three aspects of the western way of war: the ability to finance war, possessing a highly disciplined military, and an aggressive mindset toward achieving quick decisive victory, which established Prussia as a major European power. Frederick II accomplished this feat while being surrounded by powerful neighbors that possessed larger populations, armies, and financial excess. His initial assessment on the state of his Prussian inheritance from his personal writings follows:
…cast your eyes over the map, and you will see that the greatest part of my territories is dispersed…cannot mutually assist each other… A third at least of my dominions lies in waste; another third is in woods, waters, or marshes.
…third which is cultivated, produces nor wine, nor olives, nor mulberry-trees.

Prussian economic policy used an internal revenue system of various taxes and tolls with the sole purpose of supporting a standing army. Realizing the limited resource base that Prussia had to draw upon, Frederick II achieved a synergistic resourcing effect through his choice of strategic objectives, limiting his internal recruiting base, and using his peacetime military for social gain. The resource rich state of Silesia remained Frederick the Greats’ primary strategic objective, possession of it would drastically increase the economic capacity of Prussia.
The Prussian Army relied upon the service of mercenaries and by plan, minimized the use of townspeople from the Prussian sovereigns to fill any remaining requirements, and only required short service terms. This manning approach had two economic benefits; it maximized the number of people left in the w...

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...er civilizations, its use by Frederick II is what secured Prussian power and him the title of Frederick the Great.
Armies of the day aligned their forces in long linear formations that once in place, where very difficult to control. The oblique order was a version of a flank attack in which Frederick II would fix one end of the enemy formation and then flank an assaulting force around with deadly effect.

Works Cited

Heinrich Von Treitschke, The Confessions of Frederick the Great and the Life of Frederick the Great (Maryland: Wildside Press LLC, 2010) 37-38.
Margaret Shennan, The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia (New York: Routledge, 1995) 31.
Claus Telp, The Evolution of Operational Art 1740-1813: from Frederick the Great to Napoleon (New York: Routledge, 2005) 7.
Geoffrey Parker, The Cambridge History of Warfare (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 181.

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