Then a proposition is deduced that the man who get the job has 10 coins in his pocket. So, Smith is now justified in believing in this proposition. But in the end, Smith is the one who gets the job and he also has 10 coins in his pocket, but he doesn’t notice this. In this case, the proposition that is suggested by Smith is true because the man who get the job, who is Smith, really has 10 coins in his pocket, but he just gets this right by luck as he thought that Jones will be the one who get the job at the very beginning. Therefore, this is a justified true belief but not knowledge.
Williams’ case for relativism is very different than Schafer’s relativism; this is the main reason why notional confrontation is not just resisting moral disagreement. In every system what is right or wrong differs but one’s own acceptance or rejection of certain propositions does not depend on the system (Williams, Pg. 225). Williams does not explicitly say this, but he must say this in order to assert that one can convert from one system to another, and that systems employ right and wrong to certain propositions. Yet Williams claims that the “more remote [a system] is from being a real option for us, the less substantial [the question] of whether it is ‘true’ or ‘right’, etc.” (Williams, Pg.
My response is that even if you are unable to interpret the speaker’s intention, by stating that there is no fact about meaning is fallible. Regardless of one being able to interpret the speaker’s intention does not necessarily mean that there is no meaning behind the utterance of, say for example “gavagai.” Whatever the meaning of “gavagai” may be is solely dependent upon the speaker’s use and intention. Hence, the argument of the skeptic will not go through, and so this line of response to my argument fails. In conclusion, I have argued that the skeptical claim of there being no fact about meaning is fallible In the accounts of both Kripke and Quine, Quine’s skeptical claim falls as a slightly more worrisome than that of Kripke’s and to dissolve his claim, I provided a possible suggestion that can assist him out of his own ditch.
In either case, we do not have free will and hence should not be held morally responsible for our actions. However, the fault is this: it is unclear whether his idea of moral responsibility is the correct one as he fails to demonstrate this. This will therefore offset his argument, because of the possibility of many views of moral responsibility, which I will discuss
Cultural Relativism and the Divine Command Theory both had a tough time explaining why culture and God had the rights to state what is considered moral behavior. Especially when you lay your trust on God to guide you on what is moral or not, you face dangerous risks because there is a possibility that God is just a make-believe person up in the sky. Hence, humans who follow God’s words can misinterpret his meanings and cause immoral behavior in society. On the other hand, Ethical Relativism appeals to an authority that is present on this in this world, society and cultures. Nevertheless, society and cultures should not be relied on to indicate moral and immoral behavior because it is questionable to believe that our actions become moral just for the reason that our culture or society accepts them as normal.
Ethical egoism is a mistaken theory in that it leads to logical contradictions (Rachels p.87). If one were to protect one’s interest that would require one to prevent another from carrying out their duty to their self, it would be both right and wrong to do so. However that is not logical and self-contradictory, thus not would not be basing conduct on reason. To reiterate, the theory of ethical egoism states that one should put his or her own needs before others, this fails the second part of the minimum conception of morality. Furthermore in advocating that one treat others in differently when there are no factual differences is unjustifiable and makes this an arbitrary doctrine.
His counterclaims to some theories are rather redundant and weak. He clearly disagrees with Nietzsche’s take on truth, but did not provide convincing backup claims to defend his position of why the question “What is truth?” is unnecessary. In addition, Lynch’s argument towards the redundancy theory is also not clear and satisfactory enough because simply dismissing objections as blind generalizations gives a sense that he has nothing better to say to defend his position. One of the theories mentioned believes that power is the source of motivation behind truth to which I have to disagree. There are many factors, like self-interest, morality, and knowledge, that motivate the will to truth and power is only one of the many and cannot be used as the overarching factor.
Despite Mill's conviction that act-utilitarianism is an acceptable and satisfying moral theory there are recognized problems. The main objection to act-utilitarianism is that it seems to be too permissive, capable of justifying any crime, and even making it morally obligatory to do so. This theory gives rise to the i... ... middle of paper ... ...absent in the utilitarian standpoint. Ergo, rule- utilitarianism does not allow for an individual's freewill because it tells one to examine others rules, or beliefs and not one's own. Thereby conforming to sociality.
Is it ever justified for us to believe in anything on insufficient evidence? William Clifford and Joseph Long have different answers to this question. Clifford thinks that it is always morally wrong because we have a moral obligation to exam our beliefs epistemically. On the contrary, Long argues that there are prudent values to believe something without absolute justification, therefore, it is permissible to do so. To illustrate Clifford’s and Long’s point of views, Luke Skywalker in Star Wars could be an example in deciding whether to believe the Force or not.
Plato’s non-natural Forms and the commands of a non-natural divinity would also avoid the difficult task of deriving values from natural, physical facts that ethical naturalism faces. Philosophers (not least of all Ruse) commonly proclaim that Moore’s application of the naturalistic fallacy hinges on the is/ought distinction. For Moore, we cannot derive moral statements from non-moral statements because "‘good’ is indefinable, or, as Prof. Sidgwick says, an ‘unanalysable notion’" (Moore 1903: 17). This would imply of course that any attempt whatsoever to define or analyze a moral term such as ‘good’ in other terms is fallacious. Moore concedes that we can analyze moral words in terms of each other but all reductions of moral terms will ultimately reduce to ‘good’ and ‘bad’.