The theory’s problems start arising when you start to think “why do our actions become moral if society or our culture approves of them?” There is also nothing in the theory of Cultural Relativism that explains why normal behavior in a society is considered the moral behavior instead of the other way around. Thus, morality is decided on a random basis there is nothing that says what makes normal behavior moral. The Divine Command Theory and Cultural Relativism both share this weakness that discredits
If the world did not have goodwill, then one may argue that no good can exist. Because people would not be willing to do good things unless for their own purposes. Harrison claims that,“A Kantian follower would say that the maxims are important because it gives us all a foundation for the differences between being morally good or bad”. If one can do an action in some sort that can be put into a universal maxim. Therefore, you are acting ethically.
In the article Moral Luck, Thomas Nagel is defending his definition of moral luck and opposing Kant’s view of moral luck. Kant believes that moral luck is the good will and to do our duty by the reasons for our actions. Nagel believes that this theory is too simple. Nagel’s view of moral luck is when outside factors that are out of our control are considered to be reasons for moral judgements whether the actions are good or bad. Good and bad luck should not influence our moral judgement of a person and their actions.
Above all we desire a meaning to life. We can find meaning by acting morally. Therefore, one is not obligated to obey a law that contradicts morality. After all, it would be morally wrong of the government to deny anyone meaning in life. Works Cited * Singer, Peter.
For Kant, people have to do what is right because it is the right thing to do, without taking into consideration personal opinion. On the other hand, mill’s theory would agree with the idea of non-subjectivity but not on the same terms as Kant. Mill would argue that if something brings happiness to the general public but not to the individual, it would still be considered the right thing to do. Both authors do not believe in the idea of virtue theory. However, their reasons are parallel to each other.
“Morality is not the doctrine of how we may make ourselves happy, but how we may make ourselves worthy of happiness”. Two things that are not compatible are what an individual should do and what the individual wants to do. When an individual does what they want to do they end up in a road that will lead them into immediate happiness but will not benefit them in the long run. On the other hand when the individual is doing what they should do it will bring them a feeling of discomfort and unhappiness but will benefit them at the end. The purpose of Kantianism is to tell us that morality is not to make us happy but the whole purpose is to do the right thing just for the sake of doing it.
This is not the point of Kant’s theory however, because he does not look at consequences for determining moral law, but rather at maxims. In order to determine what may produce more or less harm, it is true we would need to know the consequences of our actions. But, sometimes we cannot be sure of our consequences, and thus when we look at our intentions we can know if we are acting fairly (without deception or coercion) and decide on an action that would be moral based on a maxim of good will. O’Neil does point out that it is possible for a society to endure more pain in effort to protect individuals from being used as a mere means, yet they are doing so in a way to be the most fair, and therefore their actions can still be applied to the theme of giving everyone a fair value in life
Strawson argues that determinism, which is the idea that any and everything is predetermined and inevitable in nature, does not necessarily have to be true in order for us to claim that we are not morally responsible for any of our actions. In essence, whether or not there is an external force that determines our actions, we cannot be held morally responsible for being who we are. First, moral responsibility is deserving to be praised or blamed for one’s actions based on one’s moral obligations. By his standards, our predetermined fate is ultimately morally responsible for what we do and who we are. According to Strawson, free will is simply not real because that would result in us being truly responsible for our actions as a result of being able to exercise that will.
Because a dignity is something with immeasurable, or intrinsic value (like morality), it would be impermissible for someone adhering to the ideals of a good will to harm one. A good will is a will that follows the moral law, and it probably goes without saying that impairing something morally priceless and invaluable would not be doing that. Premise 3: If humans have intrinsic value, then that which humans need to function has intrinsic value. As humans are, obviously, not self-sustainable creatures, by definition, they are dependent on other components to survive. In the event that humans were to be characterized as having intrinsic value, the fact of their dependence would still remain.
In the late 1960’s and into the 1970’s, the South Asian region of East Bengal (then East Pakistan, now the country of Bangladesh) was undergoing a severe famine, due to rampant poverty, a civil war and frequent cyclones. The lack of overseas help to this impoverished region was probably what triggered Peter Singer to write the article Famine, Affluence and Morality, wherein he claims that world hunger and famine can be prevented and possibly eradicated if everyone in the wealthy nations did their bit to help the sufferers monetarily. Singer further claims that duty and charity should not be as distinct as they are now, and hints at uniting the two. Upon careful analysis of Singer’s paper, one can find multiple loopholes in this proposal, and can conclude that Singer’s idea, while crafted out of good intentions, is neither feasible nor correct. Before anything else though, it is essential to understand Singer’s argument.