If P is not a basic justified belief , but rather a nonbasic justified belief (meaning that these belief do not need support of other beliefs in order to be deemed true), it would have... ... middle of paper ... ...ss is “made-up” to achieve the desired results. How is one supposed to know which process to use in assessing a belief for reliability and justification if there might be an infinite amount of different processes to choose from? This is a major issue for reliabilists and there is no solution to this problem. Reliabilism appears to be a logical reasoning to why your beliefs might be justified, but without a proper, clear-cut, general theory, how is one supposed to know what processes to employ? And if you have beliefs that fit well with each other and make you to believe you beliefs are justified, then they are in fact justified?
If we were to use this form of induction, we would end up ... ... middle of paper ... ...ess my critique of sense data. One may argue that it is possible for sense data to be physical; that independence of self does not imply existence. One may also criticize the fact that my inference to the best conclusion argument still relies on some enumerative induction, allowing it to fall victim to Stace’s original claims about the ineffectiveness of induction. In short, it is quite clear that the inductive method of inference to the best conclusion does not give us enough justification to claim we know unperceived objects to ￼exist. However, through our example of the two worlds and proven inconsistencies in the concept of sense data, we have enough justification to believe in material objects.
Whether reasoning can expose truth is determined... ... middle of paper ... ... that can ever be certain is a philosophical idea called “Solipsism”. This theory determines that the only thing that can be known for sure is the self. I can be sure that I exist, and that I think. However, this theory also has its complications, because there can only be one solipsist. Therefore, there is no means of proving this hypothesis.
Therefore given a cause, the event must occur and couldn’t occur in any other way than it did. Whereas, the thesis of freewill is the view that as human beings, regardless of a cause, we could have acted or willed to act differently than we did. Determinism therefore, states that the future is something that is fixed and events can only occur in one way, while freewill leaves the future open. Obviously a huge problem arises between these two theses. They cannot both be true as they contradict one another.
Hume’s begins by describing the different kinds of statements that we can know to be true, or the way we can justify certain statements. He explains the difference between “Relation of Ideas”, and “Matter of Fact”. In the simplest of definition Hume’s describes “Relation of Ideas” as statements that can be known with absolute certainty by thought and by definition. “Matters of Fact” can not be known with the same degree of certainty, and are not known by thought or definition but rather depend upon how things actually are in the world. Hume’s argues against Induction: The principle of Induction teaches us that we can predict the future based on what has happened in the past.
This can however immediately have the reflexive argument turned on it and have the question begged of it: “If it is not possible to know anything then how is it you know that nothing is knowable ?”. Strong Scepticism is therefore unable to be defended. 3. A Definition of Knowledge Knowledge can be said to be information that the brain has received that meets a certain set of criteria. When someone states that they know something they must also believe that, that something is so.
The denotation of the word states a thing that is accepted as true or as certain to happen, without proof. Which basically means it’s not quite
Hume states that people believe that the future will resemble the past, but we have no evidence to support this belief. In this paper, I will clarify the forms of knowledge and reasoning and examine Hume’s problem of induction, which is a challenge to Justified True Belief account because we lack a justification for our beliefs. The problem of induction has a close relation with the inductive reasoning and such expression as “a posteriori”. There are two distinct methods of reasoning: deductive and inductive approaches. A deductive argument is the truth preserving in which if the premises are true than it follows that the conclusion will be true too.
W.V. Quine concurred with Duhem’s judgment, thus formulating the Duhem-Quine thesis in which states that it is impossible to test a hypothesis in isolation, because the empirical test of the hypothesis requires at least one or more background assumptions or auxiliary assumptions. In this paper I will argue that the Duhem-Quine thesis casts doubt on the logic of falsification and thus the decisive character of the crucial experiment. The outcome of an experiment is not predicted on the basis of a single hypothesis because auxiliary assumptions are involved as well. If the outcome of an experiment is not that in which was predicted, it is possible that the hypothesis is sound and the error lies in one or more of the auxiliaries.
Reality being based on a series of dependent... ... middle of paper ... ...for the existence of everything, is based around PSRb. If the principle was incorrect and there was no explanation for every single positive fact, the fifth premise would also be unable to hold the same claims as before and would deny the cosmological argument. This objection towards the Principle of Sufficient Reason also brings up an intriguing point. If the validity of PSR is at question, how can we even consider the Cosmological Argument as a viable argument? The premises are sound when supported by PSR, but if the principle is false, does it not invalidate the whole argument?