Particularism can be scrutinized for having many objections. Philosopher’s struggle to recognize that we can deal with the problem only by asking the question. If philosophers recognize this then is easy for us to pretend it isn’t true. To understand this more clearly if you think about the second question alone “how do we know?”. The way that someone knows “how” he or she know is by using what he or she know to help guide them.
This paper will discuss the differences between rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism, and whether or not the former is an adequate alternative to the latter with regards to consistency with ideas of right and wrong. This topic is particularly poignant because, like many philosophical questions, it does not have a definite answer, as both sides have their own deficiencies. Consequentialism, which is a segment of the grander Value Theory, asserts that the rightness or wrongness of an action is a matter of measuring the outcome of the action itself. Moral decisions can then depend on the latent costs and/or benefits that result from doing the action. Utilitarianism, the most popular form of consequentialism, is in the same vein with regard to moral actions and their likely consequences.
Next we’ll define “perceptual justification.” Perceptual justification, one of James Pryor’s main interests, is a justification rooted from conscious perceptual experiences. Many philosophers, such as Alvin Goldman, object to this type of justification claiming that perceptual experiences are not always reliable for one to know something. Alternatively, he focuses on the mechanisms responsible for one’s perceptual experiences. The reasoning entailed in perceptual justification can be broken down further to propositional justification and doxastic justification, which includes propositional justification. Propositional justification can be defined when a Subject “S” possesses propositional justification for the belief that some proposition “P” if and only if they have good reason to believe that proposi... ... middle of paper ... ...ate first encounter justification.
Reason is essential in determining knowledge claims, it is important that knower’s are able to pass a judgement based solely on rational evidence, this may be even more so importance when observing the practice of scepticism. In contrast, emotion can inhibit good reasoning, as expressed by the ‘James-Lange theory’; it can be influenced by external factors such as belief, which can supress logical thought processing. Albeit, this presents the argument that reason and emotion... ... middle of paper ... ...d adequacy of evidence” is truly dependent on the knowledge claim in question and the profound nature of the area of knowledge. Initially, I believed that knowledge claims made in the field of science are naturally to be questioned in the research stages and so are more reliable than that provided of the human sciences. However, I discovered that this may not be the case due to the limitations within the statement itself, the lack of distinction between theoretical and applied knowledge A sceptic may be “willing” to question a knowledge claim, but to what extent or measures taken for a sceptic to be “willing” to accept knowledge claim may be non-existent.
Thoughts on a Possible Rational Reconstruction of the Method of "Rational Reconstruction" ABSTRACT: Rational reconstructions standardly operate so as to transform a given problematic philosophical scientific account-particularly of a terminological, methodological or theoretical entity-into a similar, but more precise, consistent interpretation. This method occupies a central position in the practice of analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, we encounter-even if only in a very few specific publications-a vague image of it. This is due on the one hand to the problem of the intentions of application, i.e., of the normativity of rational reconstruction (descriptive/prescriptive-ambivalence). It is also due on the other hand to the problem of the significance of the method in the field of history of philosophy (systematic/historical-dichotomy).
The intuitions philosophers care about are typically judgements about whether specific (hypothetical or actual) cases are cases of a certain kind. Some philosophical topic such as reference, knowledge or personal identity is under investigation. A theory is proposed and is then tested against our intuitions about specific cases that bear on the topic. In general, if our intuitions contradict what a theory implies about whether, say, S refers to x, or knows that p, or is identical to T, this counts against the theory. If on the other hand, our intuitions match what a theory tells us about particular cases, this usually counts in favor of the theory.
It provides answers to the question of the necessary and sufficient conditions that make up knowledge and their sources. The study also examines the limits and structure of knowledge in understanding justifications and whether justifications are internal or external components of the mind. According to the proponents of rationalism, reason is the primary source of knowledge, belief and justifications. Certain truths and intellectuals exist which can be used to explain realities. Rationalists believe that certain principles are fundamental in explaining knowledge.
Some examples will be added that are necessary to assist us, in sustaining the main argument as well as to facilitate defining some requirements, for a HOT to occur in a conscious state. Thirdly, some of Ned Blocks objections to the Higher Order Thought Theory will be considered and review in order to reaffirm the validity of the main argument. Block's objections will be taken as the main challenge to Rosenthal's HO theory.... ... middle of paper ... ...higher order theory provides an encouraging investigation of the many connections consciousness has with other mental phenomena. To conclude this essay, I like to emphazise that Rosenthal's HOT is more of an empirical hypothesis, rather than an analysis of the term ‘consciousness.’ His aim is precisely to explain the phenomena of consciousness in relation to other mental states, such as thought and perception, and while achieving this, he has elaborated a theoretical structure for comprehending the functions of our mind. One may be able to conceive consciousness in the absence of higher-order states, but this does not mean that we can explain consciousness in the absence of higher-order states.
In the works of Linda Zagzebski, On Epistemology, the question of what is meant by an epistemic virtue and how does open-mindedness qualify as virtue. In Epistemology, there is a binding relationship between self-trust and self-knowledge. Zagzebski raises the question of what the relationship is and clearly explains that we cannot have one without the other. Riggs, another philosopher of Epistemology, wrote an article speaking about open-mindedness. Riggs explains how he understands the virtue of open-mindedness and the qualifications and limitations that he places on the virtue of open-mindedness.
This synergistic-reflective-equilibrium description should then be useful not only in giving a fuller understanding of how moral decisions ought to be made, but also how moral philosophy can be united into a pluralistic collective whole. I. The Synergistic-Reflective-Equilibrium Model The synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model is the position in which the justification of what is right or wrong is done by using neither a pure theory model, nor a pure intuition model. The synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model is a back-and-forth process—starting with particulars and going to the general and back to the particulars and so on and so forth. This is a constant process that never really comes to closure as new decisions are constantly having to be made.