Nietzsche's New Morality as Reaction to the Old The purpose of Friedrich Nietzsche's On The Genealogy of Morals (1887) is to answer the following questions, which he clearly lays out in the preface: "under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil? And what value do they themselves possess? Have they hitherto hindered or furthered human prosperity? Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or is there revealed in them, on the contrary, a plenitude, force, and will of life, its courage, certainty, future?"
Nietzsche calls this conceptual transformation. Nietzsche says, “Thus one also imagined that punishment was devised for punishment. But purposes and utilities are only signs that a will to power has become master of something less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a function…” (Nie... ... middle of paper ... ... part of this human nature to be cruel. It does us good to see others suffer. It is even better when we make others suffer.
In essay two of Nietzsche’s ‘On the Genealogy of Morality’, ‘Guilt’, ‘bad conscience’ and related matters, Nietzsche seeks to explore the origins and constructs of guilt and in doing so, presents us with an account where the concept of guilt has been misconstrued by the evolution of society. This very shift in our understanding of guilt has subsequently led to, what Nietzsche claims to be, “bad conscience”. To understand this evolution of guilt and the entity of “bad conscience” it is necessary to closely analyze Nietzsche’s account and in doing so, delve deeper into the mechanics of Nietzsche’s understanding of our morality. ADD FIRST PART! Nietzsche identifies the etymological properties of the word guilt, noting the similarities between the German word for guilt and the German word for debt.
This relationship to the future highlights why nearly all philosophical interpretations of Nietzsche do not regard ‘The Genealogy’ as a literal historical account. Furthermore, Zimmerman’s analysis of Nietzsche as having a Hegelian notion of negation seems to be supported by Nietzsche’s method of analysis in the Genealogy itself. In aiming to discover the origin of moral values Nietzsche strips back the layers of interpretation which had condescended over older interpretations of Christianity until he is closer to the origin. In a process which could be considered as dialectical negation in reverse. Overall, therefore there are highly compelling reasons to regard this to be the dominant aim of Nietzsche in writing the Genealogy.
Rather, Nietzsche is interested in affective interpretations. There is also a possibility he had not reexamined the pros of On the Birth of Tragedy until he wrote Ecce Homo. What is more, Nietzsche is blunter in his Nachlass when he states “there are no facts, only interpretations.” Additionally, some insight can be provided based upon the very nature of Ecce Homo, in which Nietzsche puts himself on trial, ironically in Socratic fashion, and defends his life’s work chapter by chapter. Nietzsche is ultimately interested here in providing a definitive rationale for his philosophy, which celebrates the Dionysian worldview of emotion and instinct over cold rationality and reason. Birth of Tragedy, offers an extended defense of the Dionysian worldview and, with all of its flaws, was a work with which Nietzsche was finally able to com
Therefore, the disgust response could be argued to be a product of well thought-out beliefs, that are available to be put into practice quickly by our intuitive reactions. I have presented the dispute between advocates and skeptics regarding the disgust emotion and its place in morality. In presenting Kelly’s view, I have given explanation for why he takes the stance he does, and why believes his view to disprove the advocate’s arguments. In concluding, I offered a line of argument that I think may give support for the advocate stance, even in light of Kelly’s criticisms. However, ultimately, I side with Kelly’s arguments and maintain that disgust simply has no place in the realm of moral judgment.
Both the Iliad and Second Treatise teach a lesson in revenge: it causes problems when unchecked. The Iliad tells of a hero, Achilles, whom tragically causes the death and/or ... ... middle of paper ... ... we defined earlier, for his actions against them, for the sake of defending themselves from further mistreatment. He makes it clear that the mistreatment should be severe and against the people, and that revenge is not justified for one individual against the king for any misdeeds the king does against him. This is supported by his statement that everyone has the right to self-defense, and contrasted by Achilles seeking revenge against his leader for insulting him (which is proven by Homer to be an unjust and tragedy inducing decision). Homer makes the gods the exception; they can do whatever they want and as they please.
We can ultimately both explain and exonerate our disposition to speak of moral opinions and moral truths. So, concurring with contemporary non-cognitivisms, we are able to declare that we have moral opinions, that many of these opinions are truths and we can even maintain that we have a moral understanding. What we are doing when we assert such things will, however, actually be somewhat dissimilar to what we may have originally thought: it will still be a case of asserting non-cognitive outlooks towards non-normative contents. Error Theory As previously indicated, Nietzsche has been assigned to having a notion of almost all of the metaethical theories noted above. We will begin, however, with how Nietzsche’s notorious objections of Christianity and morality should be understood as proposing an error theory.
Suppose, though, that one day I passed the factory where it was made, and ... ... middle of paper ... ...e’s rhetoric, we must not take all the small details so seriously such as the exact characterisation of the Slave and Master Race. Rather we must appreciate that in characterising the two races in this light, Nietzsche simply wanted to make his readers feel a certain way, and perhaps the only way he could do that in a particular instance in his writing was through the use of hyperbolic language. As a reader I was certainly moved by Nietzsche’s reading, and if we are to accept Janaway’s re-interpretation, then perhaps this is enough to convince us of the idea of the Slave Revolt in morality. Thus in conclusion, if we interpret on the Genealogy of Morals as an experience- as a journey for the reader from a state of certainty in his morals to a state of somewhat revulsion- then we can conclude that Nietzsche’s arguments as presented in essay one are very convincing.
Where Kant’s system is based on a set of principles or duties, Nietzsche’s system is based on virtue. Nietzsche is critical of Christianity in general and its evaluation of morality. In the reevaluation of values, he shows how the characteristics of morality in Christianity are more prohibitive of living virtuously than those of Ancient Greece, which include strength, confidence, sexuality, and creativity. In Christianity, those values are pity, shame, asexuality, and humility. The set of values of Ancient Greece is considered Master Morality and the values of deontology is considered to be Slave Morality.