The Significance and Priority of Evidential Basis in Epistemic Justification
ABSTRACT:There are various approaches to epistemology as well as to the philosophy of science. The attempt to naturalize them is the newest approach. In the naturalistic framework, epistemology turns out to be identical with the philosophy of science. The main characteristic of both naturalized epistemology and naturalized philosophy of science is their methodological monism. Therefore, both of these meta-level areas of philosophy pursue only one scientific discipline to be a meta-method for themselves. There are objections to naturalism on the basis that (from a methodological point of view) naturalized philosophy is monistic.
I. The Concept of (Epistemic) Justification
Today's Epistemology. Epistemology (theory/philosophy of knowledge) is defined in general as the branch of philosophy, concerning the nature, possibility, source, scope and limits, criteria/standards (of truth) of knowledge. Today's epistemology, however, has been interested basically in the notion of epistemic justification, since the publication of Edmund L. Gettier's article "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" in 1963. In this article Gettier introduces two counter-examples to the traditional tripartite account of knowledge, i.e. the standard analysis of knowledge: knowledge as justified true belief, and shows that these three conditions, the truth condition, the belief condition, and the justification condition, are not sufficient even if they are necessary, and thereby they could not give a proper definition of knowing. After Gettier's article, epistemologists have seen the justification condition as the most problematic one among these three conditions. So, within the la...
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...tion is to its being viewed as a justification case; and thereby, the proposed solution here is only to cease the application of rule PPJR to it.
Selected Bibliography
Foley, R., 1987. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge.
Klein, P. D., 1981. Certainty: A Refutation of Skepticism, Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Kyburg, H. E. Jr., 1961. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, Wesleyan Univ. Press, Middletown.
———, 1983. Epistemology and Inference, Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Lehrer, K., 1990. Metamind, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Moser, P. K., 1989. Knowledge and Evidence, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.
Pollock, J. L., 1990. Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford.
In this essay, the author
Explains that there are various approaches to epistemology and philosophy of science, and the attempt to naturalize them is the newest approach.
Explains that epistemology has been interested in the notion of epistemic justification since edmund l. gettier's article "is justified true belief knowledge?"
Opines that an effective way of inquiring about the concept of justification could be to investigate it in a definite, problematic case.
Analyzes how the lottery paradox originated by h. e. kyburg. it is a fair lottery with thousand tickets, in which only one ticket will be the winner.
Compares prob(p1, b) >.9 &
Explains that s is justified in believing that either ticket 1 or ticket 2 will win the lottery, or a ticket 1000, on the grounds of the following piece of evidence derived from b.
Explains the distinction between general and specific elements of justification in the lottery paradox.
Explains that the lottery paradox is a paradox of justification, since epistemologists do not distinguish the exclusive disjunction from the inclusive one.
Argues that rejection of ppjr would eliminate all inconsistencies in lps and preserve the unrestricted right of inference.
Explains that ppjr and cp did not compromise with each other in an epistemic context because the individual justifications were overridden by the low probability of their conjunction.
Explains that defending the non-paradoxical preface case as a case of epistemic justification would essentially mean to defend cp.
Proposes a real solution to the lottery paradox by refuting individual justifications, moreover without rejecting ppjr.
Explains the solution to the lottery paradox by refuting the lottery case as an epistemic one. the paradoxical result expresses the justification of s's two conjunct-contradictory beliefs.
Explains that the lottery case is a destructive closed system, in which all of the pi's (i=1,..., 1000) have the same position and power of occurrence as e1 declares.
Analyzes the structure of a paradox, stating that it has three different structural parts that contain some problems giving rise to the paradox.
Explains that paradoxes are important from a philosophical point of view. they influence the intellectual development of man and add new things to his intellectual mass.
Explains that epistemologists have made contributions to the literature of the lottery paradox and justification, but they could not see the point which should have the priority.
Explains that epistemic justification can be distinguished from non-epistemic, like moral and prudential, ones.
Explains that the barber paradox is based on a so-and-so case, whereas the lottery case is objected from an epistemological point of view.
Explains kyburg, h. e. jr., probability and the logic of rational belief, wesleyan univ. press, middletown.
Explains pollock, j. l., nomic probability and the foundations of induction, oxford univ. press.
Explains that s is justified in believing that "ipi, i=1,..., 1000, on the basis of the following conjunction principle cp as a principle of justification.
Explains the principle of closure in justification, which is widely accepted by epistemologists.
Explains that epistemologists have rejected cp or ppjr to avoid the lottery paradox. the 1001st member of lps is eliminated and the open contradiction vanishes.
Explains that pieces of evidence, whether probabilistic or non-probabilistic, give clues to the considered situation in justification, i.e. this concrete case of the lottery.
Analyzes how a person can be justified epistemically in believing propositions that are justified to her if she knows that this set is logically inconsistent.
This paper addresses the question of whether probabilistic coherence is a requirement of rationality. The concept of probabilistic coherence is examined and compared with the familiar notion of consistency for simple beliefs. Several reasons are given for thinking rationality does not require coherence. Finally, it is argued that incoherence does not necessarily involve fallacious reasoning.
In this essay, the author
Examines the concept of probabilistic coherence and compares it with the familiar notion of consistency for simple beliefs.
Explains that most work in epistemology treats epistemic attitudes as bivalent, and suggests that it is reasonable to have degrees of confidence in a proposition when the available evidence is not conclusive.
States that bayesians claim that rational degrees of confidence satisfy the standard kolmogorov axioms of probability.
Explains that people do not assign point values to propositions, which is required if their degrees of confidence are to conform to the axioms.
Explains the so-called dutch book argument, which was first presented by ramsey in his paper "truth and probability".
Argues that the dutch book argument is misunderstood if it works by forcing compliance with the probability axioms as a means of avoiding monetary loss.
Explains that dutch book vulnerability is philosophically significant because it reveals a certain inconsistency in some system of beliefs.
Argues that incoherent degrees of confidence are supposed to be analogous in important respects to the familiar notion of inconsistency for full beliefs.
Explains that it is not irrational to have inconsistent degrees of confidence, but it can be rational if a big enough prize will be obtained by having such beliefs.
Explains that coherence is a general norm, which rational agents should satisfy, provided that no special prize is attached to violating the norm.
Explains that personal probability judgments are objective and invokes the concept of calibration. the weather channel forecaster is perfectly calibrated.
Explains that calibration provides a way of making sense of the correctness of probability judgments, in cases where probabilities can also be interpreted as relative frequencies.
Argues that rationality requires coherence, and that the probability of necessary truths and denials is zero.
Analyzes how the dutch book argument is used to show that having less than one degree of confidence in a tautology is taken as revealing inconsistency.
Argues that even if ideally rational agents, who are logically omniscient, would satisfy coherence, this does not entail anything about what is rational for creatures such as ourselves.
Analyzes lyle zynda's defense of the claim that coherence is a rational ideal in response to foley and plantinga.
Argues that bayesians are often criticized for making the unrealistic assumption that agents consider and attach a probability to every proposition in advance of any empirical inquiry.
Opines that zynda's point that coherence provides a standard against which we can measure our opinions is certainly right.
Analyzes howson and urbach's argument that violation of the probability axioms involves a kind of inconsistency.
Explains how howson and urbach define subjectively fair odds as those odds which confer no positive advantage or disadvantage for either side. betting quotients are then defined in the usual way in terms of odds.
Explains how howson and urbach appeal to the dutch book theorem, which states that a set of betting quotients which does not satisfy the probability axioms cannot all be fair.
Analyzes how the person who is confident in goldbach's conjecture takes x to be its fair betting quotient, when it cannot be.
Argues that incoherence does not involve the explicit logical error in formulating our opinions that some bayesians have claimed.
Explains how a dutch book can be constructed against someone whose degrees of belief violate the axioms.
Explains how garber extended the bayesian conditionalization model of belief change to accommodate logical learning, solving the so-called problem of old evidence.
Analyzes how zynda shows how one can make sense of the notion of closer approximations to coherence.
Describes foley, r, garber, c., and urbach's contributions to bayesian confirmation theory.
Cites kennedy, r., chihara, plantinga, a. and skyrms, b.
Logic is the language of reasoning. According to Kit Fine, a Professor of Philosophy, logic is a systematic way of explaining what makes an item valid (Films for Humanities and Science, 2004). As humans seek to validate their thoughts and find truth in the world, this science of reasoning is what allows us to develop conclusions, which can then be accepted as truths. Uniting mathematics, philosophy, language, and other disciplines together to help generate these widely accepted truths, numerous logical theories have emerged since the time of Aristotle to shed light on how our minds deduce and arrive at logical conclusions. Two such theories, Bayesian confirmation theory and syllogism can be used to provide humans with a means to more accurately and easily arrive at truthful conclusion.
In this essay, the author
Explains that logic is a systematic way of explaining what makes an item valid. as humans seek to validate their thoughts and find truth, this science of reasoning allows us to develop conclusions, which can then be accepted as truths.
Explains the bayesian confirmation theory, which relates directly to probability. it is used to determine an outcome based on a given condition.
Explains that probability relies on inductive reasoning to arrive at a likely conclusion. conclusions are justified using prior experiences, which does not always lead to truthful outcomes.
Analyzes how aristotle's syllogism utilizes deductive reasoning to arrive at conclusions based on given premises.
Explains that syllogism utilized the deductive reasoning process to arrive at conclusions. aristotle believed that the use of logical reasoning led to accurate outcomes because truthful premises must create valid arguments.
Explains that deductive reasoning is supposed to be based in absolute proof and has a measurable success rate, but there is no way to test the validity of the premises in real-world situations.
Explains that both inductive and deductive reasoning can work in tandem to provide a compelling argument. both use reasoning to carefully examine truths of situations that have occurred or are currently occurring.
Explains that logic has evolved over time, as have the theories that are used to arrive at accepted truths. the bayesian confirmation theory and syllogism approach arriving at conclusions in distinct ways.
Almost all epistemologists, since Edmund Gettier’s 1963 article, have agreed that he disproved the justified-true-belief conception of knowledge. He proposed two examples
In this essay, the author
Explains that virtue epistemology is the theory that all of the things we believe are done through an ethical process.
Analyzes how edmund gettier's 1963 article disproved the justified-true-belief conception of knowledge.
Explains that epistemic luck can be accidental, coincidental, or just wishful thinking that a person has true belief.
Explains duncan pritchard's theory of knowledge that incorporates a condition against luck to which he calls anti-luck virtue epistemology.
Analyzes how henry's belief that what he sees is indeed a barn is justified. however, the countryside in which henry found the barn was scattered with façades of barns.
Explains that the testimony of henry and his friend joe may not be reliable, but if both joe and henry saw the same barn, they can share the credit of reliable information, as the receiver and giver.
Explains the virtue reliabilist epistemologies of ernest sosa and john greco. they claim that their view is anti-skeptical and solves the gettier problem while retaining a theoretical simplicity.
The most trenchant criticism of naturalistic approaches to epistemology is that they are unable to successfully deal with norms and questions of justification. Epistemology without norms, it is alleged, is epistemology in name only, an endeavor not worth doing. (See e. g., Stroud 1984, Kim 1988, Rorty 1979) Furthermore, it is claimed, an epistemology without norms or with norms fashioned from scientific practice leaves science prey to skeptical doubts. What one makes of this depends on whether one takes epistemology to be worth doing in the first place. (cf. e.g., Kim and Rorty) However, I shall argue, it is possible to allow for justification within a broadly construed Quinean naturalistic framework. The skeptic can be disarmed as Quine has argued. Along the way I shall offer a corrective to Quine's celebrated dictum that the Humean condition is the human condition.
In this essay, the author
Argues that it is possible to account for justification within a naturalistic framework broadly construed along quinean lines.
Argues that it is possible to allow for justification within a broadly construed quinean naturalistic framework.
Argues that naturalized epistemologies challenge the tradition in arguing that the description of cognitive processes is a more central epistemic concern than the search for foundations and principles of justification. traditionalists have responded by challenging the legitimacy of the descriptivist's claim to be
Explains that one way of sorting out the relationship between descriptive and traditional epistemology is to taxonomize their connections.
Argues that descriptive epistemology is a competitor to tradition's and offers competing solutions to similar problems.
Explains that descriptive epistemology might be seen as complementary to tradition's. the focus of tradition remains the justificational questions of the tradition.
Explains that descriptive epistemology might be seen as a successor discipline to tradition, but it does not address the questions of tradition because it deems them irrelevant or unanswerable
Opines that option 3 entails the rejection of all the traditional normative questions associated with epistemology.
Analyzes how quine has retreated from his radical earlier view that naturalized epistemology must be purely descriptive to a more tempered view which endorses the justificational questions of tradition.
Explains the implications of "putting epistemology in a psychological setting." wittgenstein, rorty, and quine endorsed two options.
Explains that epistemology is a going concern, but transformed into science, the factual inquiry into the relationship between observation and theory. the key question for quine is how humans have managed to arrive at science from such limited information.
Explains that epistemology is free to use the results of the natural sciences to answer its questions. quine's response is twofold based upon his "unregenerate realism."
Argues that quine's project, insofar as it ignores the project of kant and carnap, evades a deep problem endemic to the human condition.
Analyzes how quine's argument is a rejection of skeptics' attempt to "transcendentalize" objections derived from intersubjective comparisons and errors.
Analyzes how quine sees naturalized epistemology as an "enlightened" approach to the traditional problems.
Argues that the skeptic, if he is producing a reductio, is unshaken by quine's contention that skeptical doubts are scientific doubt.
Argues that science does not give us knowledge about the physical world, and that the shift to fallibilism in the 17th century was implicitly a rejection.
Explains that stroud concludes that'skeptical doubts' are science-doubts, but doesn't put the epistemologist in the stronger position of being free to use scientific knowledge of the world.
Analyzes how quine's naturalization of epistemology is at one with a rejection of that model. the "deep problem" of skepticism is endemic to one model of the human condition.
Analyzes how quine's early formulation of his position has struck many as being excessively descriptivist. the theory of confirmation appears to be reduced to or replaced by the psychology of theory testing, appraisal and evaluation.
Explains that the question of the justificatory function of epistemology arises at two very distinct levels of inquiry. quine rejects the call for putting science on a foundation.
Explains that the empirical results of science combine with the methodological rules of scientific method to form a seamless web. the locus of predictive failure is not determined by the logic of the test situation.
Cites barrett, r. b., and gibson, f. (perspectives on quine), cambridge, mass.
Explains campbell, d. t., "evolutionary epistemology" in p.a. schilpp's the philosophy of karl popper i. lasalle.
Explains campbell, d. t., descriptive epistemology: psychological, sociological, and evolutionary.
Explains dretske, f., "machines and the mental," proceedings and addresses of the american philosophical association, 59, 1, 1985, 23-33.
Explains gibson, r. f., enlightened empiricism: an examination of w. v. o. quine's theory of knowledge.
Cites hull, d. l., plotkin, h.c. (ed. ), learning, development, and culture.
Explains quine, w. v. from a logical point of view, cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 1961.
Cites quine, w. v., "reply to stroud" in midwest studies in philosophy vi.
Explains rorty, r. "the unnaturalness of epistemology" in gustafson and tapscott.
Explains stroud, b., "the significance of naturalized epistemology" in midwest studies in philosophy vi.
Hanfling, Oswald, Logical Positivism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 24-71. (I read this book and got some ideas, but no quotes)
In this essay, the author
Explains that moritz schlick and a.j. ayer were both logical positivists and members of the vienna circle. they shared the quest for truth and certainty.
Explains that moritz schlick believed that all important attempts at establishing a theory of knowledge grow out of doubt of the certainty of human knowledge.
Argues that protocol statements are real happenings in the world and would temporally precede other real processes in which the production of an individual's knowledge consists.
Explains that ayer seeks to determine the truth or falsehood of empirical propositions in his article "verification and experience."
Explains that the distinction between basic and other propositions is implicitly acknowledged by philosophers who reject agreement with reality as a criterion of truth.
Explains kant's reasoning that all knowledge comes into us through sensory experience applies to schlick’s thoughts about protocol statements being ultimately determined by our experience and perception.
Opines that truth and falsity are valid distinctions, but the concept of good and bad exists in reality on a scale which language often causes us to forget.
Analyzes hanfling, oswald, logical positivism, new york: columbia university press, 1981, p. 24-71.
McKenna, Michael, and D. Justin Coates. “Compatibilism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 26 Apr. 2004, plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/.
In this essay, the author
Explains that compatibilism is a form of determinism and free will. they will show how it contrasts to others and explain how others may think this position is wrong.
Explains that they have the freewill to choose whether to do homework or not. they can see how both free will and precedents are at hand.
Explains compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism go hand in hand. libertarianism seeks to fully make everything based on freewill and morally right actions.
Opines that if we had full free will, we would be able to go out and murder someone, be morally responsible for it, and feel guilty about it.
Explains that they grew up believing that while driving it is illegal to have the inside car light on, but it's a deep psychological thing in their brain to do so.
Compares compatibilism with determinis, which says people are not morally responsible for their actions, thus everything that is done, has already been predestined for them.
Opines that people who fully believe in religion would feel roboticized if they had the option to think about choosing the counter option, but they can give up so much thought to one single question at times.
Explains that while it's not predetermined, we can sure choose how we want our end destination to be.
Argues that compatibilism implements the good from both of these two other arguments. we can freely choose how we want the outcome of our decisions, but through past actions we can also tend to choose to do things because we know the outcomes and consequences.
Cites merriam-webster's dictionary of determinism. mckenna, michael, and d. justin coates.
Edmund Gettier is famously known for his counter examples against this claim of having knowledge if and only if there is justified, true belief. In 1963, he published a paper which demonstrates the implications of the JTB theory. We can look at his counter examples which rely heavily on the use of thought experiments which subsequently, allow him to analyse which direction if any, of the JTB theory is incorrect. By Gettiers use of thought experiments, we are able to imagine a coherent scenario in which we are able to recognise where justified, true belief may be present but not knowledge.
In this essay, the author
Explains that kjtb claims are more commonly known as biconditional claims. thought experiments are used to test such claims by examining their implications with the use of seemingly coherent scenarios.
Illustrates the biconditional claim by using the theory of sexual consent, wherein an elderly couple can't find time to spend with one another due to their busy schedules.
Presents a counter-example to this direction by using the following thought experiment. the gunman forcefully enters your home and forces you to have sex with him.
Analyzes how the lr direction fails as consent is present but once again (a) and (b) are not. explicit talk is not always required for consent. the couple make love every week, and there is consent but they have not asked each other explicitly.
Explains that thought experiments show that we can think of a coherent scenario in which the claim being made can be refuted or supported.
Illustrates the use of thought experiments by looking at a traditional theory of knowledge, k=jtb, knowledgejustified, true belief.
Explains that both the lr and rl directions of this biconditional are satisfied.
Argues that the rl direction of this theory is false if jones sold her ford to her brother in the morning.
Explains edmund gettier's use of thought experiments to probe the truth value of biconditional claims.
Explains that smith and jones have applied for the same job. smith believes that the man with ten coins will get this job, and the company's president has assured him that jones will be chosen.
Analyzes gettier's claim that smith has ten coins in his pocket, which is true, only in virtue of the number of coins he didn't know of.
Explains gettiers thought experiment shows that smith was led to new belief in a true claim, where justification was present but not knowledge because of an previously held false belief that the person who gets the job has ten coins.
Concludes that thought experiments help us identify which direction can be refuted of a biconditional claim.
Since its publication in 1969, Quine's seminal essay entitled Epistemology Naturalized has had a polarizing effect on pursuits in this field. Many have rejected the naturalist approach to epistemology on the grounds that it is mere relativism (see below), while others have celebrated Quine's program for articulating an empirical approach to epistemology. In what follows, I will endeavour to provide a clean explanation of some of the central features of Quine's naturalism and point out what I believe are the strengths and weaknesses of these features and, I will offer a brief account of why I believe Quine's naturalism to be an exemplary approach to clarifying how epistemic pursuits ought to be carried out.
In this essay, the author
Opines that quine's seminal essay entitled epistemology naturalized has had a polarizing effect on pursuits in this field.
Explains that naturalized epistemology is the departure from traditional philosophy insofar as it invites empirical science to play a crucial role clarifying the explanatory relation between theory and evidence.
Explains that there has been disagreement over just which criteria are to count as justification in the first place. quine characterizes this approach by drawing a parallel to the attempted reduction of mathematics.
Analyzes how quine's theory of knowledge stands in stark contrast to this approach. he argues that epistemic justification should be replaced by the test of evidential verification.
Explains that following quine's theory closely we discover that no theory can ever be ultimately verified, but only supported by observations to its contrary.
Explains that epistemology is a normative inquiry, while quine's view of naturalism uses empirical science to verify what it is that we assert.
Analyzes how quine's solution is to use empirical science to assist us in our epistemic pursuits.
Opines that epistemology still goes on, though in a new setting and clarified status. the relation between the meager input and the torrential output is one that we are prompted to study for the same reasons.
Opines that quine is offering a revisionist picture of epistemology and science in general. there is no one perfect principle that can be used in guiding normative concerns because it is irrational or irresponsible to assume that we have the philosophical authority to justify the way we ought to conduct our epistemic projects.
Argues that quine wishes to dispense with normativity altogether, but this is not quite accurate.
Analyzes the vertigo inherent in quine's claim that clairvoyance is a reliable source of information about the world than our eyes, ears, and other senses.
Explains that normative justification, following quine's program, simply no longer works in philosophy because the doctrinal side, traditionally conceived, has proved to be nothing more than an experientially empty dogmatism.
Opines that quine's naturalism recognizes the inseparability of language from theory. this approach to the "proofs" of science seems reasonable against the history and evolutionary nature of our scientific enterprise.
Argues that quine's dismissal of doctrinal truth is a virtue of his theory, because language is dependent upon an original set of observation sentences that engenders said language with its semantic content.
Argues that much of language transcends what is directly observable, and that "truth" per se is a prime example of this aspect. quine's conception of empirical semantics follows.
Analyzes how quine's revisionist approach to science has been criticized by purist philosophers who think it undermines the normative element of epistemology.
Explains that the norm of naturalized epistemology coincides with that of traditional empiricism, nihil in mente quod non prius in sensu.
Opines that the acceptance of scientific method into epistemology is a laudable feature of the naturalistic approach.
Opines that quine's revisionist picture of science is ample room to be wrong. no theory, however carefully worked out and bulwarked with evidence, is immune to refutation.
Analyzes how quine argues for a scientific picture of the world which includes epistemology as one of its theoretical pursuits and uses its own "crowning norm," empiricism, as the judge.
Opines that quine has not offered us any "indubitable" method for conducting our epistemic pursuits.
Argues that the epistemologist's goal is validation of the grounds of empirical science, but he defeats his purpose by using psychology in the validation.
Opines that quine suggests that the methods we have already for discovering whether and how our beliefs are valid should not be overlooked in favour of trying to discover this information by appeal to pure rationalization.
Analyzes how quine concludes that an empirical stance towards epistemology is our only rational option. this has the unsavoury effect of mechanizing and insulating our cognitive processes inside a strict internalist approach.
Analyzes the plausibility of quine's version of epistemology, stating that it can be interpreted as a legitimized epistemic system or program couched in relativism.
Analyzes how quine's denial of justification in favour of adopting an evidential relationship between our theories of the world and what we actually discover is one that can be tested.
Analyzes how quine's approach to the learning of a language can reduce its semantic content to objects that are immediately verifiable.
Explains that quine's eschewing of a priori reasoning as an effective method for ascertaining the correct methodology of epistemology guarantees that any of our theories can be tested by science.
Concludes that quine's commitment to empirical observation is verifiable, and that any conclusive decision on this matter can appeal to no other tribunal than that provided for us by our senses.
Opines that the most familiar strategy could quite possibly be: blatant positive assumption.
Explains the location of quine, the pursuit of truth, and kim, j. "what is naturalized epistemology?"
Describes quine's naturalized epistemology, richard foley, and ibid.
Describes quine's "epistemology naturalized," p. 19; and his "the pursuit of truth."
Knowledge, its source and truthfulness have been under question for a long time. People have always wondered what exactly constitutes facts and if there are any defining laws that can be attributed to all knowledge or information available in the world. Many philosophers speculated on how information can be interpreted according to its falsity or truthfulness, but have not come to definite conclusions. Edmund Gettier has provided one of the key pieces in understanding and trying to figure out what knowledge really is.
In this essay, the author
Explains that knowledge, its source and truthfulness have been under question for a long time. people have always wondered what exactly constitutes facts and if there are any defining laws that can be attributed to all knowledge or information available in the world.
Explains the gettier problem, which links relative information supported by a form of reasonable assumption and the truthful outcome.
Explains that a visual representation of something, and mental registration of it being that thing, makes it what it is or isn't.
Analyzes how gettier-style examples are effective in raising questions of what constitutes true knowledge, but they do not refute what actual knowledge is.
Explains that it is a criterion that is made up for. it is defined characteristic of the surrounding environment.
Most philosophers would say that the knowledge is not justified true belief. This can be demonstrated by the Gettier cases, however, these cases do not evidently refute the traditional belief that knowledge is justified true belief; this definition of knowledge is commonly attributed to Plato and his dialogues . This theory, however, suffered a significant setback when the aforementioned Gettier cases were discovered.
In this essay, the author
Analyzes how the gettier cases do not refute the traditional belief that knowledge is justified true belief. this theory suffered a significant setback when the
Explains wilfrid sellars' gettier cases, which demonstrate how justified true belief is not always sufficient for knowledge.
Analyzes how a wife enters her home and looks into the living room. she misidentifies the man in the chair as her husband's brother.
Explains that most epistemologists would happily claim that the wife in this case had a justified true belief, however she does not know, that her husband is home.
Analyzes stephen hetherington's argument that a gettier subject knows even though they come very close to not knowing.
Narrates how a woman is sitting on her patio, and she believes that there is one in her garden. however, she is in deep thought about tragic news, which preoccupies her mind.
Analyzes how the woman in this example, clearly knows that there is a cat in her garden but she only barely knows (lacking belief despite the presence of truth and justification).
Opines that knowledge is not merely justified true belief, even though it may be on the right track. counterexamples are just diagnostic tools. an account of the underlying problem is more valuable to us.
Explains that justified true belief still has a persistent appeal, even though it is flawed. wilfrid sellars previously stated that traditionalists were basically right when saying that knowledge equates to justified truth belief.