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Evidential Basis in Epistemic Justification

analytical Essay
5286 words
5286 words
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The Significance and Priority of Evidential Basis in Epistemic Justification

ABSTRACT:There are various approaches to epistemology as well as to the philosophy of science. The attempt to naturalize them is the newest approach. In the naturalistic framework, epistemology turns out to be identical with the philosophy of science. The main characteristic of both naturalized epistemology and naturalized philosophy of science is their methodological monism. Therefore, both of these meta-level areas of philosophy pursue only one scientific discipline to be a meta-method for themselves. There are objections to naturalism on the basis that (from a methodological point of view) naturalized philosophy is monistic.

I. The Concept of (Epistemic) Justification

Today's Epistemology. Epistemology (theory/philosophy of knowledge) is defined in general as the branch of philosophy, concerning the nature, possibility, source, scope and limits, criteria/standards (of truth) of knowledge. Today's epistemology, however, has been interested basically in the notion of epistemic justification, since the publication of Edmund L. Gettier's article "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" in 1963. In this article Gettier introduces two counter-examples to the traditional tripartite account of knowledge, i.e. the standard analysis of knowledge: knowledge as justified true belief, and shows that these three conditions, the truth condition, the belief condition, and the justification condition, are not sufficient even if they are necessary, and thereby they could not give a proper definition of knowing. After Gettier's article, epistemologists have seen the justification condition as the most problematic one among these three conditions. So, within the la...

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...tion is to its being viewed as a justification case; and thereby, the proposed solution here is only to cease the application of rule PPJR to it.

Selected Bibliography

Foley, R., 1987. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge.

Gettier, E. L., 1963. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis, 23, 121-123.

Klein, P. D., 1981. Certainty: A Refutation of Skepticism, Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Kyburg, H. E. Jr., 1961. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, Wesleyan Univ. Press, Middletown.

———, 1983. Epistemology and Inference, Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Lehrer, K., 1990. Metamind, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Moser, P. K., 1989. Knowledge and Evidence, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.

Pollock, J. L., 1990. Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford.

In this essay, the author

  • Explains that there are various approaches to epistemology and philosophy of science, and the attempt to naturalize them is the newest approach.
  • Explains that epistemology has been interested in the notion of epistemic justification since edmund l. gettier's article "is justified true belief knowledge?"
  • Opines that an effective way of inquiring about the concept of justification could be to investigate it in a definite, problematic case.
  • Analyzes how the lottery paradox originated by h. e. kyburg. it is a fair lottery with thousand tickets, in which only one ticket will be the winner.
  • Compares prob(p1, b) >.9 &
  • Explains that s is justified in believing that either ticket 1 or ticket 2 will win the lottery, or a ticket 1000, on the grounds of the following piece of evidence derived from b.
  • Explains the distinction between general and specific elements of justification in the lottery paradox.
  • Explains that the lottery paradox is a paradox of justification, since epistemologists do not distinguish the exclusive disjunction from the inclusive one.
  • Argues that rejection of ppjr would eliminate all inconsistencies in lps and preserve the unrestricted right of inference.
  • Explains that ppjr and cp did not compromise with each other in an epistemic context because the individual justifications were overridden by the low probability of their conjunction.
  • Explains that defending the non-paradoxical preface case as a case of epistemic justification would essentially mean to defend cp.
  • Proposes a real solution to the lottery paradox by refuting individual justifications, moreover without rejecting ppjr.
  • Explains the solution to the lottery paradox by refuting the lottery case as an epistemic one. the paradoxical result expresses the justification of s's two conjunct-contradictory beliefs.
  • Explains that the lottery case is a destructive closed system, in which all of the pi's (i=1,..., 1000) have the same position and power of occurrence as e1 declares.
  • Analyzes the structure of a paradox, stating that it has three different structural parts that contain some problems giving rise to the paradox.
  • Explains that paradoxes are important from a philosophical point of view. they influence the intellectual development of man and add new things to his intellectual mass.
  • Explains that epistemologists have made contributions to the literature of the lottery paradox and justification, but they could not see the point which should have the priority.
  • Explains that epistemic justification can be distinguished from non-epistemic, like moral and prudential, ones.
  • Explains that the barber paradox is based on a so-and-so case, whereas the lottery case is objected from an epistemological point of view.
  • Explains kyburg, h. e. jr., probability and the logic of rational belief, wesleyan univ. press, middletown.
  • Explains pollock, j. l., nomic probability and the foundations of induction, oxford univ. press.
  • Explains that s is justified in believing that "ipi, i=1,..., 1000, on the basis of the following conjunction principle cp as a principle of justification.
  • Explains the principle of closure in justification, which is widely accepted by epistemologists.
  • Explains that epistemologists have rejected cp or ppjr to avoid the lottery paradox. the 1001st member of lps is eliminated and the open contradiction vanishes.
  • Explains that pieces of evidence, whether probabilistic or non-probabilistic, give clues to the considered situation in justification, i.e. this concrete case of the lottery.
  • Analyzes how a person can be justified epistemically in believing propositions that are justified to her if she knows that this set is logically inconsistent.
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