Evidential Argument

The problem of evil can be debated in two different forms: The Logical Problem of Evil and Evidential Problem of Evil. The Logical Problem of Evil is formed as a deductive argument: God’s existence is logically incompatible with evil. While in Evidential Problem of Evil differs in that doesn’t claim that God’s existence is completely incompatible with the existence of evil. It makes God’s existence unlikely or improbable.

The problem of evil is an argument against the existence of God, the existence of evil, and suffering (pain, suffering, death). This argument claims that it is incompatible with the existence of an all loving and all powerful God. One of the earliest statements of the problem, came from the Greek philosopher Epicurus and

As stated earlier, it differs from the logical in that it doesn’t claim that God’s existence is completely incompatible with the existence of evil. But rather that the existence of evil make’s God’s existence unlikely or improbable. This form is also known as inductive argument; in that it doesn’t claim to prove its conclusion.

Now, let’s look at it from a different perspective to the problem of evil through the Free Will Defense. The free will defense begins with the claim that God created humans so they could response in love, faithfulness or obedience to Him. In order for this to be true, humans must be genuinely free to choose how they want to respond to God; and therefore, humans must have genuine free will. If this is true, we can assume the consequence of it that there is a world with good and

Either maximum pleasure, minimum pain, but no free will; or pain and suffering, a price worth paying for free will. Mackie believed that God had a third option. That if God was truly omnipotent, then He could have the best of both worlds: Genuine Freedom and the minimization of pain. He believed that God could create the ultimately human, that were genuinely free but could always choose to do the right thing. He later claimed that, “God was not faced with a choice between making innocent automata and making beings who, in acting freely, would sometimes go wrong; there was open to him the obviously better possibility of making beings who act freely but always go right. Clearly, his failure to avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and wholly good.” (JSPEAKS,