Essay On Reason By Immanuel Kant

1 Thus it is clear to Kant that the long-held idea that reason existed to nurture man's happiness is fundamentally untrue. However Kant maintained that there must be a purpose for which reason was placed in man. He arrives at the conclusion that although reason influences the will, it is not meant to do so in order to supply any goods outside of its initial influence, "[reason'... ... middle of paper ... ...accruing to me or even to others, but because it cannot be fitting as a principle in a possible legislation of universal Iason exacts from me immediate respect for such legislation. 11 This means that if one's maxim clearly nullifies itself once applied theoretically on a universal level, the maxim, or the theoretic legislation, must be considered against that which is good. When considering the Platonic form of goodness, Kant's idea of the good will is similar in that it adheres to a theoretical universal, and that reason is essential to its discovery.

From this idea of “a priori” concepts, Kant begins his thesis with the notion that the only thing in the world that is a qualified good is the “good will”, even if its efforts bring about a not necessarily good result. A “good will” is good because of the willing that is involved. Two main implications arise with this idea of the “good will”. The first implication is moral actions cannot have impure motivations. There are many impure motivations but Kant tends to focus mainly on the motives of the pursuit of happiness and self-preservation.

Kant saw the will as fully autonomous and therefore needing no external sources for motivation, thus making it possible to act out of reason alone. This ... ... middle of paper ... ... never motivate, and so conclude that morality doesn't exist in reality. In conclusion, we can see that both the two theories have a number of things in common as well as some important differences. Both made a significant break with past moral theorists in putting forward a morality that does not according to Kant "need…the idea of another being above man, for a man to recognize his duty" (quoted in 'The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers' Ed. J.O.

In fact, even if that person acts justly because of the desire for happiness of others, Kant would say that a person’s actions have no moral worth. John Stuart Mill’s observation was that people misunderstood utilitarism as self-pleasure. Happiness should be varied as intended pleasure and absence of unhappiness. Mills states that it "… is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether…” This leaves no room for opinion because then the greater number would not be contemplated. So who does Mills leave to decide to whom may plan what the greater happiness is?

Correspondingly, its negative use consists in not allowing one's self to 'venture with speculative reason beyond the limits of experience' (Bxxiv). Thus, criticism removes the decisive hindrance that threatens to supplant or even destroy the 'absolutely necessary practical employment of pure reason..in which it {pure reason} inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility' (Bxxv). Accordingly, the critique guarantees a secure path for science by confining speculative reason and by giving practical reason the complete use of its rights: rights that thus far had not been recognised. Place in the History of Ideas Kant, being confronted with the two extremes of rationalism and empiricism, set for himself the task of creating a synthesis of the two. As he saw it, rationalism operates in the sphere of innate ideas, with their analytical and therefore aprioristic ideas; this necessity, however, is not based on experience and consequently does not apply to reality itself.

Given this assumption, his argument is brilliantly made. However, he has no real basis for this argument. Kant even admits the limit of his assumption. Reason would overstep all its limits if... ... middle of paper ... ...y can only be based on human action. It is important to understand why humans regard things as moral and Hume does an excellent job of explaining this based on observable human characteristics.

A great philosopher as Immanuel Kant would not have admitted the precariousness of these developments. The “Copernican revolution” from the Critique of Pure Reason demonstrates the substantial role the subject plays for an exterior object to become a phenomenon, in accordance with our human faculties of knowledge (the sensitivity and the intellect). Thus, the subjective side of knowledge is attested, and that happens within a philosophical system, par excellence, objective. The intellect is limited to know only phenomena, the noumenon remaining unknowable. Yet, objectivity does not apply to this type of entity, but exclusively to its phenomenal appearance, in the framework of human experience.

I believed my efforts would bring nothing but good, however, I damaged myself in the process of trying to help another being. Even though, my intentions were moral, it did not necessarily mean the outcome would be good. My motive according to Kant, was not the right kind of motive- I thought I was helping, I thought I would make myself and others happy, but in the end, my motive back fired and left me frazzled, disappointed, and my father still an alcoholic.

Existence does not add to an objects description, it can not be added to the concept of the thing. It just posits the existence of such a thing. Let us now take a more critical look at Kant's argument (some things will have to be stated again.) In the concept of God we find the idea that he is a perfect being. From this idea alone the existence of God is supposed to follow a priori.

By this I mean that one manÕs well being is not always universal to all. Most significantly, Kant renounces happiness as the principle of morality because it obliterates the specific difference between virtue and vices. Universality is the form of a moral law whereby all rational beings are subject to the same condition as the basis of morality. Kant argues that there can be principles for action that do not admit of exceptions, and that this occurs through practical reason. In other words, the possibility for morality does not hinge on the empirical world, but rather is a feature of the nature of the entity that is the ground for morality.