Introduction
In this essay, I shall argue that there is no established truth-functional account of the meaning of indicative conditionals that is not subject to criticism but that the equivalence thesis - a truth-functional account of the meaning of indicative conditionals - is worth saving.
Throughout the course of the essay, I will discuss two different attempts to defend truth-functionality: the principle ‘assert the stronger instead of the weaker’ and the supplemented equivalence thesis. The principle was proposed by Grice in his William James lectures on ‘Logic and Conversation’ as a conversational explanation of why a conditional - which has been interpreted using the truth-table for the material conditional - can fail to be assertible even though the negation of its antecedent or the truth of the consequent is assertible. Whereas, Jackson defends a version of the equivalence thesis he refers to as the supplemented equivalence thesis in ‘On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals’. I intend to argue that Jackson successfully refutes the Gricean attempt to defend truth-functionality and provides convincing reasons to suggest that the equivalence thesis is worth saving. In order to evaluate these attempts at defending truth-functionality, I shall begin by defining some basic terms.
Indicative Conditional and Material Conditional Distinction
A sentence in the indicative mood is one that states how things actually are e.g. ‘Alice is wearing suncream’. An indicative conditional sentence is a statement of the form ‘If A, then C’ e.g. ‘If it is sunny outside, then Alice is wearing suncream’. Indicative conditionals differ from subjunctive conditionals because a subjunctive conditional is a conditional statement that indicates wha...
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...ive. However, I remain reluctant to conclude that his thesis is an ultimately correct truth-functional account of the meaning of indicative conditionals due to the number of objections that Jackson acknowledges. Nevertheless, I believe that Jackson proposes several philosophically convincing reasons which support the thought that all indicative conditionals are material conditionals.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that Jackson successfully refutes the Gricean attempt to defend a truth-functional account of the meaning of indicative conditionals. Furthermore, I have examined his alternative line of defence and several reasons he proposes to support a truth-functional account. Although I am reluctant to conclude that his theory is an ultimately correct account, I have argued that he proposes several reasons which prove establishing an account is worthwhile.
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