Laudan's Theory of Scientific Aims I criticize Laudan's constraints on cognitive aims as presented in Science and Values. These constraints are axiological consistency and non-utopianism. I argue that (i) Laudan's prescription for non utopian aims is too restrictive because it excludes ideals and characterizes as irrational or non-rational numerous human contingencies. (ii) We aim to ideals because there is no cogent way to specify in advance what degree of deviation from an ideal is acceptable. Thus, one cannot dispense with ideals.
Verifiability can’t reach absolute truth because of the complications with induction. Falsifiability can’t reach absolute truth for a couple reasons. First, proving that a theory is false only verifies that the negation is true. That’s not much concerning scientific advancement. Second is because of falsifiability identification, with the demarcation criterion between science and pseudo-science, a (supposed) true theory can’t be scientific, because it can’t be falsified.
But also, there is no probability of them actually occurring and that we, as human beings, put too much faith in miracles, which is wrong. These points in themselves are confusing and cumbersome. If miracles were actually against the laws of nature, then Hume’s definition of those laws of nature should be redefined, or his acceptance of miracles should be re-evaluated. If miracles are possible, then any sort of concrete evidence to support that miracle should be enough to prove its existence. There is no need to go through a list of criteria that contradicts itself.
This is essentially what Bouwsma and Malcolm have done. They tried to prove that the existence of the evil genius would not make a difference in our lives. For this reason, I believe that although Bouwsma and Malcolm have made a valid point, they have only touched the surface of Descartes' argument. They have succeeded in proving that life is not meaningless, but that was not the purpose of Descartes' argument to begin with.
Popperian hypothetico deductivists would find several problems with the view of science Alan Chalmers stated in ‘What is this thing Called Science?’ From “Scientific knowledge is proven knowledge” to “Scientific knowledge is reliable knowledge because it is objectively proven” popper would disagree to everything. With Chalmers falsificationism or hypothetico-deductivism view, his statement indicates that scientific induction is completely justifiable. However as it is now known, induction is not a reasonable way to prove or justify science. One of a few problems that hypothetico-deductivists would find in Chalmers statement is contained in the phrase, “Scientific theories in some rigorous way from the facts of experience acquired by the observation and experiment.’’ Theories are never produced strictly, Popper would say, but firstly crafted through the thought and feeling of a scientist in their given field. This then discards the idea that theories are the result of facts and it then forwards the idea that a theory will be manipulated by individual people as they are no more than a personal concept with reason.
These same institutions that would pervert the logic of Instrumentalism can use Realistic logic to disqualify facts that are in contrast to their beliefs by saying things like, “It’s just a theory. It is not true because there are still thing about said phenomenon that science can’t explain.” So then, which is a more favorable approach to scientific truth, Realism or Instrumentalism? In my opinion, it is Realism that keeps us from introducing mystery and occult lore into our pursuit of scientific knowledge. But, one cannot ignore the unexplained phenomena even though we know some to be true purely by axiomatic accounts. Instrumentalism reconciles this but at the cost of accepting the unknown as occult, at least from current understanding, and therefore allowing for any school of thought to pervert Instrumentalist logic to conserve and justify their beliefs.
I have argued that this problem casts doubt on the logic of falsification and the crucial experiment because the outcome of an experiment is not predicted on the basis of a single hypothesis since auxiliary assumptions are involved as well. To overcome this, a scientist can make adjustments to the experiment without completely abandoning his theory. To correctly estimate the agreement of a physical theory with evidence, it is not enough to be a skillful experimenter. One must also be an impartial and faithful judge in determining an anomaly in his theory and making the decision to accept non-supporting evidence.
His argument goes something like this: To reason from induction, one must have “found certain observed cases true that will also be true in unobserved cases.” According to Stace, this also fails because there are no observed cases of an unobserved object. Though this is true, this does not give Stace enough to rule out the method of induction altogether. Induction, simply put, is anything that is not deduction. Stace only addresses enumerative induction and ignores other types of induction—more specifically, inference to the best conclusion. If we were to use this form of induction, we would end up ... ... middle of paper ... ...ess my critique of sense data.
The first camp holds the belief that science’s aim is to give proper descriptions of what the world is like. On the other hand, the second camp believes that a proper description of the world must be given, but acceptance of corresponding theories as true is not necessary. Following the principles of the second camp, van Fraassen offers his alternative to scientific realism. His stance is known as constructive empiricism. According to van Fraassen, “science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves a belief only that it is true”.
I believe, that these questions could be elucidated by answering the question of limitness, or, of form of Science. Does Empirical Science have any limits? The answer of the scientists is No: Science is unlimited. There are no scientifically unresolvable questions, they have sense. The answer of the philosophers is not clear, but it is close to No.