Philosophers focus primary on the nature of reality and question what exists or any other concept regarding the first principle of things. This is known as Metaphysics. Metaphysics has a variety of problems that each describes our existence, for example what reality really is and others separating the mind and body relation to each other or are they opposites. In this article the main focus will be on an interesting problem in Metaphysics called the mental and the physical and the simplicity of describing and understanding of this problem with guidance of popular philosophers like Desecrates and my understanding of the problem. What connections if there are any between the mind and the body and if they are the same? The problems about …show more content…
The mind being the main control of the body. Many individuals have problems connecting the two due to consciousness of the mind and how it makes us who we are and that having no connection with our body. We do have strategies and ways to see how our mind and body works but not necessary our consciousness in reasons as why we choose to do certain things, who we are, personality, or even free will. Others can only see our body and how we look but not who we are. If we did have a connection between our mind and body we can assume that it allows us to choose and control our body. If that is the case we would be able to control our bodies and their properties. Feeling pain, hunger, laughter, or is it that the mind can only control portion of the body as sending signals from the brain to our bodies. We don’t connect both because either we create them in our mind we can control them, since its not the case either someone else creates them or something does. I think that the mind is not physical at all but as far as being connected to the body maybe just a portion of it. Because of science we know that we need our bodies to exist or continue to exist. I guess we will never know since we don’t have proof of anyone surviving without their bodies and are here to tell their
Barbara Montero is an associate professor of philosophy at the City University of New York. In her article “Post-Physicalism” she aims to convince people, mainly physicalists, to begin thinking of the mind/body problem from a new perspective. Montero reasons that the term “physical” is too difficult a term to define, which leads to a serious flaw of the direction of physicalist arguments. Her main idea is that the mind/body problem is really the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, not a fundamentally physical world. Directing the question towards “Is mentality a fundamental feature of the world?”, in her opinion, relieves the conflict between naturalism and ontological significance, and paves the way
Richard Taylor explained why the body and the mind are one, and why they are not two separate substances. In the article “The Mind as a Function of the Body”, Taylor divides his article in a number of sections and explains clearly why dualism, or the theory that the mind and the body are separate is not conceivable. In one of these sections it is explained in detail the origin of why some philosophers and people believe in dualist metaphysics. As stated by Taylor “when we form an idea of a body or a physical object, what is most likely to come to mind is not some person or animal but something much simpler, such as a stone or a marble”(133). The human has the tendency to believe a physical object as simple, and not containing anything complex. A problem with believing this is that unlike a stone or a marble a human (or an animal) has a brain and the body is composed of living cells (excluding dead skin cells, hair, and nails which are dead cells). The f...
The differences of mind and soul have intrigued mankind since the dawn of time, Rene Descartes, Thomas Nagel, and Plato have addressed the differences between mind and matter. Does the soul remain despite the demise of its material extension? Is the soul immaterial? Are bodies, but a mere extension of forms in the physical world? Descartes, Nagel, and Plato agree that the immaterial soul and the physical body are distinct entities.
In my experience, I am aware of many cases in which my body affects my mind (I stub my toe & I feel pain) and many cases in which my mind affects my body (I feel an itch & I scratch it).
That is a good question and there are probably a lot of answers to this question but coming u...
I do not think that the mind and body are the same thing. Both from arguments relating to my own beliefs, and with supporting arguments I hope to have thoroughly explained why I feel this way. I just don?t see how something as unique as the mind, with so much nonphysical substance to it, can be a part of the brain, an object which is so definitively physical. Although I feel the two are separate, this does not mean that I think they have no connections at all. The mind and brain are, without a doubt, a team. They interact together and run the body, however, they just are not the same thing.
The mind-body problem has kept philosophers busy ever since Descartes proposed it in the sixteenth century. The central question posed by the mind-body problem is the relationship between what we call the body and what we call the mind—one private, abstract, and the origin of all thoughts; the other public, concrete, and the executor of the mind’s commands. Paul Churchland, a proponent of the eliminative materialist view, believes that the solution to the mind-body problem lies in eliminating the single concept that allows this problem to perpetuate—the folk psychological concept of mental states. Churchland argues that the best theory of mind is a materialistic one, not a folk psychological one. Unlike other materialist views such as identity theory, Churchland wants to remove the idea of mental states from our ontology because mental states cannot be matched 1:1 with corresponding physical states. This is why Churchland’s view is called eliminative materialism—it is a materialistic account of the mind that eliminates the necessity for us to concern ourselves with mental events. At first this eliminative materialism appears to be a good solution to the mind-body problem because we need not concern ourselves with that problem if we adopt Churchland’s view. However, there is a basic flaw in his argument that raises the question of whether we should actually give up folk psychology. In this paper, we will first walk through the premises of Churchland’s argument, and then we will explore whether Churchland does a suitable job of justifying our adoption of eliminative materialism.
The mind and body do interact with the body in some ways. Descartes says that the mind imagines things, you see things in your mind. These things do not just come from anywhere. You get these images from your senses. Say if one sees something with their eyes. Then turns away and closes their eyes. The image is still there.
Physicalism, or the idea that everything, including the mind, is physical is one of the major groups of theories about how the nature of the mind, alongside dualism and monism. This viewpoint strongly influences many ways in which we interact with our surrounding world, but it is not universally supported. Many objections have been raised to various aspects of the physicalist viewpoint with regards to the mind, due to apparent gaps in its explanatory power. One of these objections is Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. This argument claims to show that even if one has all of the physical information about a situation, they can still lack knowledge about what it’s like to be in that situation. This is a problem for physicalism because physicalism claims that if a person knows everything physical about a situation they should know everything about a situation. There are, however, responses to the Knowledge Argument that patch up physicalism to where the Knowledge Argument no longer holds.
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
In philosophy, the majority of studies relate to the mind. Whether it is the main subject or just a helpful side topic to move the main subject along, this term is used often. Defining the term mind is difficult, and is a topic that is popularly studied and debated among philosophers. These qualified and knowledgeable people try to determine whether or not the mind is who people are or if they are their body or a combination. Although they have learned many helpful truths and defined other useful terms, the debate is still evident in the philosophical community today. Learning about how the mind relates to the body, and whether the mind and the brain are the same thing are other ways to look at the many options of how to discern
While the great philosophical distinction between mind and body in western thought can be traced to the Greeks, it is to the influential work of René Descartes, French mathematician, philosopher, and physiologist, that we owe the first systematic account of the mind/body relationship. As the 19th century progressed, the problem of the relationship of mind to brain became ever more pressing.
Since Descartes many philosophers have discussed the problem of interaction between the mind and body. Philosophers have given rise to a variety of different answers to this question all with their own merits and flaws. These answers vary quite a lot. There is the idea of total separation between mind and body, championed by Descartes, which has come to be known as “Cartesian Dualism”. This, of course, gave rise to one of the many major responses to the mind-body problem which is the exact opposite of dualism; monism. Monism is the idea that mind and body one and the same thing and therefore have no need for interaction. Another major response to the problem is that given by Leibniz, more commonly known as pre-ordained harmony or monadology. Pre-ordained harmony simply states that everything that happens, happens because God ordained it to. Given the wide array of responses to the mind-body problem I will only cover those given by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. I will also strive to show how each of these philosophers discuss what mind and body are and how each accounts for God’s influence on the interaction of mind and body, as this is an interesting distinction between them, as well as the important question of the role of substance. This is important, I believe, because it helps to understand the dialogue between the three philosophers.
two distinct kinds of entities, bodies and minds (1). All objects that exist or can exist belong to one of these categories. The two forms are said to be mutually exclusive and commonly defined by fundamentally different characteristics, yet both are required to accurately define the world around us. According to Descartes, the body is a tangible physical substance (the unthinking thing), whereas the mind is an intangible non-physical substance (the thinking thing) and comes metaphysically before the body (3). The mind and body casually interact with one another while maintaining their distinctiveness: the eyes perceive objects and then focus the image to the pineal gland, where it transmits the information to the non-physical mind; the mind then may transmit a signal to the body, telling it what to do. The mind and body are independent from one another, yet they work in harmony; the mind receives signals from the body and the body responds to signals from the mind.
Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949) is a critique of the notion that the mind is distinct from the body, and is a rejection of the philosophical theory that mental states are distinct from physical states. Ryle argues that the traditional approach to the relation of mind and body (i.e., the approach which is taken by the philosophy of Descartes) assumes that there is a basic distinction between Mind and Matter. According to Ryle, this assumption is a basic 'category-mistake,' because it attempts to analyze the relation betwen 'mind' and 'body' as if they were terms of the same logical category. Furthermore, Ryle argues that traditional Idealism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce physical reality to the same status as mental reality, and that Materialism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce mental reality to the same status as physical reality.