These ways of knowing affect how we perceive reality, and help us create our beliefs. The title as given by IB implies that there is a difference between something that is true and something that is believed to be true. It suggests that different ways of knowing can portray a truth. This point is problematic, because I do not think that something that is believed to be true and truth itself can be differentiated. In fact, I believe that it is difficult to acquire logical, unbiased truth; I think that the closest man can gather about truth can also be called “consistent knowledge”, meaning that the information is knowledge that is unchanging.
In the article, "The Will to Believe", William James responds to W.K. Clifford who argued that it "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence". James held the belief that it 's more important to accomplish truth than to avoid error a and that it can in fact be reasonable to hold a belief without sufficient evidence. Both philosophers, in my opinion, offer persuasive arguments; however, I feel that beliefs are often a moral issue and the choice to believe can be an emotional or instinctual one rather then an intellectual one. Therefore, I don 't support Clifford 's argument that it its wrong in every situation to maintain beliefs based on insufficient evidence and plan to argue against
In this paper I will argue that Roderick Chisholm gives a correct solution to the problem of the criterion. The philosophical problem with criterion is that we cannot know the extent of knowledge without knowing criteria, and vice versa. Chisholm approaches the problem of criterion by saying that in order to know whether things are as they seem to be we must have a procedure for recognizing things that are true from things that are false. He then states that to know if the procedure is a good one, we have to know if it really recognizes things that are true from things that are false. From that we cannot know whether it really does succeed unless we already know what things are true and what things are false.
Intuitions This paper examines two attempts to justify the way in which intuitions about specific cases are used as evidence for and against philosophical theories. According to the concept model, intuitions about cases are trustworthy applications of one’s typically tacit grasp of certain concepts. We argue that regardless of whether externalist or internalist accounts of conceptual content are correct, the concept model flounders. The second justification rests on the less familiar belief model, which has it that intuitions in philosophy derive from one’s (often tacit) beliefs. Although more promising than the concept model, the belief model fails to justify traditional philosophical use of intuitions because it is not clear a priori that the beliefs at issue are true.
It is not just the case that we can have all kinds of good reasons for what we believe, though those reasons do not quite measure up to the standards required by genuine knowledge. The radical sceptic questions whether we ever have the slightest reason for believing one thing rather than another, so we can never even get to the point of justified belief, never mind whether our justifications are sufficient for knowledge, in some more restricted sense. The second crucial feature of philosophical scepticism concerns its scope. The philosophical sceptic's negative verdict on human knowledge is highly general. This generality explains why philosophical scepticism formulates its challenge in terms of the possibility of knowledge.
Moore recognizes that there might be some sceptical philosophers who would think the premise to be false, as it is true that you may be dreaming you have hands. The third requirement is that the conclusion of the proof must follow from the premise, and if the premise “here is a hand” is true, then surely the conclusion “a hand exists” is true. Moore says that if this argument is a rigorous one, then it is obvious that many more can be given (Moore 1993 pp. 165-6). The conditions Moore says the proof satisfies, is sufficient in believing there is an external world.
These alternatives can make you believe the proposed claim or convince you to disbelieve them. When this occurs, you construct a justified belief. These beliefs do not necessarily have to be true for other people, are not absolute (they can range from having an absolute conviction, suspension of judgment, or rejecting a proposition), and can be altered at anytime. What makes justified beliefs justified? According to the evidentialists, it is the possession of evidence for a belief.
The fulfillment of knowledge can sometimes introduce doubt into our minds. We begin to question proven theories, to discredit the basis of the foundation and even deny its existence. Knowledge can be a great attainment but an excess of it can lead to doubt. Doubt forms because we tend to rely on our feelings to decide what is real and what is not, but why is that wrong? It’s simple, our feelings are not absolute.
The method of doubt suggest that in order to find out which beliefs are stable and which are not, we first have to pretend that everything we know is questionable. If Descartes can find any reason for doubt, regarding any of his beliefs, he will withhold assent and this will lead to finding secure foundations of knowledge. We cannot tell when our senses are correctly reporting truth or deceiving us. Just because some of our senses, such as our vision, hearing and touch, are mistaken, that is not reason enough to suspect all of them. The only reason we know that some of our experiences are wrong, is because we are able to realize after the event, that what we thought to be true, is actually wrong.
Finally, his argument against this fails since it is false that if an experiential state has representational content, then it is in need of justification. I venture the diagnosis that BonJour mistook the representational content of a cognitive state for the assertive functional role of a belief. Foundationalism may well be false, but not for BonJour’s reasons. Laurence BonJour observes that critics of foundationalism tend to argue against it by objecting to "relatively idiosyncratic" versions of it, a strategy which has "proven in the main to be superficial and ultimately ineffective" since answers immune to the objections emerge quickly. (1) BonJour aims to rectify this deficiency.