Therefore, even if casual determinism is true, there is no reason to believe that people cannot still be morally responsible for their behavior. Frankfurt even goes on to say that he believes that premise (A) should instead be phrased as such: a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise. This revision takes into account the invalid assumption that coercion makes moral responsibility
In my Theory of Knowledge class, I learned that belief and truth can be very contrasting ideas. In my opinion, I can believe something that may not necessarily be true. However, there can also be truth that is impossible for me to believe. Belief is a mental state in which someone is confident in the existence of something, but may not necessarily have objective proof to support their claim. Truth is objective and public; it is eternal and unchanging without biast.
I think that we have to look at the foundations first. And we have to look at the foundations that we know and if they’re where some reasons to doubt, then I will have to doubt the principles. And I think that knowledge does not depend upon things of whose existence I don’t have knowledge yet. So how can we say that if there isn’t enough evidence to support a claim, why is it considered wrong? I find it illogical because just because there still isn’t enough evidence, doesn’t mean its wrong, its just not considered right or wrong.
Henry of Ghent attempts to persuade us that skepticism is impossible and that we can have knowledge. He states that some propositions are shown to always be true due to how humans act and as thus they defeat skepticism. The Skeptics disagree with Henry’s argument since they believe that we have no way of verifying truth. Thus the Skeptics state that we can act through beliefs alone. Henry’s argument is ultimately defeated on this point since it does not give a definitive way of truth verification, and thus allows for Skeptics to argue that they act solely on belief.
If we were to use this form of induction, we would end up ... ... middle of paper ... ...ess my critique of sense data. One may argue that it is possible for sense data to be physical; that independence of self does not imply existence. One may also criticize the fact that my inference to the best conclusion argument still relies on some enumerative induction, allowing it to fall victim to Stace’s original claims about the ineffectiveness of induction. In short, it is quite clear that the inductive method of inference to the best conclusion does not give us enough justification to claim we know unperceived objects to ￼exist. However, through our example of the two worlds and proven inconsistencies in the concept of sense data, we have enough justification to believe in material objects.
Entity realists believe in things, but not theories. The entity realist believes that you should believe in the existence of an entity 'E' referred to by a term 'E' just in case our understanding of 'E' allows to successfully construct instruments that manipulate and use the world in a variety of diverse contexts and structures. Entity realists do not believe that entities are true because there is no clear definition of true. Anti-realists have no argument against entity realists, because entity realism attempts to shoot down theories.
Essentially, Collins’ argument does not prove what he claims it does and is too strong to account for the existence of a life permitting universe because it not only misuses probability, but is rendered useless due to the paradoxes inherent in probability theory. Collins’ representation of the Fine-Tuning Argument is as follows: 1) Fine-Tuning is not improbable under theism. 2) Fine-Tuning is very improbable under the Atheistic Single Universe Hypothesis. 3) Prime Principle of Confirmation: When considering two competing hypotheses, an observation counts as evidence in favor of the hypothesis under which the observation has the highest probability (or is the least improbable) (Collins 8). 4) / From premises 1 and 2 and the Prime Principle of Confirmation, it follows that the existence of Fine-Tuning provides “strong evidence” for the design hypothesis over the Atheistic Single Universe Hypothesis (Collins 2003).
In either case, we do not have free will and hence should not be held morally responsible for our actions. However, the fault is this: it is unclear whether his idea of moral responsibility is the correct one as he fails to demonstrate this. This will therefore offset his argument, because of the possibility of many views of moral responsibility, which I will discuss
Protagoras's own way out that his view must be "better"... ... middle of paper ... ...th recognizing the self-contradictory and self-defeating character of relativism is that it does remove the easy out. We may know thereby that there are absolute and objective truths and values, but this doesn't tell us what they are, how they exist, or how we can know them. In our day, it often seems that we are still not one iota closer to having the answers to those questions. Thus, the burden of proof in the history of philosophy is to provide those answers for any claims that might be made in matters of fact or value. Socrates and Plato got off too a good start, but the defects in Plato's theory, misunderstood by his student Aristotle, immediately tangled up the issues in a way that still has never been properly untangled.
Reality being based on a series of dependent... ... middle of paper ... ...for the existence of everything, is based around PSRb. If the principle was incorrect and there was no explanation for every single positive fact, the fifth premise would also be unable to hold the same claims as before and would deny the cosmological argument. This objection towards the Principle of Sufficient Reason also brings up an intriguing point. If the validity of PSR is at question, how can we even consider the Cosmological Argument as a viable argument? The premises are sound when supported by PSR, but if the principle is false, does it not invalidate the whole argument?