Deterrent Effect Case Study

1189 Words3 Pages

The first, second, and fourth factor weigh against standing. Regarding the first factor, Plaintiff states that he lives and resides in Childress, Texas; which is over 500 miles from Red Rocks. Generally, "[c]ourts have consistently maintained that a distance of over 100 miles weighs against finding a reasonable likelihood of future harm." Jones v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 05-0535, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86613, 2006 WL 3437905, at *3 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 29, 2006). Moving to the second factor – Plaintiff’s past patronage – Plaintiff admits that he has no history of visiting Red Rocks, other than the concert which lead to this instant action. With respect to the fourth element, Plaintiff’s residence being so far away from Red Rocks is not dispositive …show more content…

Other jurisdictions that have taken up the issue have concluded such plaintiffs have standing. The Ninth Circuit recognizes the “deterrent effect doctrine” which means that an ADA plaintiff has Article III standing when the plaintiff encounters accessibility barriers and would return to the property if not for the barriers because the plaintiff “has been injured by the deterrent effect of the barriers actually encountered.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 571 F.3d 853, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2009). See also, Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008); Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, 293 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002). The Fifth Circuit has held that ADA plaintiffs “need not engage in futile gestures before seeking an injunction; the individual must show only that” the inaccessible property “affects his activities in some concrete way.” Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 236, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1561, 182 L. Ed. 2d 168 (5th Cir. 2011). Some district courts interpreted this as the Fifth Circuit endorsing the deterrent effect doctrine and courts applied it in their cases. Kramer v. Lakehills South, LP, No. A-13-CA-591 LY, 2014 WL 51153, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2014); Gilkerson v. Chasewood Bank, 1 F. Supp. 3d 570, 584 (S.D. Tex. 2014). In fact, in a recent Colorado …show more content…

Family Dollar Stores of Colo., Inc., as support to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim, arguing that the court in Garcia rejected the deterrence theory. (ECF No. 71 at 6). This is an incorrect interpretation. The court did not reject the theory, it assumed, for the purposes of the order, that the Tenth Circuit would adopt this theory and then went on to explain why the plaintiff could not even satisfy that broader standing theory. Garcia v. Family Dollar Stores of Col., Inc., No. 16-cv-02348-RM-KLM, 2017 WL 3498955, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 16, 2017). Furthermore, this instant case is distinguishable from Garcia in several respects. First, the alleged discriminatory behavior in Garcia came from employees at the Pueblo Family Dollar store. Id., at *6. Here, the alleged discrimination comes from Denver’s ticketing practices and the physical condition of Red Rocks. Second, in Garcia the plaintiff “fail[ed] to plausibly allege that discriminatory conditions are continuing at any Family Dollar store.” Id. The two complained of employees no longer worked at the Pueblo Family Dollar store and the plaintiff could not make any showing that the behavior of those employees was a corporate policy. In this case, Plaintiff has alleged that the ticketing practices are still in place and that Red Rocks has not made any changes to their seating arrangements or ramps. Finally, in Garcia the plaintiff only alleged he had a fear of returning to any Family Dollar because he feared he

More about Deterrent Effect Case Study

Open Document