Derek Parrfit Theory Of Personal Identity

Functionalists want to individuate mental states causally, but since mental states have mental effects, functionalist advance on behaviorism by acknowledging some similar input and output systems have similar descriptions without entailing similar mental effects. Functionalism, as an advancement of behaviorism, also describes the function of the mental state. The Absent Qualia Argument’s counterexample suggests functionalism is susceptible to similar problems behaviorism faces. The additional requirement functionalism holds, namely functionally equivalent internal states, mental states possibly differ. Block argues it is plausible to not only have type identical behavior states, but also functionally equivalent mental states.

In addition, Smart's theory is a posteriori claim, which is to say that through an observation or senses we can come to a factual conclusion. The Identity Theory makes a prediction concerning science and that is that in the future man will be able to know by fact that the mind is no more than a physically charged form of matter. In human speech and language we are accustomed to using different terms that have the same meaning. The classic example is the sensation of pain. A person upon feeling pain declares, "I am in pain;" however, the fact that there exists in the body neurotransmitters that fire through synapses to the mass of the brain that cause the brain ma...

Then only the degree of perception’s independance from consciousness would distinguish his theory from Merleau-Ponty’s. Currently, both theories can account for the substantive, outward, behavior of humans. Only the procedural behavior, the internal process, differentiates the theories. The conundrum of deciding between the theories is resolvable by an empirical critical experiment. While this will require more knowledge of cognitive psychology, current evidence suggests that Merleau-Ponty was correct and the mind is less encapsulated than Fodor's original claim.

According to Locke, it is consciousness that “alone makes self”. Therefore personal identity consists in the person not the human being. To Locke, this question of personal identity was im... ... middle of paper ... ...However this is why psychological continuity theory, is essential in creating a coherent personal identity theory that does not consider amnesia victims as non-existent. It is in this continuance chain of memories links that allows personal identity, as a meaningful concept in itself, to live on.

If an argument is valid then that means the structure guarantees that, if the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true. The Knowledge Argument isn’t sound because if it was sound then that would mean physicalism is false; but phyiscalism is not false, therefore the Knowledge Argument is valid. I believe that that physicalism is true and that everything that could/does exist is either physical or depends on the physical. Since I believe the knowledge argument states that physicalism is true, the argument is valid. The Knowledge Argument can be simply put as one that may know all the objective and physical facts about conscious experiences, but still doesn’t fully know human conscious experiences, so physicalism is false.

A strong objection to my argument however is of Hume's opinion or lack of opinion (account or lack of account) on personal identity. Hume argues that the concept of personal identity is a falsification and that our personal identity is nothing more than a collection of memories which we bundle together as memories. I will counter-argue however that " ". From Locke's point of view, a person is a "thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself...in different times and places...{through} only consciousness which is inseparable from thinking" and can only be considered the same person over time if he or she retains their memories. For Locke, it is the capacity to reason, understand, and browse through our memories and thoughts that makes a individual a full fledged person rather than being just a human being or dog or dolphin or any other non-human animal.

I like this example because it’s specific, and clearly defines how non-physical facts can come about in a physicalism point of view. I strongly believe that property dualism is the right view on the mind-body issue because the knowledge argument shows humanity cannot be one hundred percent physical, and how mental properties are always significant. If a human comes to conclusion that they are missing some factual information, the only way to determine that is through the use of mind and consciousness. A major objection to property dualism is the problems of interaction. The problems of interaction raise the question on how it’s not possible for mental and physical substances to interact.

Identity theorists or type physicalists would say that brain activity and those mental processes are type identical or basically within the same category. Token physicalists, which are more event specific, would say that the mental processes are different in quality than the physical counterparts or reactions within the brain. What they’re saying is th... ... middle of paper ... ...d on their choices. I would assume that there is a cause behind these free actions specifically their character, personality etc. Without these assumptions, morality wouldn’t make sense.

The latter two would effectively reveal the greater roles of Kurtz and Marlow as the id and the ego, respectively, and offer the opportunity to draw a conclusion about the work as a whole. Sigmund Freud’s theories on the construction of the mind are simple, but fundamentally changed the field of psychology. He proposed, among other things, that the human mind is composed of three parts: the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious. The preconscious consists of information, such as a telephone number, that is “accessible to consciousness without emotional resistance” (Schellenberg 21). In Freud’s estimation, the unconscious is the most important area of the mind.

This paper aims to endorse physicalism over dualism by means of Smart’s concept of identity theory. Smart’s article Sensations and the Brain provides a strong argument for identity theory and accounts for many of it primary objections. Here I plan to first discuss the main arguments for physicalism over dualism, then more specific arguments for identity theory, and finish with further criticisms of identity theory. Physicalism is the theory that the universe contains nothing other than the physical. Therefore, the universe can be fully explained in physical terms.