Depoliticizing Administrative Law by Miles and Sunstein

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Looking at the article Depoliticizing Administrative Law by Miles and Sunstein, we explore the problem of partisanship in appellate and Supreme Court reviews of agency decisions. The evidence abounds that judicial review of agency actions is highly politicized. Republican appointees are much more likely to invalidate liberal decisions while Democratic Appointees are just as likely to invalidate conservative decisions. If Judges are assigned to random three judge panels and the panel is inadvertently composed of an all Republican or an all Democrat panel then the decisions that come out of those panels can play a significant role in regulation decision making. The biggest issue is that if these agencies are not being treated the same, then there is a risk to the rule of law based upon these politicized voting decision since the future of important decisions can be effectively swayed by a panel of judges divided among political lines. There is a lot of evidence that is presented showing that judicial behavior is, in fact, highly politicized in administrative law. This evidence leads to a question of how to remove the politicized bias in administrative review decisions. Is it even possible and what are the implications of the effects of any change that may be made? Article Summary The article is broken down into 3 sections. The first being the empirical evidence that is used to prove the authors thesis that there is something very wrong with the politicizing of administrative law decisions. The authors explore the key findings to Segway into the second section. Section two explores the evidence and uses interpretive questions to explore the seriousness of the problem. The final section offers up three potential s... ... middle of paper ... ...truly looking at the issues. The second Prong approach would be to ban RRR and DDD panels and require a mixed panel. The facts show that mixed panels are not shown to vote in a politicized fashion. Thus we can see that there is more reason to trust the decisions of the mixed panels than the unified panels. Another option would be to require five panel teams instead of the three. That way you don’t have to worry about the randomness of assignment. The odds that you will get a RRRRR or DDDDD team is low and if it were to happen, then additional safeguards could be put in place to review the decision (Shapiro & Murphy, 2012) The politicization of judicial decisions is an important one and understanding the empirical data that proves it occurs is the first step in deciding whether we need to address this problem and if so what solutions will be implemented.

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