Cuban Missile Crisis Analysis

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In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis arose when United States intelligence discovered an existential threat 90 miles off of the Florida coast. What had been previously understood as an installation of defensive armaments in Cuba was revealed to be an arsenal of offensive nuclear missiles—an undertaking made possible by the import of Soviet arms that put the US mainland in short-range of nuclear ballistics.1 US intelligence deliberated about an appropriate response in private, weighing the pros and cons of a tactical air strike against a full on invasion, before settling on a "quarantine" of the island nation.2 Public acknowledgement of the crisis came in a televised address by President Kennedy on October 22, the same day that he began private …show more content…

On October 22nd, 1962, radios and televisions across the country broadcast a message of certainty and unapologetic resolve on the part of the US government in order to avoid engagement in an undesirable war.3 However, on the same day, the president's private letter to Khrushchev, though firm, maintained a respectful caution. The note described the proposed quarantine and promise of retaliation as the "minimum response", as if to beg pardon, within the frame of possible "catastrophic consequences" on a global scale.4 While the basic information about the issuance of a quarantine made up the bulk of each address, the character of delivery was tailored to suit very different recipients. To the public, the astute "TV president" delivered a self-aware report that coincided with his confident public image and platform towards the Cold War, all the while downplaying the gravity of the underlying possibility that a misstep could well result in nuclear annihilation.5 To Khrushchev on the other hand, the president knew that he was communicating with a man well aware of the …show more content…

Here, Khrushchev painted the proposed quarantine as "grossly violating the United Nations Charter" and insisted that the munitions in question were of a purely defensive nature.7 The followup from Kennedy was terse and more aggressive than before; it rejected Khrushchev's claims by plainly stating what each party knew and reasserted the quarantine with a deadline.8 The following day, Khrushchev returned by doubling down hours before the scheduled quarantine. He equated the American response to an ultimatum, insisted that the United States would respond similarly were the tables turned, and made clear that military engagement would be imminent should the quarantine be carried

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