Alan Chalmer’s controversial description of scientific method is, in many ways, in opposition to Karl Popper’s hypothetico-deductivist account, otherwise known as falsificationism. In this essay, I will elaborate on the various conflicts that the Popperian view has with Chalmer’s account. I think that Chalmer and Popper have common ground on which they have built their views but that while each are imperfect, I support the Popperian hypothetico-deductivist account as the predominant view at present. I shall justify this in my proposed objections to Chalmer’s statements but also highlight the shortcomings of falsificationism. I will assume that science is rational.
Popper argues that falsification is the demarcating factor. He points out that many pseudosciences draw their “justification” from affirmative events. The problem is that many of the theories under this umbrella are too general, ... ... middle of paper ... ...amined by the population and ethical lines should be decided by society as whole, not just the practicing field of science. With the fury of ethical, monetary, legal and societal issues surrounding this field it is time to take a second look at science. Demarcation must stand at the forefront in order to determine what endeavours are worth the investment to support, correct and evaluate and what endeavours are ultimately non-scientific bunk.
The aim of science is to reach an exact truth of the world. The second attribute is that scientific realism is epistemic. To accept a theory one must believe that it is true. Van Fraassen acknowledges that a “literally true account” divides anti-realists into two camps. The first camp holds the belief that science’s aim is to give proper descriptions of what the world is like.
Thus, the scientific method is the application of induction into practice. In Karl Popper’s paper The Problem of Induction, however, Popper argues that induction is not adequate justification to warrant a reasonable conclusion. In fact... ... middle of paper ... ...g on the fact that we can breach these inevitable gaps of knowledge and still find a conclusion. As Kuhn comments, science requires a definitive paradigm in which we can commit to, because without it, there would be no scientific advancement. In this sense, the inductive reasoning used in the scientific method is justified, as our understanding of scientific truths and all scientific advancement relies on its existence.
I agree with Popper (1988), who stated that only those propositions that research may prove false should be considered as scientific (the principle of falsification). That means that if you disprove an idea, it never can be the truth. and of course by continually trying and failing to falsify something you build support for it. For example, I am working with variation of abiotic factors in intertidal tide... ... middle of paper ... ...bservation-theory-hypothesis- hypothesis testing, is an important tool that gives us the potential to create a good background for discussions and the ability to predict, describe, or explain how the world works, which is one of the key goals of science (Klemke et al. 1988).If knowledge is obtained through the scientific method, it is more likely that it has scientific merit, because it had to go through different stages of testing for correctness.
In his essay, Kass takes a standing ground against research that uses living in vitro human embryos, by arguing that the research practices undermine “the... ... middle of paper ... ...ices are harmful because they lure and misguide us so well. We need to set up the public policy on such a sensitive issue like embryonic research, and the bioethicists are people we hope to rely on. But since they still use ill logics to battle against each other to establish their concrete standing ground, we have to be more cautious to rely on them. As important as moral standard discussing in embryonic research issue is the logical standard. Logical fallacies might make the essay look more attractive, but after being scrutinized, the presence of logical fallacies degrades value of essay itself.
The above explanations also against the idea that - 'science is objective' because I claimed that individual opinion and speculative imagining should be seen as a part of developing science knowledge. As a result, I would say that science is partially subjective and partially objective. In conclusion, the view of Chalmers would be falsified and against to Popperian's hypothetico-deductive method. I agree with Popperian's view and objected the definition of science which defined by Chalmers because science knowledge is not always reliable. Also, individual opinion and personal speculative imagining and have a place in science.
Falsificationism states that a theory is scientific if and only if it is falsifiable or verifiable. In other words if a theory, T, is testable, then it is scientific. With falsificationism, guidelines are used to decipher between testable and not testable therefore scientific and non-scientific respectively. So by using falsificationism consistently one should be able to solve the demarcation problem. But within falsificationism, some contradictions have arisen and from these, three versions of falsificationism have been formulated.
Indeed, simply the inclusion of hypotheses in the scientific method is going against the inductive method. Hypotheses themselves are general principles, making them deductive in nature, while the observations that lead to someone forming hypotheses would be inductive. Gathering data to test the hypothesis would be inductive as well. The authority of natural science is in part derived from the scientists themselves, in which case, trust plays a large component. Bacon’s method does not eliminate the need for this trust, however it does allow for a little more confidence in the conclusions in that one can know that if they were reached using Bacon’s method, there is a lot of empirical support for each axiom.
This happens to bring up another point. It is the "conjectures: to jump to conclusions--often after one single observation" that he cites as the way science is done (p. 25). Is this not diametrical opposed to his main point that we must be more stringent and not allow people with personal conjectures (like Freud or Marx) to call what they did science?