Conservatism and Innovation: A New Perspective on the Scientific Realism Debate

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In this thesis I propose a new philosophical framework for the philosophy of physics as an alternative to the existing scientific realism and antirealism debate. Such reconsideration of the debate is warranted by the widely shared perception of a disconnect between the philosophy and the practices it purports to describe. Specifically, I offer a shift in focus from analysis of the justificatory practices of physicists to an examination of the methodologies evident in the presentation of theories. I will show that this scientific activity can be described in terms of a tension between a "conservative" strategy and an "innovative" strategy. This interaction will be demonstrated in two case studies. The first case is H. A. Lorentz' search for an absolute frame of reference for space and time. The second case is the current search for dark matter.

The scientific realism versus antirealism debate turns on the relevance of epistemology to metaphysics. Realists argue that our best sciences yield information about the actual nature of the physical world. He might appeal to the "no miracles" argument, for example. However, this tactic presupposes the realist's own preferred relation between evidence and nature. Against this view, the antirealist argues that the product of scientific investigation is a description of observable phenomena and not of any underlying reality. Generally, antirealists have emphasized historical evidence against the realist picture and made arguments for one form of instrumentalism or another. As it stands, it seems that the issue is irresolvable.

Structural realism, a variant on scientific realism, is purported to address the antirealist criticism while maintaining a realist sensibility. Rather than focusin...

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... tension between these two strategies is what drives scientific progress. By testing the applicability of existing principles, and introducing new principles with broader domains of applicability, physicists aim at capturing more phenomena under fewer principles.

Two examples are illustrative of the effect of this framework in the philosophy of physics. First, I examine H. A. Lorentz' theoretical practices in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. I show that Lorentz maintained a conservative strategy, even as the evidence mounted against him. This strategy failed when his preferred principles were replaced by Einstein's. My second example is the ongoing search for additional evidence for dark matter. Those seeking physical evidence for the applicability general relativity pursue the conservative strategy and those who offer new principles follow the innovative.

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