In the previous quote from the Tao Te Ching, one can understand that the “unnamable” has no need to be named or characterized. The things that can be named are not considered eternal by the philosophy of the Tao Te Ching. One potential explanation behind the perception of words having a lessened role is because the Dao cannot be expressed in language. If the Dao, the most basic principle of the philosophy of Daoism cannot be expressed in words, then words should not be as important as they are in Confucian philosophy. Not only is language considered less important by Daoism, it is potentially harmful and divisive.
If morality is to be found, it cannot be located in the physical world. Following moralities discovery, there is no absolute justification that one morality is greater than another. Therefore in applying moral skepticism to Emma’s situation we find that there is a large indifference to the actions. As there is no inherent moral compass the actions Emma commits are neutral. They aren’t done out of spite or pleasure, it is just something that is done.
There are many factors, like self-interest, morality, and knowledge, that motivate the will to truth and power is only one of the many and cannot be used as the overarching factor. I share a common ground with Lynch in disagreeing with Rorty’s approach that there is no such thing as truth therefore we should stop worrying about it entirely. This deflationist approach comes off as rather nonchalant to me because it encourages people to not care or take interest in something that they believe to not exist. I also agree with Lynch’s argument pertaining to particularism. Normative judgments are not independent entities that can be used solely for the purpose of determining what is good or bad.
His argument goes something like this: To reason from induction, one must have “found certain observed cases true that will also be true in unobserved cases.” According to Stace, this also fails because there are no observed cases of an unobserved object. Though this is true, this does not give Stace enough to rule out the method of induction altogether. Induction, simply put, is anything that is not deduction. Stace only addresses enumerative induction and ignores other types of induction—more specifically, inference to the best conclusion. If we were to use this form of induction, we would end up ... ... middle of paper ... ...ess my critique of sense data.
Davidson's "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth" Davidson’s argument against the possibility of defining truth draws upon the work of Tarski. However, Tarski’s assumption that the semantic conception of truth holds only for formal languages which are not semantically closed is not as plausible as it seems to be since it can be shown that this would result in the impossibility of formulating a theory of truth, because the epistemological presuppositions of formal semantics undermine any theory of representation of reality in which our cognitions can be true or false representations. Yet Davidson concludes that "there cannot be a definition of ‘For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if . . .
In effect an answer to this depends entirely upon the individual; such an ambiguous statement undoubtedly entails a great difference in answers and interpretation. Although such a statement seems accurate both as a principle and an ideal, it lacks justification to compel one to act in such a way and furthermore lacks consideration of subjective opinions and specific situations. In essence, such a minimal statement cannot operate amongst a complexity of human indifferences, ideals, emotions and individualism and hence is intrinsically flawed in its application.
If a dogma is an unfounded conclusion or simply a statement, then it would seem that dogmas have little or no place in philosophical theories. That is to say, if philosophy seeks a better understanding of knowledge, then anything that is strictly dogmatic would be just the opposite. The only issue with dogmatic ideas within philosophy is the ability to discern them. When Quine titled this paper he was asserting that there were a couple of ideas within empiricism that lacked a proper foundation. The title leads us to believe Quine has discovered something fundamentally wrong with empiricism.
What does he mean by that? One possible, or probably the most obvious, interpretation of this statement is that filial piety cannot exist without conflicts in the family. Such interpretation would indeed be in complete opposition to Confucius’ view on the matter. However, since conflict implies action, that interpretation would also contradict the inaction principle of Taoism. Lao is definitely not encouraging conflicts in the family.
The Buddhist believe that there will always be negativity in life, and that all life has a lot of suffering in it. Therefore, you cannot change that. This is why the Buddhists think reincarnation is a bad thing. There is a similar bond between the Confucians and the Tao in the category rules and behavior. They both believe that you must act accordingly in some way.
There are two features of philosophical scepticism which differentiate it from everyday 'sceptical' outlooks. The first has to do with its strength. The more challenging sceptical arguments do not depend on imposing high standards for knowledge or justification. Rather, the scepticism they imply is radical. It is not just the case that we can have all kinds of good reasons for what we believe, though those reasons do not quite measure up to the standards required by genuine knowledge.