Perhaps one of the most fiercely contested battlefields in philosophy is that of free will and its compatibility with determinism; it is not just a captivating debate, but also one that has potentially such a far-reaching consequence on our existence. The two camps are the Incompatibilists, whom I shall mainly focus on, and the Compatabilists, who believe that free will and determinism are incompatible and compatible respectively. We can see how far reaching the consequences of this argument are by examining what is at stake. For an agent to have moral culpability, it is generally regarded that they need to have had some choice. If a chef was to serve bad food to a customer, causing the customer to become unwell, we may usually blame the chef. However, if the food was discovered to be infected before the chef received it and he had operated hygienically, we could not blame the chef; the food poisoning occurred via matters outside of his control. The Incompatibilist argument runs along the same lines, often employing the use of reductio arguments in an attempt to debunk the truth of determinism. The most popular line is to show that as a consequence of determinism, no agent could have ever acted in a different way. From this it leads on that as no one could have done otherwise, no one is responsible for any action. Even if the chef now knew prior to cooking the food that there was a good chance of infection, he would not be responsible. His decision to cook the food (along with every decision he or anyone else have made) is actually an illusion; he is as culpable for the infection as that of a light particle for deciding to hit my retina. It would be phenomenologically illogical to conclude that such a decision exists. Thus, at lea...
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... can re-define the phrase “could have done otherwise” to mean “could have done otherwise if the agent desired”. This definition makes the notion of alternate possibilities compatible with determinism, rather than the criticism used by the Incompatibilist. Additionally, if we use the concept of other possible worlds, we can allow ourselves freedom in the notion that in another world I may well have acted other than I have in this reality.
However, the Incompatibilist can argue that merely being able to act according to one’s desires does not allow enough freedom; we must be free to want what we want, a position that is ultimately incompatible with determinism. The use of alternate worlds is also unsatisfactory to the Incompatibilist, as surely it is irrelevant whether in another world I would have performed or refrained from action x, as only this world is relevant.
In “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Harry Frankfurt attempts to falsify the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. The Principle of Alternate Possibilities is the principle where a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. A person would be morally responsible for their own actions if done by themselves. If someone else had forced that person to do the action, then the person doing the action is not morally responsible. Frankfurt does not believe this to be true and that the person doing the action is morally responsible. Frankfurt’s objections towards the Principle of Alternate Possibilities shows the refutation of natural intuition and places moral responsibility upon those who deserve it.
In “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Harry Frankfurt illustrates the concepts of freedom of will and freedom of action, but more importantly, Frankfurt has refined the compatibilism theory. Compatibilism allows the freedom of will to exist in the deterministic world. According to determinism theory, the future state of worlds is determined by some events in the distant past (E) and the laws of nature (L). More specifically, E refers to the history, such as experiences or states whereas L refers to scientific or physical law like gravity. For example, an alcoholic’s action is determined that he will not stop drinking. Here E is that he had been drinking in the past, and L is the physiological addiction effect caused by alcohol. As we can control neither E nor L, then it follows that we can never act free. The thesis of compatibilist, however, states that we may have free will, even if all of our actions are determined by forces beyond our controls.
However, I have taken a more compatibilist approach towards the argument of free will, determinism, and moral responsibility. I think that determinism lays the foundation for an individual to make a decision by exposing a multitude of possibilities. But, it takes free will to make the decision which in turn makes us partially responsible for our actions since we had various options at hand. I suspect that the concept that free will and determinism can coexist and oftentimes work hand in hand. Since we are predisposed to a particular body, with different DNA, and a unique mindset, I can agree that we are predetermined to think and act a certain way because of genetics and how we were raised. However, I also believe that this is not the only force at hand whenever people make decisions. As we grow and experience the world, we are faced with situations that have us question and rearrange our perspectives and the way we think. This is where determinism comes into play. For example, a child who was taught to eat meat during their early life learns about how the meat industry functions in an Environmental Science class in high school. As a result, they decided to be a vegetarian. This causal event serves as an influence that instilled a new idea into the student. However, it takes free will to ultimately make the decision to convert because it goes against what was determined for the individual. It was their autonomous choice to convert since there were two options at hand: to change their eating habits or to remain the
In philosophy today, free will is defined as, “the power of human beings to choose certain actions, uninfluenced by pressure of any sort, when a number of other options are simultaneously possible.” Philosophers have debated the issue of whether humans truly possess free will since ancient times. Some argue that humans act freely, while others believe that, “Every event, including our choices and decisions, is determined by previous events and the laws of nature—that is, given the past and the laws of nature, every event could not have been otherwise,” which is an idea known as determinism (Barry, #14). This relationship between free will and determinism continues to puzzle philosophers into the twenty-first century. An example of a piece to the free will puzzle, are the schools of thought of Incompatibilism and Compatibilism. Incompatibilism is defined as,
For centuries philosophers have debated over the presence of free will. As a result of these often-heated arguments, many factions have evolved, the two most prominent being the schools of Libertarianism and of Determinism. Within these two schools of thought lies another debate, that of compatibilism, or whether or not the two believes can co-exist. In his essay, Has the Self “Free Will”?, C.A. Campbell, a staunch non-compatiblist and libertarian, attempts to explain the Libertarian argument.
All in all, each view of the philosophy of free will and determinism has many propositions, objects and counter-objections. In this essay, I have shown the best propositions for Libertarianism, as well as one opposition for which I gave a counter-objection. Additionally, I have explained the Compatabalistic and Hard Deterministic views to which I gave objections. In the end, whether it is determinism or indeterminism, both are loaded with difficulties; however, I have provided the best explanation to free will and determinism and to an agent being morally responsible.
Free will is the ability for a person to make their own decisions without the constraints of necessity and fate, in other words, their actions are not determined. Determinism is the view that the initial conditions of the universe and all possible worlds are the same, including the laws of nature, causing all events to play out the same. Events are determined by the initial conditions. Two prominent positions advocated concerning the relation between free will and determinism are compatibilism and incompatibilism. In this essay I shall argue that compatibilism is true. Firstly, I shall explain what compatibilism is and consider possible objections and responses to the theory. I shall then examine incompatibilism and evaluate its strengths and weaknesses and argue that compatibilism is a stronger argument and, as a result, show why it is also true.
Imagine starting your day and not having a clue of what to do, but you begin to list the different options and routes you can take to eventually get from point A to point B. In choosing from that list, there coins the term “free will”. Free will is our ability to make decisions not caused by external factors or any other impediments that can stop us to do so. Being part of the human species, we would like to believe that we have “freedom from causation” because it is part of our human nature to believe that we are independent entities and our thoughts are produced from inside of us, on our own. At the other end of the spectrum, there is determinism. Determinism explains that all of our actions are already determined by certain external causes
Neither soft determinism nor hard determinism successfully reconciles freedom and determinism. Soft determinism fails as it presents a limited type freedom, and it can be argued that the inner state of the agent is causally determined. Hard determinism presents a causally sound argument, whilst ignoring the moral bases of our society. Due to the failure of these theories to harmonize the data, the metaphysical problem of freedom and determinism persists.
“There is a continuum between free and unfree, with many or most acts lying somewhere in between.” (Abel, 322) This statement is a good summation of how Nancy Holmstrom’s view of free will allows for degrees of freedom depending on the agent’s control over the situation. Holmstrom’s main purpose in her Firming Up Soft Determinism essay was to show that people can have control over the source of their actions, meaning that people can have control over their desires and beliefs, and because of this they have free will. She also tried to show that her view of soft determinism was compatible with free will and moral responsibility. While Holmstrom’s theory about the self’s being in control, willingness to participate, and awareness of an act causes the act to be free, has some merit, her choice to incorporate soft determinism ultimately proved to invalidate her theory.
Besides in the case of constraint, (A) the agent could have done otherwise. Then, by extension, it would also be equal to say that (B) if the agent had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise. As Chisholm describes, this later statement is clearly in a accordance with determinism as, even if by an exaggerated chain of causal events, it can be seen that if he had decided to do otherwise, he would have done so. Under this conclusion, if (B) is in agreement with determinism, and (A) and (B) are of equal value, (A) would also be deterministic in nature. Accordingly, it would then be possible to find that (A) is both consistent with determinism and moral responsibility, and that these two theories must also be equal with one another. Additionally, under very specific circumstances it could be possible to find (B) to be true while (A) to be false, such as in the case of a man who, unbeknownst to him, is locked in a certain room with no way out. However, the man in this case is certainly content in the aforementioned room with no intention of leaving. If he had wanted to leave he is of the belief that he would be able to do so, proving (B) true. This is despite the fact that he would not have done this, as he is not able to, showing (A) to be false. Therefore we can see the need for an additional statement (C), he could have
Before I begin it is pertinent to note the disparate positions on the problem of human freedom. In "Human Freedom and the Self", Roderick M. Chisholm takes the libertarian stance which is contiguous with the doctrine of incompatibility. Libertarians believe in free will and recognize that freedom and determinism are incompatible. The determinist also follow the doctrine of incompatibility, and according to Chisholm's formulation, their view is that every event involved in an act is caused by some other event. Since they adhere to this type of causality, they believe that all actions are consequential and that freedom of the will is illusory. Compatiblist deny the conflict between free will and determinism. A.J. Ayer makes a compatibilist argument in "Freedom and Necessity".
The problem of free will and determinism is a mystery about what human beings are able to do. The best way to describe it is to think of the alternatives taken into consideration when someone is deciding what to do, as being parts of various “alternative features” (Van-Inwagen). Robert Kane argues for a new version of libertarianism with an indeterminist element. He believes that deeper freedom is not an illusion. Derk Pereboom takes an agnostic approach about causal determinism and sees himself as a hard incompatibilist. I will argue against Kane and for Pereboom, because I believe that Kane struggles to present an argument that is compatible with the latest scientific views of the world.
In the debate regarding liberty (i.e. free-will) and necessity (i.e. causal determinism), Hume places himself firmly in the compatibilist camp by arguing that both notions can be reconciled. Though some of the arguments he presents in the Enquiry are unconvincing, Hume nonetheless still contributes to compatibilism by defining free-will and determinism in such a way as to avoid the logic of the incompatibilist position.
Freedom, or the concept of free will seems to be an elusive theory, yet many of us believe in it implicitly. On the opposite end of the spectrum of philosophical theories regarding freedom is determinism, which poses a direct threat to human free will. If outside forces of which I have no control over influence everything I do throughout my life, I cannot say I am a free agent and the author of my own actions. Since I have neither the power to change the laws of nature, nor to change the past, I am unable to attribute freedom of choice to myself. However, understanding the meaning of free will is necessary in order to decide whether or not it exists (Orloff, 2002).