Descartes expects one to become master of oneself and "the world" by methodologically suspending his judgement on what cannot qualify itself to be undoubtable. Kant leads us to the point where we can triangulate universal conditions of the possibility of knowledge through individually acquiring the competence to judge the legitimacy of encountered propositional claims. Finally, Fichte confronts us with the idea of the identity of self-consciousness and objectivity. (1) Transcending ordinary life and experience to a somewhat higher being is surely not the scope of transcendental philosophy. What the revolutionary achievements of Descartes, Kant, and Fichte have generically in common is to account for the legitimacy of our knowledge claims or, in other words, for the possibility of autonomy.
In modern philosophy Jeremy Bentham, (1) G.E. Moore, (2) and Nicholas Rescher (3) have tried to mathematize ethics. Such mathematizations square with Quine's view that mathematizing inexact things by way of exact methods marks a successful reduc... ... middle of paper ... ...participants. It misses the mark methodologically, or, as Broadie likens it, it is "playing at ethics" or even a "perversion." It is, as Aristotle sees in the Nicomachean Ethics, a deception, since the underlying longitudinal assumption is that someone thinks they can become good by talking about the good without doing good and without being impacted by doing what they have chosen in a moral feedback loop system.
Hegel countered this notion with the phrase, "What is rational is real, and what is real is rational." He believed that the ability to be understood is a prequalification for something to exist. Also, Hegel completely reversed Kant's idea of the nature of truth. While Kant carefully listed and categorized the components of truth, Hegel stated that truth was an organic and dynamic process that is impossible to break into neat components. In fact, he claims that truth constantly changes and encompasses many contradictions.
John Stuart Mill famously criticized Immanuel Kant and his theory of the Categorical Imperative by arguing that, “[Kant] fails… to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur.” If accurate, this is a debilitating criticism of Kant’s moral theory as he had intended it. Mill’s critique instead classifies Kant’s moral theory as a type of rule utilitarianism. Any action under Kant’s theory is tested as a general rule for the public, and if the consequences are undesirable, then the general rule is rejected. “Undesirable consequences” are, according to the more precise language of Mill’s utilitarianism, consequences which are not a result of producing the greatest happiness.
One of David Hume’s greatest contributions to philosophy is his skepticism in challenging what people think by proposing that even “fundamental truths” could be subjective and caused by our limitations as humans. In his Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, he claims that all matters of fact are developed through people’s experience in life (Hume, David. Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding in Readings in Modern Philosophy, edited by Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins, 336-349. Indianapolis: 11-1, 2000.) In this paper, I will argue that David Hume’s argument for the reduction of matters of fact into experience is faulty since his framework contradicts with itself.
Their common shortcomings are the simplification and to be unable to reveal how the new ideas occur in the process of scientific creation. The irrational theory of discovery advocates "the method of bisection" of discovery and verification and holds that the scientific discovery is "the intuitional result like poetry" (Popper), and doesn't thoroughly have the possibility of epistemological research (L. Laudan) . The problems of scientific discovery should be studies by psychology and sociology.
Ayer uses may different backings to let forth his opinions on the ideas of metaphysics; using the very sentences that metaphysical philosophers write against them, and showing that if an idea cannot be formed through that which we can readily, or actively understand then the ideas themselves have no bearing on philosophy. Ayer states, "A simple way to formulate it would be to say that a sentence had literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable." Ayer starts his justification of the elimination of metaphysics as a science with the simple statement that any metaphysical philosopher is merely spouting nonsense. Ayer believes that in order to truly have any thoughts on the metaphysical world that one must have knowledge above the world of reality, and must actually have empirical evidence of that which is referred to as metaphysical. Ayer does seem to leave a backdoor open for those who refer to themselves as metaphysicians by stating that "it is possible to be a metaphysician without believing in a transcendent reality."
A great philosopher as Immanuel Kant would not have admitted the precariousness of these developments. The “Copernican revolution” from the Critique of Pure Reason demonstrates the substantial role the subject plays for an exterior object to become a phenomenon, in accordance with our human faculties of knowledge (the sensitivity and the intellect). Thus, the subjective side of knowledge is attested, and that happens within a philosophical system, par excellence, objective. The intellect is limited to know only phenomena, the noumenon remaining unknowable. Yet, objectivity does not apply to this type of entity, but exclusively to its phenomenal appearance, in the framework of human experience.
(1) The product of the two distinctions yields three kinds of knowledge: synthetic à priori, analytic à priori and synthetic à posteriori; analytic à posteriori being impossible. For Kant propositions like; "7+5=12," "all bodies have mass" and "every event has a cause." were synthetic and known à priorily. (2) Post-Kantian philosophy witnessed an attack on the possibility of synthetic à priori knowledge such as the rejections of analysis, geometry and arithmetic as synthetic à priori by Bolzano, Helmholtz and Frege respectively. (3) These were motivated by a fear that Kant's conceptualism, of the mind imposing space and time on the world, may lead to anti-realism, such as that of Husserl's bracketing the existence of the world based on his extensions of Descartes and Kant.
Following the construction of the foundations of mathematics, we should agree that the interaction among its concepts (i.e. the rules of the mathematical reasoning) is reduced to the interaction among the natural numbers. Hegel defines them reflexively ,  ensuing from "the qualities" of "the beig" which (conversely) indicates that the mathematical truth denotes something "in the real world." Russell has pointed out that "Hegel's philosophy is very difficult-he is ...the most difficult to grasp of all great philosophers"  (III., p. 337), thus associating him with the philosophers "willing to spread confusion in mathematics"  (III.