In 1993 Samuel P. Huntington wrote an article for the respected journal Foreign Affairs titled “The Clash of Civilizations?”. This article was very controversial and stirred up much debate among scholars, politicians, and anyone interested in the future of international affairs. His book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, is a more detailed exploration of the ideas and predictions put forth in his article. Huntington believes that with the end of the Cold War, the world is divided along the borders of civilizations and religion rather than the boundaries of countries. He identifies eight clearly distinct civilizations: Western (the United States and western Europe), Islamic, Sinic (primarily China), Orthodox (primarily Russia), Japanese, Hindu, Latin American, and African.
The future looks very promising for our economy in more ways of more trade, less protectionism and better technology and communications. However, the world will look to the U.S. as the saver or as the virtue enemy. To our allies we must keep them as our friends, to our enemies we must keep them down and impose our will on them. We must limit weapons of mass destruction, which seems to be the number one threat to our global stability. Finally, we must assistance other nation’s to achieve political, social and economical success.
However, changes within the system will maintain its anarchism. In order to support his thesis, the author replies to liberal critics, who consider the neorealism as obsolete taking into account three important arguments against the neorealism. The first one, refers to democracies. Waltz puts in doubt the peace thesis arguing that the increase number of democracies will not assure peaceful intentions of states towards others. Indeed, Waltz argues that, contrary to peace thesis defenders, the United States and Great Britain, the predominant democracies in the nineteenth century, instead of using force, they used their influence ov... ... middle of paper ... ...reasingly trespassing boarders through globalization.
They used Iraq’s history to argue against the theory of modernization in which as neoliberals, they say “maintains all societies as they grow, which will head towards a more modern and civilized existence, and in particular toward democracy.” Though, the modernization theory still needs an actual success story. Like most neoliberals though, Acemoglu and Robinson do not fail in providing a successful view on America colonization and the historical explanations provide a great backdrop to understanding different development patterns. Why Nations Fail is recommended for anyone who would like to research more on institutional differences across the globe and the impact institutions play on the overall growth of a nation.
The leading American Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis argues that there was “a new consensus emerging – the post revisionist one” (Leffler and Painter 1994 ). According to this consensus, the United States had “become an imperial nation after World War Two” (Leffler and Painter 1994 ) but that the American officials weren’t inspired by capitalist greed or fears of another depression. Gaddis makes a point that “the United States was not a confident power in 1945 and actually had to reshape many of its domestic priorities and institutions to deal with the competition of the Soviets”. (Pipe 2007) In addition, Gaddis outlines three important lessons or ideas in his book. The first being that during the Cold War, “military strength ceased to be the defining characteristic of power itself, which it had been for the past five centuries”.
It is entirely possible the war ended as a political acceptance stance using a similar framework of multiculturalism rather than of direct assimilation of western ideas. However without a doubt the committee for present danger has influenced US foreign policy not only during the cold war but they are now trying to find relevancy within the 21st century (Kirchick 2004). After the cold war the US became a curious hegemony unsure of how to exercise power against those it deemed ‘rogue states’ or how to support diplomatic solutions from global problems. They have been best described as a “superpower without a mission” (Baylis et al. 2008, p. 76).
BACKGOUND Odd Arne Westad, Director of the Cold War Studies Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science, explains how the Cold War “shaped the world we live in today — its politics, economics, and military affairs“ (Westad, The Global Cold War, 1). Furthermore, Westad continues, “ the globalization of the Cold War during the last century created foundations” for most of the historic conflicts we see today. The Cold War, asserts Westad, centers on how the Third World policies of the two twentieth-century superpowers — the United States and the Soviet Union — escalates to antipathy and conflict that in the end helped oust one world power while challenging the other. This supplies a universal understanding on the Cold War (Westad, The Global Cold War, 1). After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union opposed each other over the expansion of their power.
This is misleading because axis implies an alignment of some sort. ... ... middle of paper ... ...aghdad: “I made it quite plain…that it was obvious from the briefings that Saddam had no weapons of mass destruction and had only battlefield weapons…I could not have been more blunt” (Watt-1). After British troops went to Iraq, Cook resigned promptly afterward. Blair went into Iraq with the intention to disarm not to dethrone because of the imminent threat to British interests. The Prime Minister was well aware that President Bush was to go to war in any case, yet Blair believed “it would be more damaging to long-term world peace and security if the Americans alone defeated Saddam Hussein than if they had international support to do so” (Wheatcroft pg.67).
Secondly, Clinton’s actions treat people as a means, not an end. He is using the people of Iraq as a means to get Saddam to comply with the United Nations demands. Clinton is using the threat of decimating cities, and destroying towns as a means to get the terms of the U.N. met. This shows how a second condition of good will is not met. Friedrich Nietzsche would support Clinton’s decision to reject peace and bomb Iraq because according to him, “the will to power determines what is right.” (Kessler, pp.96) According to Nietzsche Clinton sees himself as the origin of moral value in this situation.
Every speech he gives appears to be primarily concerned with shoring up public opinion, warning us about the difficulties ahead and purposefully praising Americans for their "patience and resolve." The administration understands a basic truth about leading a democracy in war: Public support must never be taken for granted. Even in allegedly "easy-to-support" wars, like World War II, political leaders have found it necessary to adjust the military tempo to boost public morale. All the more so in the current campaign, where the course is uncertain and the prospects for immediate success are bleak. Ironically, the initial wave of solidarity behind Bush actually intensifies concern, because there is no way the president can hold on to stratospheric approval ratings.