Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington, DC leaders in our government and military realized that there was a need for a special force with the capabilities to respond to major incidents that typically would involve weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Currently nearly every state and territory in the United States has a rapid WMD reaction force known as a Civil Support Team (CST), these teams are compromised of highly trained multi component individuals ready to respond at a moment’s notice to any conceivable attack that may occur.
The history of the CST is a brief one compared to other units and entities in the Army’s vast history, but this history and necessity is very important. The CST started in 1998 as program to create a reactionary force for any WMD incidents that occur in the United States (Besosa, 2001). There were two critical events that occurred causing the need for the CST to arise and they were the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing. The two incidents, one of international terror and the other of domestic terror, shook our country and showed how vulnerable we truly were. Because of this leaders began to come up with a plan to help lessen the impact of a terror related event in the future. After these two attacks leaders began to develop means to deal with future WMD attacks, but they struggled to determine the best course of action to follow. During the initial development of the CST government leaders had to determine who would lead this charge against or enemy threats. The Department of Defense became the logical choice due to its experience and structure, but there are many limitations on the DOD such as how do we mobilize th...
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...reventing a larger crisis than what could happen in the event of a WMD attack.
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From the creation of the Army’s Technical Escort Unit, there has always been one mission that has never changed; the removal, transportation and disposal of chemical weapons. “The U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit was formed in 1944 and is the longest, continuously active, military chemical unit in existence... The unit was formed as a group of specialist to escort chemical weapons”(Cashman, 2000, p. 104). Although this mission type has not faded, the overall mission of these units has expanded to a larger arena.
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... of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011),III-10
The National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS) directives define the U.S. objectives. In the NSS, the Executive Branch underscored that departments provide assistance and obtain cooperation with the U.S foreign allies. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense NDS directed the Department of Defense to “strengthen and broaden alliances and partnerships” through training and education opportunities. Ultimately the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff NMS instructed the Military Services to comply with the NSS guidelines.
The Army has transformed several times during its history. Adapting to the operational environment is a necessity for the force called upon to prosecute its adversaries. The Army must do what is necessary to protect the U.S. against all enemies, and advance the national interests of the American people. To accomplish this, anticipation of threats is crucial and victory against its adversaries is an imperative. The nation relies on the military for strategic level deterrence and expects that it will be decisive in combat operations. For the military to be successful, it is important that transformation adapt to meet these expectations by conforming to the requirements of a successful force of the future in order meet any new threats in any environment around the world.
In his speech of March 23, 1983, President Reagan presented his vision of a future where a Nation’s security did not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation, but on the ability to protect and defend against such attacks. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program was designed to tell whether, and how, advanced defense technologies could contribute to the feasibility of this vision.
... Sept. 11th, 2001, terrorist attack on theWorld Trade Center and the unreliability of U.S. intelligence onWeapons of mass Destruction in Iraq have been a focus of intense scrutiny in the U.S. in 2004 particularly in the context of the 9/11 Commision , the continuing armed resistance against U.S. occupation of Iraq, and the widely perceived need for systematic review of the respective roles of the CIA, FBI and the Defense Intelligence Agency. On July 9th, 2004 the Senate report of Pre-war Intelligenceon Iraq of the Senate Intelligence Committe stated that the CIA described the danger presented by Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq in an unreasonable way, largely unsupported by the available intelligence. In a briefing held Sept 15th, 2001 George Tenet presented the Worldwide Attack Matrix, a "top-secret" document describing covert CIA anti-terror operations in 80 countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The actions, underway or being recommended, would range from "routine propaganda to lethal covert action in preparation for military attacks". The plans, if carried out, "would give the CIA the broadest and most lethal authority in its history".
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
This paper explores the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID) role as it pertains to military readiness. The emphasis of military readiness is clearly considered by senior military leadership as the top priority. There is a direct relationship between crime prevention and military readiness. Crime prevention techniques used by CID are explored here as they relate to the military’s ability to complete the mission. These tools and techniques should always be evolving in the ever expanding role and responsibility placed on CID pertaining to crime prevention in the military.
Headquarters, Department of the Army (31 August 2007), FM 3-05.132 Army Special Operations Forces Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations,