Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington, DC leaders in our government and military realized that there was a need for a special force with the capabilities to respond to major incidents that typically would involve weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Currently nearly every state and territory in the United States has a rapid WMD reaction force known as a Civil Support Team (CST), these teams are compromised of highly trained multi component individuals ready to respond at a moment’s notice to any conceivable attack that may occur.
The history of the CST is a brief one compared to other units and entities in the Army’s vast history, but this history and necessity is very important. The CST started in 1998 as program to create a reactionary force for any WMD incidents that occur in the United States (Besosa, 2001). There were two critical events that occurred causing the need for the CST to arise and they were the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing. The two incidents, one of international terror and the other of domestic terror, shook our country and showed how vulnerable we truly were. Because of this leaders began to come up with a plan to help lessen the impact of a terror related event in the future. After these two attacks leaders began to develop means to deal with future WMD attacks, but they struggled to determine the best course of action to follow. During the initial development of the CST government leaders had to determine who would lead this charge against or enemy threats. The Department of Defense became the logical choice due to its experience and structure, but there are many limitations on the DOD such as how do we mobilize th...
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...reventing a larger crisis than what could happen in the event of a WMD attack.
Works Cited
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Porteus-Viana, Liza (2012, May 14 ). Guards WMD CST can respond faster than other federal
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The United States Army has been a leader in military prowess on the world stage since its inception in 1775, and with such a record, it is reasonably assumed that there must be solid foundation within the organization working to maintain the high level of performance. The Noncommissioned Officer Corps is one institution within the Army that serves as a large portion of this foundation that makes it the fighting force that it has always been, and the noncommissioned officers have been an integral piece since the very inception of the Army. The Prussian General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, organizer of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, encapsulated this idea when he coined the noncommissioned officer (NCO) as the backbone of the Army. (Arms, 1991) In an Army that is continuously adjusting to world around it while maintaining its status as the military leader to all other nations, the Noncommissioned Officer Corps has always provided the platform for continuity through a growing rank system based on its original core, an evolving training program to develop effective leaders, and a creed that moves us forward while remembering the rich history of the corps that came before us.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), III-1.
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.
...in technology and tactics have made Special Forces units more reliable. For example, the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and the incident with the Somali pirates of the coast of Somalia show the capabilities of today’s Special Forces. The author asserts that, in the future the United States will shift away from major combat operations. These large engagements have proven to be costly in lives and treasure. For that reason, she infers that the US Military will choose the “go small, go long” model for future engagements in the Middle East. Special operation forces are uniquely suited for this model. Their conspicuous nature and low cost make them politically and strategically ideal. The author also suggests that future large scale operations may look like the conflicts in Libya and Somalia rather than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Technical Escort Unit (TEU) now provides the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to include the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an immediate response capability for chemical and biological warfare material. Its mission is to provide a global response for escorting, packaging, detection, rendering-safe, disposing, sampling, analytics, and remediation missions. This does not only include chemical weapons for which it was originally created, but now incorporates biological weapons, state sponsored laboratories, small independent laboratories and small non-weaponized radioactive materials. Most recently, they have been task organized to assist Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as a force multiplier; the objective of this is to give the Battle Field Commander instant on the ground intelligence regarding Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) hazards within their Area of Operations (AO). With this new mission with the BCT, the TEU is becoming an expeditionary force.
O'Shea, Brandon J. "ARMY.MIL, The Official Homepage of the United States Army." "OPERATION POWER PACK. N.p., 20 Apr. 2010. Web. 27 Feb. 2014.
According to Major General Lowenberg in The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security (2005...
In his speech of March 23, 1983, President Reagan presented his vision of a future where a Nation’s security did not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation, but on the ability to protect and defend against such attacks. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program was designed to tell whether, and how, advanced defense technologies could contribute to the feasibility of this vision.
...s in the cohesiveness and mutual trust between the military and the people ' ( AH Nasution , 1953 , ... ) .
... Sept. 11th, 2001, terrorist attack on theWorld Trade Center and the unreliability of U.S. intelligence onWeapons of mass Destruction in Iraq have been a focus of intense scrutiny in the U.S. in 2004 particularly in the context of the 9/11 Commision , the continuing armed resistance against U.S. occupation of Iraq, and the widely perceived need for systematic review of the respective roles of the CIA, FBI and the Defense Intelligence Agency. On July 9th, 2004 the Senate report of Pre-war Intelligenceon Iraq of the Senate Intelligence Committe stated that the CIA described the danger presented by Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq in an unreasonable way, largely unsupported by the available intelligence. In a briefing held Sept 15th, 2001 George Tenet presented the Worldwide Attack Matrix, a "top-secret" document describing covert CIA anti-terror operations in 80 countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The actions, underway or being recommended, would range from "routine propaganda to lethal covert action in preparation for military attacks". The plans, if carried out, "would give the CIA the broadest and most lethal authority in its history".
A defined chain of command with equal representation from all the armed services coupled with standardized clear communication and training throughout the branches, results in an elite fighting force with endless capabilities. Efficiency is the major goal behind Joint Warfare and so long as the clear channels of communication throughout the services hold true, this goal is attainable. This efficiency, though almost impossible to fully achieve, was seen during Desert Storm. During the Desert Storm campaign, General Schwarztkopf was Commander and Chief of US Central Command (USCINCCENT). His first order of business was to name component commanders.
Kent, Randolph and Mackinlay, John. May/June 1997. “International Responses to Complex Emergencies: Why a new approach is needed?” NATO Review, 27-29.