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Airplane Crashes
There are many airplane accidents a year. On an average, 70 –80% are human error. Though there are many other factors, such as design factors, management, and weather factors, human error is the largest. Each one of these factors played a certain role in the three articles of accidents. The BOAC Comet, the PSA crashes in San Diego, and the Air Florida crash in Washington D.C., were analyzed differently, taking into consideration each possible factor. Within the follow, each accident will be discussed.
Summary
The cause in every accident of the BOAC Comet was a design factor. The pressurization limitations were determined wrongly. In the mid air collision in San Diego, the cause was human error of the Cessna pilot for changing headings, the Boeing for not being sure of having the right traffic insight, and the tower for not warning the aircrafts they were very close together when his warning went off. Finally, the Air Florida crash, investigators took into consideration the factors of the weather, engine performance, and pilot error.
Principle Mishaps / Human Factors
The Comet DH-106 was the first jetliner to carry passengers. The person to give credit for this accomplishment would be de Havilland. The DH-106 carried thirty-six passengers, had a pressurized cabin, a ceiling of 40,000ft, and traveled 500mph. According to the investigation of the BOAC Comet, the reason the comets were exploding, was because of the pressurization within the cabin. There was no real sufficient information prior to the flights that indicated there was a problem. At first, the pilots of the comet does not know that in roll out, they need to use a lesser angle of attack and keep the nose on the ground longer. ...
... middle of paper ...
...g its assigned heading from the tower (Liveware).
AIR FLORIDA
H-E
The engine performance of the aircraft (Hardware) due to the weather (Environment).
L-L
The captain being impatient and not getting de-iced (Liveware) and the first officer not speaking up (Liveware).
Conclusion
All accidents have many factors leading up to the event. In these three accidents, Human error was the biggest factor. With the comet, it was the human error of the engineers/manufactures stating falsely that the structure could withstand a certain amount of stress and pressure. In San Diego, ATC and both pilots contributed to the mid-air collision. This was a lack of communication. Finally, with Air Florida, the captain’s attitude, lack of knowledge, and insufficiency with the checklist got them in trouble.
Bibliography:
Air Disaster; Volume 1
Air Disaster; Volume 2
The 25th of September proved to be a tragic day in the legacy of Big Island Air. The final report from the NTSB included that the likely cause of the accident was the pilot’s poor decision to fly into known instrument meteorological conditions of the cloud covered terrain. The final report also concluded that the pilot’s failure to navigate properly and a direct disregard for standard operation procedures were all contributing factors. The pilot’s blatant disregard for flying into instrument meteorological conditions while operating under VFR rules and failing to ever obtain a weather brief all played a major role in this tragic disaster.
On November 28, 2004 at about 10:00 a.m. mountain standard time, a Canadair (now Bombardier) CL-600-2A12 (Challenger 600), tail number N873G, crashed into the ground during takeoff at Montrose Regional Airport (MJT), Montrose, Colorado. The aircraft was registered to Hop-a-Jet, Inc., and operated by Air Castle Corporation doing business as Global Aviation. (Insert Here)The flight was operating under Part 135 Code of Federal Regulations. The captain filed the flight under an IFR Flight plan. Of the six passengers on board, three died from fatal injuries and the other three sustained major injuries. The aircraft was totaled due to the impact with the ground and a post-crash fire.
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On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia was lost due to structural failure in the left wing. On take-off, it was reported that a piece of foam insulation surrounding the shuttle fleet's 15-story external fuel tanks fell off of Columbia's tank and struck the shuttle's left wing. Extremely hot gas entered the front of Columbia's left wing just 16 seconds after the orbiter penetrated the hottest part of Earth's atmosphere on re-entry. The shuttle was equipped with hundreds of temperature sensors positioned at strategic locations. The salvaged flight recorded revealed that temperatures started to rise in the left wing leading edge a full minute before any trouble on the shuttle was noted. With a damaged left wing, Columbia started to drag left. The ships' flight control computers fought a losing battle trying to keep Columbia's nose pointed forward.
Rodney Rocha is a NASA engineer and co-chair of Debris Assessment Team (DTS). When possibility of wing damage appeared he requested an additional imagery to obtain more information in order to evaluate the damage. This demonstrates that he actually tried to resolve the issue. However, due to absence of clear organizational responsibilities in NASA those images were never received. Since foam issue was there for years and risk for the flights was estimated as low management decided not to proceed with this request. After learning of management decision Rocha wrote an e-mail there he stated that foam damage could carry grave hazard and have to be addressed. At the same time this e-mail was not send to the management team. Organizational culture at NASA could be described as highly bureaucratic with operations under standard procedures only. Low-end employees like Rocha are afraid to bring any safety-related issues to the management due to delay of the mission. They can be punished for bringing “bad news”. This type of relationship makes it impossible for two-way communication between engineers and managers, which are crucial for decision-making in complex env...
Travelling at a speed twice that of sound might seem to be something futuristic; however, this feat has already been achieved almost 40 years ago by the world’s only supersonic passenger aircraft-The Concorde. Concorde brought a revolution in the aviation industry by operating transatlantic flights in less than four hours. The slick and elegant aircraft with one of the most sophisticated engineering was one of the most coveted aircrafts of its time. However, this was all destined to end when Air France Flight 4590 was involved in a tragic disaster just outside the city of Paris on July 25, 2000. The crash killed 113 people, but more disastrous was its impact. The belief and confidence people had with Concorde gradually started to fade, and finally Concorde was grounded after two and a half years of the crash. Official reports state that the main cause of the crash was a piece of metal dropped by a Continental aircraft that flew moments before Concorde, but, over the last decade, the report has met a lot of criticism, and many alternative hypotheses have thus been proposed.
In conclusion, many contribution factors led to the Crossair flight 3597 crash but is mainly triggered by Crossair’s incapability of assessment, pilot error and lastly the air traffic controller. Analysis of a flight crash is important so that we will know the causes, thus being able tackle it, making sure that there are no other flight crashes like Crossair flight 3597.
Fifteen years have passed since American Airlines flight 1420 experienced a botched landing tragically killing 10 passengers, the captain, and injuring 110 others. Thankfully, 24 passengers were uninjured, and the first officer survived. This horrific accident could have turned out much worse, but it could have also been easily avoided.
Throughout time it has appeared that most accidents have indeed occurred because of human error. For example, one case of human error would have to be the loss of a sailing yacht called Revonoc, occurring in 1958. This craft belonged to Harvey Conover, a business man of his time. It turns out Harvey Conover sailed his yacht into the eye of a storm. Nobody had ever seen Harvey ever again. (www.bermudatriangleinfo.com)
Plane crashes occur for a number of reasons. There seems to be a consensus with the general public that flying is dangerous, engines fail and planes crash. That is true some times, although the majority of plane crashes occur largely due to a combination of human error and mechanical failure. In much of aviations accidents mechanical failure has been a contributing factor. It is impossible however to blame plane crashes on one reason since events leading up to an accident are so varied. Reasoning for plane crashes can be placed in a broad number of categories.
Simmon, David A. (1998). Boeing 757 CFIT Accident at Cali, Columbia, Becomes Focus of Lessons Learned. Flight Safety Digest.
With any accident investigation one of the main focuses is to determine the cause and factors involved in the accident. Determining the cause of the accident would consist of finding out why the accident happened (NTSB, 2010). This can include any mechanical failures to environmental issue or even human error can be a serious cause to an aircraft accidents. All facts, conditions, and circumstances are taken into account when determining the probably cause in an investigation (NTSB, 2010).
The presidential commission examining the Challenger mishap put a decent part of the fault on defective administration rehearses at the space organization. Key data was not being identified with top administration, for example, the developing worry about the O-rings. It additionally blamed NASA for withholding data from the general
When I stepped into the large neatly organized white polished plane, I never though something would go wrong. I woke up and found myself on an extremely hot bright sunny desert island filled with shiny soft bright green palm trees containing rough bright yellow hard felt juicy apples. The simple strong plane I was in earlier shattered into little pieces of broken glass and metal when crashing onto the wet slimy coffee colored sand and burning with red orange colored flames. After my realization to this heart throbbing incident I began to run pressing my eight inch footsteps into the wet squishy slimy light brown sand looking in every direction with my wide open eyes filled with confusion in search of other survivors. After finding four other survivors we began moving our small petite weak legs fifty inches from the painful incident. Reaching our destination which was a tiny space filled with dark shade blocking the extreme heat coming from the bright blue sky, I felt my eyelids slowly moving down my light colored hazel eyes and found myself in a dream. I was awakened the next day from a grumbling noise coming from my empty stomach.
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