Cartesian Dualism and the Union of Mind and Body

Cartesian Dualism and the Union of Mind and Body

ABSTRACT: Cartesian dualism and the union of mind and body are often understood as conceptions that contradict each other. Diachronic interpretations maintain that Descartes was first a dualist (in the Meditations) and later on developed his stance on the union of mind and body (Passions). Some authors find here a problem without solution. Nevertheless, in the last two decades, some interpretations have been developed intending to give a positive solution to the difficult relation between Cartesian dualism and the union of mind and body. The problem that I find in most of them is that they try to show no incoherence between Descartes' dualism and his conception of the union and interaction by "weakening" or making more "flexible" the dualist doctrine. I develop a synchronic interpretation, based on textual evidence, in order to show that dualism and union appeared simultaneously in Descartes' works. Under this perspective, my claim is that Cartesian radical dualism and the union of mind and body can be coherently understood only because they belong to different domains of knowledge. Thought and matter are clear and distinct primitive notions that come from reason, whose role is laying the foundations for Cartesian metaphysics and physics, while the primitive notion of union is acquired by the senses and lacks clarity and distinction even while it serves the objective of founding Descartes' moral philosophy.

Rene Descartes is well known for his dualist conception. At the same time, Descartes recognized the intimate relation between the human mind and body. Several authors have understood this as a contradiction within Cartesian philosophy.

Truly, when Descartes argues in fa...

... middle of paper ...

...

(10) A. Kenny 1968: Descartes: A Study of the Philosophy (Nueva York: Random House) p. 224.

(11) D. Garber 1983: "Understanding Interaction: what Descartes should have told Elisabeth," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 21, p. 21.

(12) Ibid., p. 27.

(13) Ibid., p. 29.

(14) Cf. Richardson, Op. Cit.; Garber, Op. Cit. and 1992:

(15) Descartes Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press); Cottingham, Op, Cit.; Bentez, Op. Cit. and 1993b: El Interaccionismo Cartesiano y el Problema de la Glndula Pineal, in L. Bentez, ed., Homenaje a Descartes (Mexico: FFyL-UNAM); Madanes 1993: Abandonamos la Partida? Consideraciones sobre el Problema de la Relacin Mente-Cuerpo, in Bentez 1993a, Op. Cit.

(16) I am working on this subject, especially on the Cartesian semantics where I think we can find the arguments that point to an answer to this problem.