Averting Arguments: Nagarjuna’s Verse 29
ABSTRACT: I examine Nagarjuna’s averting an opponent’s argument (Verse 29 of Averting the Arguments), Paul Sagal’s general interpretation of Nagarjuna and especially Sagal’s conception of "averting" an argument. Following Matilal, a distinction is drawn between locutionary negation and illocationary negation in order to avoid errant interpretations of verse 29 ("If I would make any proposition whatever, then by that I would have a logical error. But I do not make a proposition; therefore, I am not in error.") The argument is treated as representing an ampliative or inductive inference rather than a deductive one. As Nagarjuna says in verse 30: "That [denial] of mine [in verse 29] is a non-apprehension of non-things" and non-apprehension is the averting of arguments or "the relinquishing of all views." "Not making a proposition P" would be not speaking P or silence with regard to P (where P is some opposing view) and, as Sagal argues, not meaning a global linguistic silence (where P stands for any proposition whatsoever). Such an interpretation would lead to attributing wholesale irrationalism to Nagarjuna-something I wish to avoid.
In this paper I examine Nagarjuna averting an argument of an opponent (Verse 29 of Averting the Arguments), Paul Sagal's general interpretation of Nagarjuna, (1) and the former's conception of "averting" an argument. Since I focus my discussion around verse 29, we shall begin with it, then possible interpretations of it, and finally move to considerations of how to best characterize Nagarjuna's "stance" (for lack of a better word) given that verse.
Verse 29:
If I would make any proposition whatever [P], then by that I would have a logical error [E]...
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...ent way (83).
(5) See The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamkakarika, translation and commentary by Jay L. Garfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
(6) Consult, e.g., J. N. Mohanty, "Indian Theories of Truth: Thoughts on Their Common Framework," Philosophy East and West, vol. 30, no. 4 (October, 1980): 439-451, esp. 441.
(7) Garfield (note 5), 352: Verse "30. I prostrate to Gautama/Who through compassion/Taught the true doctrine,/Which leads to the relinquishing of all views."
(8) Reprinted in Understanding Non-Western Philosophy, 180-181; and World Philosophy, 107-110.
(9) David Michael Levin has an interesting, recent interpretation along these lines; see his "Liberating Experience from the Vice of Structuralism: The Methods of Merleau-Ponty and Nagarjuna," Philosophy Today, vol. 41, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 96-111.
...objects and gods differ only in degree and not in kind''. From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 44.
Pattanik, Dipti R. "The Holy Refusal': A Vedantic Interpretation of J.D. Sallinger's Silence." Melus 23.2, (Summer 1998): 113, (15). Ebsco.
Henry E. Allison (1981). Transcendental Schematism and The Problem of the Synthetic A Priori. Dialectica 35 (1):57-83.
These statements assert that the negative ( or contradictory) of an alternative proposition is a conjunction which the conjuncts are the contradictions of the corresponding alternants. That the negative of a conjunctive is an alternative proposition in which the alternants are the contradictories of the corresponding conjuncts.
Armstrong, Karen. Buddha. New York: Lipper/Penguin, 2004. 66-98. Print.
As we delve deeper into the Philosophical understanding of William Clifford and Blaise Pascal we gain a new understanding of evidentialism and non-evidentialism. Having studied both Pascal and Clifford I lean more with Pascal and his thoughts and teachings that you do not need to have evidence to believe in a higher power. This paper will continue to give more examples of Pascals teachings of non-evidentialism and why I agree with them.
... a Moral Monstrosity.” In Dynamic Argument. Ed. Robert Lamm and Justin Everett. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007. 425-26.
In fact, we see that (1) is a logically necessary truth, the denial of which is self-contradictory. As David Oderberg argues:
Lochhead, Carolyn. A Legacy of the Unforeseen. 2006. Elements of Argument: A Text and Reader. By Annette T. Rottenberg and Donna Haisty. Winchell. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martins, 2009. 706-10. Print.
Some kinds of utterances which have an indicative grammatical form seem, for different reasons, to be unable to say something true of the world. Logical contradictions are only the prime example of something the author baptizes impossible descriptions. So-called performative contradictions (e.g., "I do not exist") make up another kind, but there are at least two more such kinds: negating affirmations and performatives which cannot be explained within the philosophy of language. Only philosophical anthropology can explain their feature of "impossibleness," and a distinction between unreflective and reflective consciousness is central to the explanation. Particularly important here is G. H. Mead's distinction between two aspects of the self: the "I" and the "me." Each of the four kinds of impossible descriptions distinguished has its own contrary opposite. These are, in turn, logical tautologies, performative tautologies, affirming negations, and omissive performatives. The last three types as types have not received the philosophical recognition that they deserve. All four fit a general characterization which is given as a definition of the concept of superfluous description.
Cleanthes. "Cleanthes Hymn to Zeus." Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus. Trans. M. A. C. Ellery. Prof.
As a reader it is difficult to separate ones analysis of such a commanding piece of work from ones own constructed systems of meaning. Because of this, actual meaning is tricky to assert with certainty as it is subject to change as easily as reality is subject to influence. This may be beside the point, however; for it seems as though what matters in structuralism is the recognition that everyone, and everything everyone creates or does, is in some part connected to a system of meaning which informs and influences varying interpretations of what is real and true of the world and its diverse inhabitants.
Upon reading about the historical and religious background of Ancient India, one can clearly assume that the country was strongly influenced by three main religious teachings: Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism. These three sects in religious thinking have many similarities as all recognize the life-cycle and the need of liberation, they worship one central deity that used to be a human who gained enlightenment and they all recognize the existence of the eternal soul and after-death re-incarnation. However, they also share a lot of differences that mark the underlying principles of practicing them. I will identify the scope of differences and similarities in these ancient religions in an attempt to understand why each attracted followers, why each was shaped a certain way and how they preserved the interest of followers on into the modern times as well.
Robinson, R. R. (1994). Some methodological approaches to the unexplained points. Philosophy 2B/3B (pp. 27-34). Melbourne: La Trobe University.
Hinduism has been a religion for a long time, the Buddha was a Hindu before seeing how terrible the world was, he then found the religion Buddhism. Since the creator of Buddhism was Hinduism as a child, it is only expected for the two religions to be similar. While the two religions are similar they are also quite different as seen by their creation stories. The creation stories are these religions way of explaining how the world started. With most religions the creation story gives the most basic beliefs of the religion as this is where their religion supposedly starts its life. The two stories this paper focuses on is no different, and since they technically have the same origin, it can be obvious as to how they would be similar. However, in the case of the idea of social order and moral decline, they can be different too.