Aristotelian Intellectual Intuition, Basic Beliefs and Naturalistic Epistemology

Aristotelian Intellectual Intuition, Basic Beliefs and Naturalistic Epistemology

ABSTRACT: I first argue that Aristotelian intellectual intuition (recognizing archai through epagoge and seeing their truth by recognizing their explanatory power through nous) generates basic beliefs which are not inferred — inductively or deductively — from other beliefs. Both involve synthetic intuitive insight. Epagoge grasps a connection and nous sees its general applicability. I next argue that such beliefs are properly basic by adapting an argument made by Hilary Kornblith. According to Kornblith, the world is objectively divided into natural kinds. We humans perceive the world divided into natural kinds. There is empirical evidence suggesting that we divide the world not only as it is objectively divided, but in making inductive inferences, that is, in inferring that an object will have certain properties on the basis of its having others. This grounds the reliability of (certain) inductive inferences. But the leading principles (in Peirce’s sense) of these inferences are basic beliefs generated through intellectual intuition. Hence intellectual intuition generates certain properly basic beliefs.

For Aristotle science is demonstration from first principles. But how does one arrive at these first principles? We observe particular instances and record those observations in memory. This material generates a logos, a meaning. (1) This is the process of epagoge which frames or formulates the archai. We recognize that archai are true, we come to believe them, by the operation of nous. Through nous we come to recognize the explanatory power of archai. In recognizing this, that the archai are true to the facts, we recognize their truth. Particular experiences suggest a certain arche. But nous lets us see that this arche "is the way in which the facts can be understood." (2) But, as Randall emphasizes, nous does not intuit the explanatory power of these archai independently of, or in abstraction from, the facts they explain. "Nous does not `see' the truth of archai by holding them up, in isolation ..., and just staring at them; it `sees' their truth in the subject matter." (3)

Does intellectual intuition generate basic beliefs? Experience suggests archai; nous grasps their truth by seeing that they explain certain facts. Are these archai then inferred beliefs, inferred from the facts they allegedly explain? Are they conclusions of arguments whose premises describe these facts? Aristotle views science as deductive system. The arche of that science would not be deduced from more basic first principles.