them, and supported the claim of excess lands being given away. The Apex Court rejected both the claims of fraud and excess land being given and the Government was asked to pay costs of Rs. 5lakh to the company. The apex Court also asked the High Court to initiate criminal proceedings against the chief secretary and another officer of the state Government for not telling the whole truth in their sworn affidavits.
Whatsoever the Court did not take into consideration the substantive issues behind the allegations as to whether the land transferred was excess or more specifically if unwanted lands near Bangalore were turned over to the NICE Company, where the prices had raised to sky. The courts have gone by the earlier assurance of the Government has only a “minimum” amount of land was given to the company. In reality, inappropriate Governments need not act in public interest and may certainly abuse their “eminent domain” powers and aid and abet “eminent thievery”. Under these circumstances the courts can come to the rescue of the public interest, but in this case, unfortunately they did not take such a position. The case also raises the suspicion that the courts have blindfolded themselves to the facts on the ground, under the argument of “resjudicata”. This means that if some issues are settled in the court once, the same issues cannot be re-agitated. This principle was considered as applicable even to public interest litigation.
The BMIC project is based on the concept of internalizing the external benefits of a project to make it financially and economically viable. By this, the 111 km access controlled expressway can avail of the profits generated by developing five townships along the route, corporate and commercial centers nea...
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...been filed only to protect the interests of such influential persons. If that be so, the petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out at the threshold and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs." Once the motives became suspect, the decision was simple. It said, "Once it is held that the FWA is valid and proper, the extent of land required for the project forms part thereof in terms of schedule I and findings in this regard having become final and conclusive, it is not open to the state government nor to J C Madhuswamy and others, and not even to this court to reopen those issues once again." Thus it answered, "The second part of the second question in the negative, refraining from answering the first part of the secondquestion, as that would mean deciding the contractual disputes between the parties, which is not the scope of the present proceedings".51
AWI presented two arguments against the injunction, 1) that it fails to maintain the statutes quo, and 2) that it does not serve to cure the Plaintiff’s injury. The Court of Appeals first found that an injunction should attempt to preserve the period when there were no issues between the parties, which in this case, was when AWI pumped less water. Second, the Court of Appeals found that an injunction need not cure the Plaintiff’s injury, but instead should serve to guard against future injury. While AWI alone may not be causing the entire drawdown, stopping their pumping should increase the overall supply of groundwater. In general, the Court of Appeals found that the District Court correctly applied the law in granting the injunction. After Garetson, senior waters users will find that injunctive relief will be a strong and available tool in future water disputes.
The court ruling was accurate and fair, however the amended EIR should have been sent back to the planning commission for review however it was not required. According to CEQA" guidelines and the city's municipal ordinances there was not requirement for the commission to review the amended EIR for any further recommendations, however it would have everyone happier they had.
Were there any civil lawsuits in addition to criminal penalties? No, there were not any civil law suits in this case
As Vance Hughston writes “the major problem with the system for resolving native title claims is not hard to identify. It is the significant time and resources needed to resolve those native title claims which are opposed by government and other respondents” (Calma, 2009). Therefore, it is evident that the Native Title procedure needs some reforms to counteract the unjust requirements set out in section 223 of the Native Title Act 1933 (Cth). Within this section, it clearly expresses the marginal requirements imposed on the Native Title claimants – particularly subsection C. This subsection outlines the ongoing relationship that a native title claimant would have to sustain in order to be eligible for a possible trial. However, it poses many problematic and difficult situations towards the claimant, as they have to prove a continuous relationship with the land since sovereignty. In addition, section 237 of the Native Title Act states that the land mustn’t be partially or wholly extinguished by Government actions. If wholly extinguished, i.e. when claimants want areas such as “privately owned freehold land, pastoral or agricultural leases, residential, commercial, community purposes and in areas where governments have built roads, airports, railways, schools and other public works”, the
Despite the efforts of lawyers and judges to eliminate racial discrimination in the courts, does racial bias play a part in today’s jury selection? Positive steps have been taken in past court cases to ensure fair and unbiased juries. Unfortunately, a popular strategy among lawyers is to incorporate racial bias without directing attention to their actions. They are taught to look for the unseen and to notice the unnoticed. The Supreme Court in its precedent setting decision on the case of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), is the first step to limiting racial discrimination in the court room. The process of selecting jurors begins with prospective jurors being brought into the courtroom, then separating them into smaller groups to be seated in the jury box. The judge and or attorneys ask questions with intent to determine if any juror is biased or cannot deal with the issues fairly. The question process is referred to as voir dire, a French word meaning, “to see to speak”. During voir dire, attorneys have the right to excuse a juror in peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges are based on the potential juror admitting bias, acquaintanceship with one of the parties, personal knowledge of the facts, or the attorney believing he/she might not be impartial. In the case of Batson v. Kentucky, James Batson, a black man, was indicted for second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During the selection of the jury the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike out all of the four black potential jurors, leaving an all white jury. Batson’s attorney moved to discharge the venire, the list from which jurors may be selected, on the grounds that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges violated his client’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to have a jury derived from a “cross-section of the community”(People v. Wheeler, 583 P.3d 748 [Calif. 1978]). The circuit court ruled in favor of the prosecutor and convicted Batson on both counts. This case went through the courts and finalized in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Equuscorp launched proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria against each of the respondents. Equuscorp’s claims were for “loss and damage” for breach of the loan agreements and for money had and received. The trial judge dismissed Equuscorp’s contractual claim in all eight cases and upheld the restitution claim in two cases. The respondents appealed this decision in the Supreme Court of Victoria’s Court of Appeal. In this appeal, the majority held that the trial judge erred and that Equuscorp was not entitled to restitution. Equuscorp appealed against the decision of the Court of Appeal in relation to the three respondents. Its grounds for appeal included that the Court of Appeal erred in deciding: a) that Equuscorp was not entitled to restitution for the unenforceable loan agreements; b) that it was not unjust for the respondents to keep the amounts pursuant to the unenforceable loan agreements; and c) that restitution was not assigned as a right or remedy to recover the amounts under the unenforceable loan agreements.
The Wik case is very similar to the Adnyamathanha’s current land claim in that several areas of native territory had been given up for pastoral lease by the Crown. In Wik, the ratio decendi was that the legislation for the pastoral leases did not provide exclusive land rights or possession to the current tenants, and that the Crown was ultimately the owner of these lands. The High Court ruled that native title therefore could co-exist with current pastoral leases in the area without significantly disrupting either parties’ right to the land. However, in the event of a conflict of rights (i.e. if the grazing and watering area of a farmer disrupted the fishing activities of Indigenous people) the native title over that particular area would be extinguished by the pastoral lease. This decision was upheld in Ward, where Kirby J stated that, “given that substantial and complex amendments to the NTA were enacted by the federal parliament upon the basis that Wik correctly stated the law,” the holding in Wik should not be revisited. However, Wilson v Anderson [2002] HCA 29 (“Wilson”) (a contemporaneous case to Ward) dismissed the findings in Wik. Callinan J noted that there was a lack of unanimous finding in Wik about the factors needed for non-exclusive possession of land rights and subsequently Wik should, “only be binding if the provisions of the Western
Therefore, the court evaluated the facts the Plaintiff provided and evaluated if they support a reasonable belief that the Defendants’ statements were misleading. The court held that (1) Defendants statement that Plaintiff would double his money is mere puffery and no reasonable investor would rely on such representations; (2) the table of financial projections must be viewed only as “estimates” and not binding, which do not demonstrate fraudulent intent; (3) the e-mail was not sent to Plaintiff. Therefore, it is not relevant to Plaintiff’s claim; (4) Because Defendants could not have disclosed the ongoing litigation at the time Plaintiff made first investment, Defendants did not violate the securities laws by failing to inform Plaintiff of litigation; (5) documents given to Plaintiff prior to investment expressly acknowledged potential challenges with respect to permitting. The false statements related to permits were not sent to Plaintiff before his decision to invest. Therefore, those misrepresentations are not actionable under the provisions of the Exchange act relied upon by the
...iminatory, making it increasingly difficult for Indigenous people to prove their Native Title rights. Justice Michael Kirby and Justice Mary Gaudron did find, in favour of the Yorta Yorta argument that the connection to the land does not necessarily have to be continuous to be able to successfully prove a native title claim. However, the High Court still dismissed the Yorta Yorta people’s claim, due to the majority of judges asserting that the land had not been maintained sufficiently to prove native title. This case holds as an example for a decision that wasn’t just; further measures could have been taken to ensure that the outcome was fair.
Generally speaking, the legal system didn¡¦t play a very active role in this case. First of all, the India government could do more on digging the truth of the gas leak out and set a more strict standard to regulate such dangerous plants in case that another crisis. Second, I didn¡¦t see any one who worked in the Union Carbide¡¦s Bhopal plant should be responsible for that tragedy. Does it mean that all that the India court wanted was money or it just wanted to reduce trial and subsequent appeals because it might have taken more than twenty years?
Apparently McLaughlin did not think so and felt that by the action of Mr. Heikklia by changing the cost of parcels mean that they were without a “meeting of the minds.” There was no deal since the land transaction was not in writing. Then Mr. McLaughlin sued Mr. Heikklia on the grounds “to compel specific performance of the purchase agreements under the terms of the agreements before Heikkila withdrew his offer” (Cheeseman, 2013).
The Supreme Court requires that waiver in criminal proceedings be made voluntarily. The Fourth Amendment right against search and seizure may be waived voluntarily when there is a showing of consent. The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination requires that waiver (in the context of confessions) must be made voluntarily. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court made it clear that the voluntariness of the waiver of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was a fundamental concern central to the creation of Miranda Warnings. There, the Court was concerned about the coercive effect of interrogation and sought to protect individuals from the coercion by requiring the iteration of Miranda Warnings in order to establish
In this case, the Respondent was working as the Superintendent of Central Excise. He was subjected to a punishment of withholding 50% of the pension and 50% of his gratuity. A writ petition was filed in the High Court which was later moved to the Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal held the punishment to be too severe. Again an appeal was made to the Supreme Court. The Court set aside the order of the Tribunal saying that the original punishment was not found to be too severe when the Wednesbury Test was applied to it and hence, it was rational and reasonable. This Court observed that:
The rule of law, simply put, is a principle that no one is above the law. This means that there should be no leniency for a person because of peerage, sex, religion or financial standing. England and Wales do not have a written constitution therefore the Rule of Law, which along with the parliamentary Sovereignty was regarded by legal analyst A.C Dicey, as the pillars of the UK Constitution. The Rule of Law was said to be adopted as the “unwritten constitution of Great Britain”.
Law Commission accepted that there are compelling reasons due to which the concept of overriding interest cannot be abolished altogether. And denying of overriding status will contradict paramount policies. However, LRA 2002 has affected it in a number ...