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thesis on mary anne warrens on the legal statusof abortion
moral permissibility of abortion mary anne warren essay
analytical summary of Mary Anne Warren's essay, "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,
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For Warren the central question in the debate over abortion is the status of the fetus as a moral person. According to Warren a fetus, while part of the human community in the genetic sense, is not a member of the moral community as it does not meet the personhood criteria, and therefore can be justifiably terminated. It’s important to note the difference between being a biological and moral member of a community. A fetus is biologically human but that doesn’t make it morally human, instead, as Warren presents, a list of criteria must be met to be considered a person and part of the moral community.
An interesting point is that Warren doesn’t say that being human, or of the species Homo sapiens, is a criterion to personhood. This leaves the opening for any other species that may one day meet these criteria to be morally considered as persons, such as chimps, dolphins, or even aliens.
Warren’s five criteria for personhood are consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, capacity to communicate, and presence of self-concepts. While not a definition of what it is to be a person, it does list the central features of moral personhood. The first three particularly seem to encompass the base necessity of cognitive functions to be able to think in a moral fashion. Unfortunately a fetus cannot be said to exhibit any of the five criteria, with the exception of consciousness, and is therefore morally comparable to a chicken or a fish. This comparison is a problem for many who argue that the fetus is a person on account of it being human, but as we already noted that is not enough. "If the right to life of the fetus is to be based upon its resemblance to a person, then it cannot be said to have any more right to life than a ne...
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...en asserts that there is a difference and I’m inclined to agree. "So long as the fetus is unborn, its preservation, contrary to the wishes of the pregnant woman, violates her rights... The minute the infant is born, however, its preservation no longer violates any of its mother's rights, even if she wants it destroyed, because she is free to put it up for adoption". The right the mother has to terminating an abortion is dependent on the fetus’s own violation of the mothers’ freedom such that as soon as the fetus is no longer violating the mothers’ rights, the mother herself has no right in violating the fetus/infants existence. Thus Warren’s argument doesn’t support infanticide and she can safely refute the objection that her defense of abortion permits infanticide.
Warren, M. (1982). On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, Questions of Life and Death, 397-403
In A Defense of Abortion (Cahn and Markie), Judith Thomson presents an argument that abortion can be morally permissible even if the fetus is considered to be a person. Her primary reason for presenting an argument of this nature is that the abortion argument at the time had effectively come to a standstill. The typical anti-abortion argument was based on the idea that a fetus is a person and since killing a person is wrong, abortion is wrong. The pro-abortion adopts the opposite view: namely, that a fetus is not a person and is thus not entitled to the rights of people and so killing it couldn’t possibly be wrong.
In her essay, “A Defense of Abortion,” Judith Jarvis Thompson outlines the most common arguments that people defend, and explains her views regarding each of these. She shares numerous examples and situations that she believes will support her views. One of her most prominent arguments is that of whether or not a fetus has moral standing as a “person.” She highlights the so called “battle” between an innocent life, the fetus, and the bodily rights of the mother. Within this argument, Judith outlines for us several situations which can provide people with a different outlook regarding abortion. Throughout Judith’s essay, she does not truly give a clear stance, but rather allows her readers to choose for themselves.
Abortions occur for all types of reasons, whether it is because the pregnancy was unplanned, rape-induced, or that it holds a life threatening capacity for the woman herself. Pro-lifers believe once one is conceived, he or she are entitled to a right to live. It does not matter whether or not the pro-lifers are able to prove that a fetus consists of personhood. The life of a potential person should not be able to override the right to one’s body. Judith Thomson presents a though experiment where personhood is granted to a fetus, but how that mere fact still fails to override the woman’s right to her body.
Mary Anne Warren’s “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion” describes her justification that abortion is not a fundamentally wrong action for a mother to undertake. By forming a distinction between being genetically human and being a fully developed “person” and member of the “moral community” that encompasses humanity, Warren argues that it must be proven that fetuses are human beings in the morally relevant sense in order for their termination to be considered morally wrong. Warren’s rationale of defining moral personhood as showcasing a combination of five qualities such as “consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, capacity of communication, and self-awareness” forms the basis of her argument that a fetus displays none of these elements that would justify its classification as a person and member of the morally relevant community (Timmons 386).
“I argue that it is personhood, and not genetic humanity, which is the fundamental basis for membership in the moral community” (133). This is the central idea in Mary Anne Warren’s argument on the personhood of a fetus. She argues that in order for a genetic human being to be considered a person, he or she would have to possess all of the six criteria’s of personhood which include sentience, ability to reason and emotionality. In order to determine the viability of the personhood of a fetus she argues two things. Firstly, Warren argues that even on the surmise that a fetus has a strong right to life, abortion can still be seen as morally permissible. Warren demonstrates this by using Judith Johnson’s Violinist analogy, which asks the basic
Warren argues against a fetus being a human in the moral sense. She states we can say a fetus has moral sense to be a human but not in the genetic sense. In order for a fetus to be human in the moral sense it has to be a being in the genetic sense. Warren thinks a fetus does not have full moral status because they are not persons. To be a person you have to have equal moral rights. Warren feels a fetus at any stage will not resemble a person or have significant right to life. A fetus does not have the ability to make decisions or have memories, therefore making them have no right to life. Warren states that a fetus is not a person and should not have morally rights. Warren stated in Potential Personhood and The Right to Life that a fetus does not resemble a person in anyway. She asks about the potential that could develop if the fetus is given the chance to become a person. “It is hard to deny that the fact that an entity is a potential person is a strong prima facie reason for not destroying it; but we need not conclude from this that a potential person has a right to life, by virtue of that potential”(Warren, p.472). After analyzing the concept of a person Warren has come to the conclusion that a fetus at any stage of development does not resemble a person enough to have right to life or potential for being a
The standard argument against abortion claims that the fetus is a person and therefore has a right to life. Thomson shows why this standard argument against abortion is a somewhat inadequate account of the morality of abortion.
Firstly, Marquis makes clear that we are working under the assumption that the fundamental disagreement present in the abortion debate is whether or not the fetus is a being worthy of being saved, and cites several writers that also believe in this fundamental disagreement to support his case. He then examines this paradigm as it pertains to the abortion argument, with pro-choicers on one side saying that fetuses are not rational actors, and pro-lifers on the other side saying that life begins at conception and making emotional appeals. He writes that the prima facie cases of the pro-choice and anti-abortionist movements are, respectively, that “being a person… gives intrinsic moral worth,” It is only… wrong to take the life of a member of the human community;” “It is always… wrong to take a human life,” and “it is always… wrong to end the life of a baby.” Marquis does not, in actuality, reject the validity of either side’s claims (185).
...e open to all women at any point of pregnancy, and that the woman reserves the right as a fully conscious member of the moral community to choose to carry the child or not. She argues that fetuses are not persons or members of the moral community because they don’t fulfill the five qualities of personhood she has fashioned. Warren’s arguments are valid, mostly sound, and cover just about all aspects of the overall topic. However much she was inconsistent on the topic of infanticide, her overall writing was well done and consistent. Warren rejects emotional appeal in a very Vulcan like manner; devout to reason and logic and in doing so has created a well-written paper based solely on this rational mindset.
The conservative argument asserts that every person has a right to life. The foetus has a right to life. No doubt the mother has a right to decide what happens in and to her body. But surely a person’s right to life is stronger than the mother’s right to decide what shall happen to her body, and so outweigh it. So the foetus may not be killed and an abortion may not be performed (Thomson, 1971)
Many arguments in the abortion debate assume that the morality of abortion depends upon the moral status of the foetus. While I regard the moral status of the foetus as important, it is not the central issue that determines the moral justifiability of abortion. The foetus may be awarded a level of moral status, nevertheless, such status does not result in the prescription of a set moral judgement. As with many morally significant issues, there are competing interests and a variety of possible outcomes that need to be considered when making a moral judgement on abortion. While we need to determine the moral status of the foetus in order to establish the type of entity we are dealing with, it does not, however, exist in a moral vacuum. There are other key issues requiring attention, such as the moral status and interests of the pregnant woman who may desire an abortion, and importantly, the likely consequences of aborting or not aborting a particular foetus. Furthermore, I assert that moral status should be awarded as a matter of degree, based upon the capacities of sentience and self-consciousness an entity possesses. In a bid to reach a coherent conclusion on the issue, the moral status of both foetus and woman, along with the likely results of aborting a particular foetus, must be considered together. Given the multiple facets requiring consideration, I assert that utilitarianism (Mill 1863) offers a coherent framework for weighing and comparing the inputs across a variety of situations, which can determine whether it is ever morally justifiable to have an abortion.
Singer first points out that the different opinions on abortion come from the debate on when a human life actually begins. He formulates the common argument against abortion as follows: it is wrong to kill an innocent human being; a human fetus is an innocent human being; therefore, it is wrong to kill a human fetus. It is because killing a human being is undoubtedly wrong and immoral that the opposition instead attempts to deny the second part of the argument “a human fetus is an innocent human being”. By doing so, critics argue that the fetus does not have the status of a human being. This debate results in focusing on whether, or when, the fetus can be considered a human being, and therefore given the same rights against being killed as another human being. Singer however claims that it is difficult to find a moral dividing line between a fetus and a human being because the development of the human egg to a child is gradual. To prove his point, he describes four commonly proposed moral lines (birth, viability, quickening, and consciousness), which he then denies with strong arguments.
Thomson starts off her paper by explaining the general premises that a fetus is a person at conception and all persons have the right to life. One of the main premises that Thomson focuses on is the idea that a fetus’ right to life is greater than the mother’s use of her body. Although she believes these premises are arguable, she allows the premises to further her explanation of why abortion could be
Most people define abortion as the deliberate termination of a pregnancy and it still one of the most popular topics today. In the reading of On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion by Mary Anne Warren, she argues that it is morally permissible for a woman to have an abortion. There are many arguments about abortion that include people saying it is equivalent to murder and also saying that telling a woman she can’t have an abortion deprives her of her right to make the decisions about her own body. Some of the topics that are being argued is 1) is a human fetus really a human being. 2) fetal development and the right to life. 3) if so, what is the moral and legal status of an abortion?
It is fully dependent on its mother 's body, unlike born human beings. Even if a fetus was alive, the ‘right to life’ doesn 't imply a right to use somebody else 's body. (Millstein par. 3). A fetus cannot survive on its own and if the caregiver does not want to bring the “fetus” into the world, then, unfortunately that is their decision. “People have the right to refuse to donate their organs, for example, even if doing so would save somebody else 's life. The "right to life" also doesn 't imply a right to live by threatening somebody else 's life. Bearing children is always a threat the life of the mother.” (Millstein par. 4). In a nutshell, we see the author clearly advocating for women’s rights and discussing whether the fetus is a human life or not. The author strongly believes that the fetus is not a fully functioning organism and should therefore not be given the option of living. That option is solely up to the mother.” Banning abortion violates a woman 's right to control her own body.” (Millstein par. 38). The author believes that when you don’t give a woman the right to choose what’s the best option for them, then that it is violating women’s