Analysis Of Augustine's Free Will

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limitedly free beings; to say that a certain world is more valuable than any other appears to be simply an arbitrary statement. Moreover, it is necessary to contemplate whether humans are indeed free, as Augustine argues. There is always a possibility that we are totally determined. After all, one may argue, humans do not freely decide to be born, do not freely decide to be the recipients of a free will, and do not freely decide to live in a world dominated by a God that in the end decides whether one receives punishment or reward. In other words, if one looks at the world this way, i.e., a place created and totally dominated by God who decides what is morally good, who ultimately decides the fate of every human being, it seems that humans are not significantly free after all, unless one considers freedom from God’s perspective.
As a matter of fact, Augustine does not realize that if it is as he argues that God foreknows every event in the world, then God created determined creatures that have no knowledge of being determined. Augustine points out that, “…although God foreknows our future wills, it does not follow from this that we do not will something by our own will.” ( Augustine’s argument here supports my criticism. Namely, what follows from this argument is that humans in reality are not free because every action that they will is necessary, thus already pre-determined by God. What Augustine does not realize is that his argument actually proves that humans have no knowledge of being determined—but they are determined! Therefore, as I shall point out, God could have created a determined world, without evil, where beings act freely not knowing that they in fact are determined.

I would like now to turn to my first ch...

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...y in question is able to do anything that it chooses to do. The second point is that the idea that God cannot create a world with free beings that never choose to do evil is contradictory if we consider the existence of Heaven, which allegedly is an evil-free place where beings are free to exercise their will and apparently never choose to do evil. But I will address this issue later on. First of all, the definition of omnipotence that I provided, of course, might be rejected by theologians who object that “being able to do anything that one chooses to do,” for example, does not include “creating a world with free beings that never turn away from the good and never choose to do evil.” But the problem is that if God is omnipotent but there is one thing he cannot do, it follows that omnipotence is not one of God’s attributes or omnipotence in this case is a misnomer.
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