An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence Distinction?

Suhrawardí and the philosophy of Light Mysticism

ABSTRACT: The distinction between existence and essence within contingent beings is one of the foundational, hegemonic ideas of the discourse of medieval philosophy. Building upon neo-Platonic precursors, thinkers such as Avicenna, Aquinas and William of Auvergne discussed this issue and debated the nature of the distinction. However, one Islamic philosopher who was to have a lasting impact upon the development of philosophical discourse in Iran, subverted the traditional Peripatetic visions of reality and brought into question the very nature of half of the distinction — existence. Through a critique of the Peripatetic notion of existence, Suhrawardi (c.1191) shows how the distinction is absurd and irrelevant for metaphysical inquiry. Suhrawardi refuses to accept traditional Peripatetic realism and has little need for the distinction's role in affirming contingency and the existence of a Necessary Existence. Later Islamic philosophy's insistence on an essentialist reading of Suhrawardi could be described as a category mistake confusing his concept of light with their concept of existence. An analysis of his major texts will show how this cannot be the case. Finally, an attempt will be made to explain this misreading and suggest that the Platonic hermeneutic of essential vision which Suhrawardi expounds might be the reason for it.

Shihåb al-Dín Suhrawardí [exe.1191] was an influential mystical philosopher and founder of the school of ishråq (illumination) whose phenomenological view of reality led him to reject the concrete nature of existence. Suhrawardí's position on existence and his basic rejection of a metaphysics of distinction represent both an alternative to Peripatetic metaphysics as well as provide a key to understanding the radical synthesis of later Islamic philosophy by Mullå Íadrå [d.1641]. The central issue revolves around an anachronistic reading of a later aporia: where does Suhrawardí stand on the question of primacy within the distinction between existence and essence? Is essence or existence primary ? Traditionally this question has been answered by Mullå Íadrå and his school by stating that Suhrawardí believed in asålat al-måhiyya (primacy of quiddity). This claim has to be verified and explained. Four central questions emerge. What does existence signify for Suhrawardí and is it ontologically distinguished from being? Is 'light' the same as being as understood by Íadrå? How does Suhrawardí understand the distinction and relate it to his metaphysics of contingency?

i) Wujúd and Existence in Suhrawardí

Suhrawardí sets out in the logic of Óikmat al-Ishråq, 'The wisdom of illumination' his mature magnum opus, to deconstruct the distinction through a critique of the Peripatetic theory of definition.