Ambiguity Decision-Making Theory

Introduction
Background
In a comprehensive review of the literature on high stakes, ambiguous decision-making, Kunreuther et al. cited Zeckhauser and Viscusi (1990) and argued, “Most understanding about high stakes decision-making comes from the study of individuals. We know surprisingly little about how such decisions are resolved by groups, firms, and governments, and the role that social influences play on individual decisions” (2001, p. 266). The authors then suggested that future research must “Provide better theories of high stakes decisions at the group, organizational and societal levels” (Kunreuther et al., 2001, p. 266). They continued by suggesting that we lack scholarly tools that are compatible with the study of ambiguity and

Although a central premise of the rational decision making theory is one of consistent preferences and identities, decision-making becomes much more complicated when decisions are made in groups. Notably, decision-making conflict results from inconsistencies. From the rationalist perspective, group decision making is conducted in situations in which there are inconsistencies among group members’ preferences and identities. March (1994) suggested that these inconsistencies are common and “…predictable facts of social, economic and political life” (p. 106) and that “…the level of interpersonal inconsistency varies with the mix of preferences and identities, with the level of available resources and with aspirations for resources” (p. 107). Because of these inconsistencies, definitions of appropriate behavior are also inconsistent. As such, unlike in individual decision-making, decision-making in multiple-actor/groups/teams can lead to complications. In these situations, March (1994) has argued that the decision-making problem, then, is that of aligning preferences and identities so that these inconsistent partnerships become consistent (p.

Specifically, within the naturalist tradition, both the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model and the Expert-based Intuitive Team Decision (EBITD) models are reviewed. These models have an advantage over the rationalist models, particularly as they relate to the studied context. In this next section, the naturalist perspective is highlighted and its usefulness is evaluated in analyzing multidisciplinary group decision-making in ambiguous, uncertain, and high-stakes situations. Unlike traditional decision-making models that require well-defined or stable goals, the RPD and EBITD models serve to define and take action on ill-defined problems that may not be constant. Thus, these models are efficient and effective in high-stakes situations when time pressures override requirements for accuracy and when taking immediate “good enough” action is of primary importance. The naturalist models also have an advantage over the rationalist models because they are more comprehensive, though still somewhat limited, when dealing with consensual decision-making in groups, particularly in complex situations. These advantages are essential when analyzing multidisciplinary group decision-making in ambiguous, uncertain, and high-stakes