Alan Soble’s article “Sexual Use and What to do about It

Soble outlines “Kant’s sex problem” and Kant’s solution, Soble also gives his own solutions, and in learning both I feel the solution is in externalism. Immanuel Kant defines his second formulation of the Categorical Imperative as knowing the value of a person. It is demeaning to use a person without his or her consent for self-gratification, especially sexually. Kant describes this as using a person simply to serve a means rather than an end, simply put rather than being a concrete loving act with the end of creating new life sex treated as only “scratching an itch”. The idea that Kant, “must take on the other’s ends for their own sake, not because that is an effective way to advance my goals in using the other,” is a way of saying that a man must care enough about the other person treat them as fairly and justly as he wants to be treated (Soble 228).

Sartre and the Rationalization of Human Sexuality ABSTRACT: Sartre rationalizes sexuality much like Plato. Rationalization here refers to the way Sartre tries to facilitate explanation by changing the terms of the discussion from sexual to nonsexual concepts. As a philosophy which, above all, highlights those features of human existence which seem most resistant to explanation, one would expect existentialism to highlight sexuality as a category that is crucial for considering human existence. Descartes comes immediately to mind when one focuses on Sartre's major categories. In Sartre's case however, it is not mind and matter but consciousness and its opposite: "nothingness" and "being."

They were seen as a violation of marriage bonds, the law and with these a violation of what was naturally determined. (Foucault, 1990, p. 38) The modern concept of homosexuality comes from a desire to see sexuality as a fundamental aspect of who we are. But is this desire correct? And more importantly: Is sexuality a part of identity within the terms of Foucault’s theory? To be able to answer this question it is first noted to make clear what is meant with the terms of “sexuality” and “identity”.

Catcalling, by reducing the person solely to their physical appearances and lastly, fantasising about someone, as it objectifies them solely on their physical appearances and can in turn symbolise men or women holistically (Halwani, 2010, pp 186). Allowing for a broader discussion in relation to when sexual objectification is morally permissible (if ever), idea’s constructed by Immanuel Kant, Martha Nussbaum and David Soble are broadly evaluated in order to construct when sexual objectification is permissible. When a person is sexually objectified by another, ones dignity and humanity is reduced by handling them solely based on their phy... ... middle of paper ... ...ted in a marriage cannot be sexually objectified and treated in an impermissible way. Though contradictory of Kant’s views of sexual objectification, Nussbaum believes sexual objectification is permissible if it is done simultaneously, with a mutual respect and if the parties are of equal social status, eliminating any risks of feeling dehumanised or subordinate. Lastly, the concerns surrounding pornography and sexual objectification are exploited through Soble’s view, illustrating that when sexual objectification is put into context with pornography, it is morally wrong as it defeats the purpose of humanity by treating one solely as a sex object.

Such meaning will emerge when (i) both men and women have identities as subjects, and (ii) the difference between them can be expressed. I aim to elucidate both conditions by appropriating Irigaray's 'Questions to Emmanuel Levinas: On the Divinity of Love.' I. Introduction Here I appropriate two questions from Luce Irigaray's 'Questions to Emmanuel Levinas: On the Divinity of Love' in order to disruptively refigure Paul Ricoeur's account of self-identity, without assessing Irigaray's reading of Levinas. Irigaray suggests the possibility of tracing sexual difference in philosophical accounts of personal identity.

This definition provides Nagel with a basis for describing sexual perversion as anything that lacks the progression of arousal between two or more conscious individuals eventuating in physical contact that emb... ... middle of paper ... ...sophy of Sex”, describes Immanuel Kant as a “metaphysical sexual pessimist” as sexual activity for Kant shows the individual as an “object of appetite” (Soble 5). The fact that an act is sexual does not change the moral standards that it must adhere to, and thus allows acts regarded as perverted in the socio-cultural norms not to be regarded as immoral. Works Cited Collins, Louise. “Is Cybersex Sex?”. The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings.

This approach should be of credit to philosopher Jacques Lacan because symbolic order gives the system and signs of convention that determines our perception of what we see as reality. With the exception of ... ... middle of paper ... ...Bodies 10). The very act of saying something about sex ends up imposing cultural or ideological norms, according to Butler. As she puts it, "'sex' becomes something like a fiction, perhaps a fantasy, retroactively installed at a prelinguistic site to which there is no direct access" (Bodies 5).

But this contradicts the principle of social monogamy, because we think the two go hand in hand. The reality is the two terms are fundamentally different and therefore, they have a hard time relating. Emotional dependency is a foundation for the modern relationship, while more and more, we stray from sex as a basic principle. That’s the problem: we are sexual creatures and require sexual elements in a relationship. Now this is not to say base it all off sex, but honor the fact that our bodies use sex as a physical connection to another person.

Therefore, these arguments would not make sense for a person who has a low view of human morality. Since, these arguments cannot prove Christian sex ethics to someone who does not accept his basic beliefs, informing them would strengthen his reasoning. For example, Goldman’s Plain Sex says that by separating love and sex it is possible to enjoy sex without running into ethical problems. Goldman’s definition of plain sex is that the purpose of sex is to achieve human contact in order to achieve physical pleasure (). Furthermore, this will allow sex to be only be surrounded by ethics that are same as other activities.

This second part of the argument is contrary to what many of you have claimed. At the outset of this paper I would also like to state my support of Thomas Nagel’s argument holding that the connection between sex and reproduction has no bearing on sexual perversion. (Nagel 105) I will begin first with the idea that sexual behavior should not be granted its own moral code. Sexual ethics only makes sense if sexuality plays a unique role in human life. If procreation has significance precisely because it is a contribution to God's ongoing work of creation, sexuality is supremely important and must be governed by restrictive rules, which would therefore prohibit sexual acts that are not for procreative purposes.