Over the past ten years, in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) theaters, airspace management was relatively simple for the Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) across all the US military services. With the exception of the initial pushes into Afghanistan and Iraq, the US operated in an air supremacy environment. Besides the occasional small arms and MANPADs, there was no true threat to fast moving aircraft. This allowed US and Coalition fighters and bombers the ability to fly CAS missions uncontested, resulting in virtually worry free situations when servicing CAS targets for ground units.
As of late, the largest scale operations occurred at the Battalion (BN) or Company (CO) level and operated independently with little command and control (C2) from Higher Headquarters (HHQ). The JTAC would submit pre-planned Joint Tactical Air request with the minimal requirements to provide armed overwatch or general ISR and only be responsible for CAS/ISR assets that will operate within a particular Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ). The CAS role was strictly utilized in a reactionary manner and more or less served as a defense mechanism for troops in contact situations (TIC).
JTACs typically did not have to worry about adjacent units’ areas of operation as Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) very seldom conducted simultaneous BN missions. The enemy was in the form of insurgency where they did not wear uniforms and hid in plain sight. Commanders did not truly own battlespace as the US was charged with peace keeping type operations as opposed to fighting a uniformed enemy with the sole purpose of taking away land in order to meet a particular endstate.
In addition, issues such as the activation proce...
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...son J. Rickard
“A Guide to Modern US Army Artillery Capabilities, Limitations, and Tactics” Maj Timothy Fitzpatrick
“Informal Fire Support Coordination At the FEBA: A Look At Procedures” Capt Edward A. Kostelnik, Jr.
“ASOC Airspace Management” Power Point Presentation, 6th Combat Training Squadron
“Intelligence Preaparation of the Battlefield” Power Point Presentation, 6th Combat Training Squadron
“Airspace Coordination Area Development” Power Point Presentation, 6th Combat Training Squadron
“Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense” Power Point Presentation, 6th Combat Training Squadron
“Battlefield Geometry” Power Point Presentation, 6th Combat Training Squadron
“Joint Battle Command Systems” Power Point Presentation, 6th Combat Training Squadron
TSgt Nick Corona, JTAC AIC, personal interview
MSgt Matthew Tinck, JTAC AIC, personal interview
In Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Iraqi forces fired 93 Scud missiles at coalition forces in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. (Rostker) Air Defense Artillery (ADA) played an immensely significant role in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm with units from 11th Brigade Air Defense Artillery and the 32d Air Defense Command rapidly deploying into theater. The effectiveness of the units and their roles in fighting this war proved that Air Defense Artillery was critical to the success of the campaign. Although Patriot Batteries placed strategically throughout Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel played a tremendous tactical role in these wars, High-Medium Air Defense (HIMAD) was not the only type of surface to air missile system in place to protect ground forces and valuable military assets. Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) units also deployed with the air defense units. These weapon systems, integrated with ground forces, provided air defense to dominate against aircraft and Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBM) on the front lines.
The positions that were held by the Americans were enviable, the line between the two Axis forces; von Arnim’s army in the north and Rommel’s in the south-central, were stretched thin and weak. The center of the Allied Forces with a significant strike would be able to pierce the defenses on the coastlines and separate them all the way to Sfax. The joint forces manned the line from the northern parts of the country to the south, with the British military undoubtedly the most prepared of the joint forces. The American military marched along with the joint forces all the way through the country of Algeria to gain control and hold strategic battle positions on the eastern part of Tunisia Dorsal Mountains. The American Army had never before engaged in any major encounters with the Germans, who would later be nicknamed “the first team”. The lack of experience will prevail once Von Angrnim’s army in the north attacks the center of the Allied Forces. A line that was enforced by the French and the American Forces failed to come to the aid of the French. The Joint Forces were not impressed by the lack of actions and effort the American Forces had shown, which created doubts within the British and French forces about their Allies of the New World. The lack of training on the maneuver and tactical side of the operations, not only left the American Forces
"NFPA 1710: Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, 2010 Edition." National Fire Protection Association. N.p., 1 Jan. 2010. Web. .
"NFPA 1710: Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, 2010 Edition." National Fire Protection Association. N.p., 1 Jan. 2010. Web. 25 Mar. 2014. .
The first failure experienced during the operations was that US Africa Command (AFRICOM) was an incomplete geographic combatant command (GCC). AFRICOM was established in 2008 as a new kind of geographic combatant command (GCC), one foc...
The 2nd Brigade of 101st Airborne Division found out in the summer of 2004 that they had to prepare for the war in the Middle East more particularly for Iraq. With Colonel Todd Ebel in Command of the 2nd Division with a year to prepare over 3,400 men and woman he got right to work. Colonel Ebel started by choosing his staff and who he thought was fit to take charge and lead this ever more complicated war. It was a huge religious civil war taking place in Iraq at the time with the Sunnis at war against the Shi’ite and after the capture of Saddam insurgency started uprising immediately. This uprising along with the uprising of Muqtada al-Sadr a key leader that had lots of violent followers that soon grew into a form of a militia called Mahdi Army which became another huge problem for the U.S. because the line between a legitamite populist movement and a huge theocratic organized-crime and terror ring was a thin one. The 2nd Brigade Infantry Battalions consisted of 1-502nd (First Strike) and 2-502nd (Strike Force) and 2nd brigade as a whole is known as the “Black Hearts”. Ebel’s mission was to deny insurgent’s access to Baghdad through his AO and as intelligence increased to uproot and destroy insurgent safe havens, while also training the IA so they could ensure the stability of the region later on. Ebel chose Lt. Col. Kunk as commander of “First Strike” 1-502nd and Lt. Col. Haycock as commander of “Strike Force” 2-502nd. By Ebel’s personality evaluations of Kunk and Haycock he decided that Kunk would work in the area that involved him being more engaging where populist centers were and work with local officials and Haycock more in the fighting areas. Kunk was in command of 3 rifle companies, 1 weapons company, 1 logistics company...
COL Freeman’s first step in the operations process was to understand the operational environment and the problem he was facing. The mission of the 23rd RCT at Chipyong-ni was to dominate the road intersection at the center of the village and occupy the high ground ringing t...
...ilar concepts yet different terms to describe irregular warfare. The Army uses the term hybrid threat to describe conditions in which the Army and the joint force is engaged in operations other than traditional force on force high intensity operations. The Marine Corps uses the 3 block concept to describe its approach to irregular warfare and relies on the commander to react with the appropriate operational approach in time and space throughout his area of responsibility. It is imperative for the joint force and all government stakeholders to reach a consensus on the definition of irregular warfare in a time that is characterized by persistent conflict and reduced budgets. Failure to do so could result in loss of institutional knowledge, inefficient processes, flawed doctrine and a waste of resources across the military and other government stakeholder agencies.
... of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011),III-10
Sharpe, Col. (Ret.) James Jr. and LTC (Ret.) Thomas Creviston, “Understanding Mission Command.” www.Army.mil. (2013) http://www.army.mil/article/106872 (accessed 20 February, 2014).
Total Force Integration (TFI), is the unification of military components to accomplish missions in a joint environment. In today’s Air Force, TFI is becoming more prevalent than ever. I currently work in a TFI unit where an Air National Guard (ANG) component and an Active Associate Unit component oversee one weapons system. Hence the reason why I found the Cooperation Negotiation Strategy (CNS) to be the most important concept.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), III-1.
- - -, dir. “Tactical Air Control Party Specialist (TACP).” U.S. Air Force. U.S. Air Force, n.d. Web. 7 Feb. 2012. .
The Technical Escort Unit (TEU) now provides the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to include the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an immediate response capability for chemical and biological warfare material. Its mission is to provide a global response for escorting, packaging, detection, rendering-safe, disposing, sampling, analytics, and remediation missions. This does not only include chemical weapons for which it was originally created, but now incorporates biological weapons, state sponsored laboratories, small independent laboratories and small non-weaponized radioactive materials. Most recently, they have been task organized to assist Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as a force multiplier; the objective of this is to give the Battle Field Commander instant on the ground intelligence regarding Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) hazards within their Area of Operations (AO). With this new mission with the BCT, the TEU is becoming an expeditionary force.
___. Army Doctrine Reference Publication The Operations Process May 2012. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2012.