Agreeing With Russell's Analyses of Sentences and Refuting Strawson's Objection

2370 Words5 Pages
bulb-icon

Recommended: Russell's Theory of Descriptions

Introduction In this paper I will argue that Russell's analyses of sentences is successful and that the objection brought by Strawson can be refuted. Russell’s theory of definite descriptions contains a significant insight in that Russell’s view that what appears to be referential propositions are in fact quantificational is correct. Russell's theory of definite descriptions Russell propounds two theses, one about names and the other about definite descriptions. This paper deals with Russell's analysis of definite descriptions, 'the F', and his theory of their proper logical analysis. Definite descriptions are complex quantifier phrases to be analysed as follows: The F is G, which has the logical form ∃x(Fx & ∀y(Fy → x=y) & Gx). Russell's philosophic goal was to show up superficial similarities in sentences and reveal the underlying logical structure of natural language sentences, thus doing away with ambiguity or vagueness found in language. The heart of Russell’s theory of descriptions, is that definite descriptions, ‘The so and so’, are not singular terms (which take their semantic value from the object), thus they do not refer to a singular object. Russell argues that this shows that surface form does not reveal logical structure and he takes a non-referential interpretation. Russell argues that definite descriptions are general terms, thus the phrases refer to objects that satisfy a general condition. The distinctions that Russell draws between different logical forms allowed him to explain three important puzzles concerning names and definite descriptions: empty names, substitution into belief contexts, and informativeness of identity statements. This paper will only show how Russell’s analysis solves the problems of e... ... middle of paper ... ...analyzed retains its significance. However, there are a number of objections to Russell not covered in this paper and it seems overall truth-value judgments are a subject that still open for debate. References Donnellan, Keith S. (July 1966). "Reference and Definite Descriptions". The Philosophical Review (The Philosophical Review, Vol. 75, No. 3) 75 (3): 281–304. doi:10.2307/2183143. JSTOR 2183143 Ludlow, Peter, "Descriptions", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . Russell , Bertrand. ‘On Denoting’ Mind, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 56. (Oct., 1905), pp. 479-493. Russell, Bertrand, ‘Descriptions’ A.W. Moore, ed., Meaning and Reference, OUP 1993) Strawson, P. F. ‘On Referring’, Mind, New Series, Vol. 59, No. 235. (Jul., 1950), pp. 320-344

Show More
Related

  • Kripkenstein: Rule and Indeterminacy

    4651 Words  | 10 Pages

    ABSTRACT: Indeterminacy theories, such as Wittgenstein's and Kripke's indeterminacy principle on rules and language and Quine's indeterminacy of radical translation, raise some fundamental questions on our knowledge and understanding. In this paper we try to outline and interpret Wittgenstein's and Kripke's indeterminacy, and then compare it to some other related theories on indeterminacy of human thinking, such as raised by Hume, Quine, and Goodman.

    Read More

  • Wittgenstein's 1913 Objections To Russell's Theory of Belief: A Dialectical Reading

    2401 Words  | 5 Pages

    The purpose of my talk this afternoon is to make clear what I shall call, following Burton Dreben, a dialectical reading of Wittgenstein's dismissal of metaphysics in the context of his pre-Tractatus objections to Russell's 1913 theory of belief.

    Read More

  • Russell, Strawson, and William of Ockham

    4040 Words  | 9 Pages

    I won’t be able to defend Ockham’s nominalism by refuting all of the many versions of the competition one by one. What I propose to do instead is set it up in relation to the celebrated exchange between Bertrand Russell and P. F. Strawson. In this exchange, Russell and Strawson were trying to figure out how a sentence can be meaningful even when the thing the subject of the sentence refers to does not exist. Russell makes what I take to be the classic realist mistake; Strawson, the conventionalist. In what follows I will first explain Ockham’s alternative and then show why I think it compares favorably against these twentieth-century counterparts.

    Read More

  • Defining a Rigid Designator

    3209 Words  | 7 Pages

    Now let us talk a little about different theories about semantics of proper names. Th...

    Read More

  • The Virtues of the Vices of Virtue Ethics by Robert Louden

    1596 Words  | 4 Pages

    American Philosophical Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1984): 227-36.

    Read More

  • Summary Of B. Russell's The Argument For Other Minds

    1146 Words  | 3 Pages

    The problem I hope to expose in this paper is the lack of evidence in The Argument from Analogy for Other Minds supporting that A, a thought or feeling, is the only cause of B. Russell believes that there are other minds because he can see actions in others that are analogous to his own without thinking about them. He believes that all actions are caused by thoughts, but what happens when we have a reaction resulting as an action of something forced upon one’s self? Such as when a doctor hits your patellar tendon with a reflex hammer to test your knee-jerk reflex. Russell does not answer this question. He is only “highly probable” that we are to know other minds exist through his A is the cause of B postulate.

    Read More

  • George Herbert Mead: The Self, ''Me'' and ''I''

    3163 Words  | 7 Pages

    A logically self-contradictory utterance is not only false, it cannot possibly describe anything. Therefore, it may also be called an impossible description. A tautological utterance, on the other hand, says something true, but it supplies no new information about the world. Therefore, from a common sense point of view, it is a superfluous description. There are at least, I will show, three other kinds of utterances which adequately can be called impossible descriptions and three which can be called superfluous descriptions. Only views which belong ...

    Read More

  • The Relationship Between the Transactional Model, and the General Adaptation Syndrome

    1591 Words  | 4 Pages

    Gross, R (2010). Psychology: The science of mind and behaviour. 6th ed. London: Hodder Education. p188.

    Read More

  • Aphorism

    1078 Words  | 3 Pages

    Wolf, Manfred. "The Aphorism." ETC: A Review of General Semantics 51.4 (1994): 432-439. Web. 21 Feb 2011.

    Read More

  • Frege on Reference and Sense

    1743 Words  | 4 Pages

    Atomic sentences have truth-values that evaluate the application of a concept to an object that is being referred. To find what the sentence refers to, the referent of the predicate must be applied to the referent of the subject. Connectives are vocabulary like “and”, “if”, and “not” that are functions from truth-values to truth tables. Each of these provide the basis for Frege’s language system such that we are able to speaking in our ordinary language, but still maintain the mathematical connection he attempts to establish early. Frege’s use of language and sentences being functions with variables is consistent with how he defines the basic constructs of what are needed in a human language.

    Read More

  • Russell's Theory on Definite Description

    1627 Words  | 4 Pages

    A definite description is a phrase which is commonly written in the form ‘the so-and-so’ in which “so-and-so” is a singular noun. An Example of definite descriptions is “the President of Russia”. Apart from “the-so-and-so”, definite descriptions can also take the form of possessives such as “Mr. Smith’s daughter”.

    Read More

  • Substitutivity in Semantic Logic

    3925 Words  | 8 Pages

    The problem of substitutivity has always been a thorn in the side of the study of semantic logic. Why does it sometimes appear that terms that refer to identical objects cannot be replaced with each other in propositions without altering the truth value or meaning of said proposition? Leibniz's Law would seem to ensure that we could perform such an action without anything significant having changed, but this is clearly not so. I intend to look at the history, not only of this problem, but of the theories that have created an atmosphere in which these questions can be contemplated. Finally, I will offer some of my own insights and perceived problems.

    Read More

  • Wittgenstein’s Context Principle

    2513 Words  | 6 Pages

    ...ty requires a certain qualification on the combination of names in a proposition. This requirement cannot be fulfilled by any model of meaning that does not incorporate Wittgenstein’s context principle. Wittgenstein is acutely aware that to say how the character of the name restricts its use in a proposition is impossible. Consequently, he argues that this can be seen in the behavior of names in a proposition; by observing names in the context of a proposition, we learn their meaning without it being told to us in the manner that the aforementioned models attempt to do.

    Read More

  • Ayer's Language, Truth, And Logic

    1123 Words  | 3 Pages

    Ayer's categorization of language places philosophical propositions in a logical system. Wittgenstein had proposed that logical propositions were nonsensical for the reasons that Ayer categorized them as logically significant; they do not correspond to sense data or anything in the world that can be explained by natural sciences. Instead, propositions of philosophy, aesthetics and even the divine lay in the novel formal and material category of logic.

    Read More

  • Grice’s Theory of Implicature

    2035 Words  | 5 Pages

    ... to define a pragmatic language that can capture the true meaning of our thoughts and sentences in a formal language. This is significant because as often as we do stick to the Cooperative Principle and the maxims that Grice specifies, there are times where we stray from these cooperations to purposefully create implications. Because we do not normally ignore this Cooperative Principle without good reason, implicature is a strong way to get a point across. While Grice’s theory of implicature seems to fall short of setting up a complete evaluation process with which to decipher these points, there are some good things within his argument. Although Grice’s theory does not give a full solution to the formalist and infomalist problems or supply a flawless technique to evaluate implicature all the time, it is worth thinking about and applying to our everyday language.

    Read More

More about Agreeing With Russell's Analyses of Sentences and Refuting Strawson's Objection

Open Document