In the following essay I will discuss whether it is possible for judgements of the aesthetic quality of works of art to be always merely personal; and what are the circumstances in which they are not personal. I will demonstrate what the necessary conditions are for an aesthetic judgement to be made accurately. I would, therefore, suggest that if aesthetics of the judgements of taste are merely personal, then these judgements would be improper, therefore proper judgements of taste are not personal. There are several arguments to support my thesis. In the first part of the essay, I examine Hume’s argument on establishing a ‘Standard’ of taste. In the second part of this essay, I look at the valuable interpretation of judgments of beauty by Immanuel Kant and his criteria for what may count as a judgement of taste.
David Hume’s aesthetic theory concentrates on taste as human responsiveness to beauty. According to Hume, judgments of beauty are judgments of taste and not of reason, and taste operates in agreement with universal principles, which might be revealed through observational investigation. His essay, first published in 1757, “Of the Standards of Taste” strives to answer the longstanding question of the objectivity of judgements of taste. Hume argues that there are no objective criteria which regulate the correctness of judgements of taste. He never withdraws his belief that recognition of beauty is fundamentally reliant on sentiment. His essay on taste, however, is his defense of an aesthetic standard in which he declares that some opinions are better than others in the sense of being more accurate .
Hume illustrates that not all opinions are equally good, but they appear to have the same claim upon us. He discusses how...
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...open to men to say: Every one has his own taste. This would be equivalent to saying that there is no such thing as taste, i.e. no aesthetic judgment capable of making a rightful claim upon the assent of all men.
Works Cited
Bell, C., Art (London: Chatto &Windus, 1928);
Gaiger, J., “The Aesthetics of Kant and Hegel” A Companion to Art Theory, Paul Smith and Carolyn Wilde (eds.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002);
Hume, D., “Of the Standard of Taste” The Philosophical Works, vol. III, edited by Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose (Aalen: Scientia, 1964);
Kant, I., The Critique of Judgement, translated with analytical indexes by James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952);
Minor, V.H., Art History’s History (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001);
Wollheim, R., Art and its Objects (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978);
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kempsmith. New York: The Humanities P, 1950.
In Gaut’s essay, “The Ethical Criticism of Art”, he addresses the relevance of an art piece’s ethical value when making an aesthetic evaluation. His key argument revolves around the attitudes that works of art manifest such that he presents the following summary “If a work manifests ethically reprehensible attitudes, it is to that extent aesthetically defective, and if a work manifests ethically commendable attitudes, it is to that extent aesthetically meritorious”. In direct contrast with formalists, who divine a work’s merit through an assessment of its style and compositional aspects, Gaut states that any art piece’s value requires a pro tanto judgement. This pro tanto position allows for pieces considered stylistic masterpieces, to be
In this essay, I will argue that Hume’s response to the “missing shade of blue” example is satisfactory. Firstly, I shall explain Hume’s account of the relationship between impressions and ideas and the copy principle. I shall then examine the “missing shade of blue” and its relation to this account. I shall then explore Hume’s response to his own counter-example and evaluate his position by considering possible objections and responses to his view. I shall then show why Hume’s response to the “missing shade of blue” example is satisfactory.
Recent literature has aimed to reconcile the content of Kant and Aristotle’s work on morality, or at least, to compare the theories as though they are contending. However, I shall argue that the two philosophers are answering intrinsically different questions. If two philosophers operate within a precise domain of philosophy, it can be tempting to assess their distinct arguments as disagreeable with the other. However, in some cases, their arguments may be aimed at responding to different questions. In such instances, endeavors to reconcile or compare the fabricated ‘opposition’ between two arguments can be unproductive and perplexing, ...
In this article Winckelmann states that the good taste in art that is present in contemporary works stems from the work of the ancient Greeks. The beauty in the modern works of artists like Raphael (especially his Madonna and child with St Sixtus and St Barbara) hold such beauty, complexity of emotion, and good taste because he draws on the ideas set up by the great ancient sculptures and society in which they lived and drew inspiration from. Winckelmann categorizes the ancients greatness into two main ideas that are necessary for contemporaries to draw from in order to reach greatness: Natural beauty and noble simplicity and quiet grandeur.
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Trans. H. J. Paton. 1964. Reprint. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 2009. Print.
Though most works of art have some underlying, deeper meaning attached to them, our first impression of their significance comes through our initial visual interpretation. When we first view a painting or a statue or other piece of art, we notice first the visual details – its size, its medium, its color, and its condition, for example – before we begin to ponder its greater significance. Indeed, these visual clues are just as important as any other interpretation or meaning of a work, for they allow us to understand just what that deeper meaning is. The expression on a statue’s face tells us the emotion and message that the artist is trying to convey. Its color, too, can provide clues: darker or lighter colors can play a role in how we judge a piece of art. The type of lines used in a piece can send different messages. A sculpture, for example, may have been carved with hard, rough lines or it may have been carved with smoother, more flowing lines that portray a kind of gentleness.
Before Hume can begin to explain what morality is, he lays down a foundation of logic to build on by clarifying what he thinks the mind is. Hume states that the facts the mind sees are just the perceptions we have of things around us, such as color, sound, and heat (Hume, 215). These perceptions can be divided into the two categories of ideas and impressions (215). Both of these categories rely on reason to identify and explain what is observed and inferred. However, neither one of these sufficiently explains morality, for to Hume, morals “. . .excite passions, and produce or prevent actions” (216)....
Philosophies of Art and Beauty Edited by Hofstadter and Kuhns, (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1976) chapters one and two for an overview of the aesthetics of Plato and Aristotle.
Kant, Immanuel. "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Immanuel Kant." Fifty Readings Plus: An Introduction to Philosophy. Ed. Donald C. Abel. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 2004. 404-16. Print.
David Hume’s essay “Of the Standard of Taste” addresses the problem of how objects are judged. Hume addresses three assumptions about how aesthetic value is determined. These assumptions are: all tastes are equal, some art is better than others, and aesthetic value of art is defined by a person’s taste(from lecture). However, Hume finds the three beliefs to be an “inconsistent triad”(from lecture) of assumptions. If all taste is equal but taste defines the aesthetic value, how can it be that some art is good and others bad? Wouldn’t all art be equal if all taste is equal? Hume does not believe all objects are equal in their beauty or greatness. He states that some art is meant to endure, “the beauties, which are naturally fitted to excite agreeable sentiment, immediately display their energy”.(text pg 259) So how will society discern what is agreeable and what is not? Hume proposes a set of true judges whose palates are so refined they can precisely define the aesthetic value of something.
In Appendix I., Concerning Moral Sentiment, David Hume looks to find a place in morality for reason, and sentiment. Through, five principles he ultimately concludes that reason has no place within the concept of morality, but rather is something that can only assist sentiment in matters concerning morality. And while reason can be true or false, those truths or falsities apply to facts, not to morality. He then argues morals are the direct result of sentiment, or the inner feeling within a human being. These sentiments are what intrinsically drive and thus create morality within a being.
Goldblatt, and Brown. Aesthetics: A Reader in Philosophy of the Arts, Upper Saddle Ridge, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997.
David Hume, following this line of thinking, begins by distinguishing the contents of human experience (which is ultimately reducible to perceptions) into: a) impressions and b) ideas.