What the revolutionary achievements of Descartes, Kant, and Fichte have generically in common is to account for the legitimacy of our knowledge claims or, in other words, for the possibility of autonomy. The business of that kind of philosophy is to rationally reconstruct the rightness of judging. For that design the architecture of those authors' theorizing is necessarily opposed to normal experience. (First of all, the common notion of "things affecting us" has to be abandoned.) Transcendental arguments are therefore all but common sense.
Ayer does seem to leave a backdoor open for those who refer to themselves as metaphysicians by stating that "it is possible to be a metaphysician without believing in a transcendent reality." Ayer states that most metaphysicians do not deceive their readers on purpose, but they merely are using language that does not purport logical thinking. Ayer als... ... middle of paper ... ... the metaphysician is mistaken in his wordings and his errors in judgment. It seems that the metaphysical philosopher would gladly lead us into a world of untruths and a world that could never be true. Ayer lets the metaphysicians keep some dignity by states that, " although the greater part of metaphysics is merely the embodiment of humdrum errors, there remain a number of metaphysical passages which are the work of genuine mystical feeling; and they may more plausibly be held to have moral or aesthetic value."
Protagoras's own way out that his view must be "better"... ... middle of paper ... ...th recognizing the self-contradictory and self-defeating character of relativism is that it does remove the easy out. We may know thereby that there are absolute and objective truths and values, but this doesn't tell us what they are, how they exist, or how we can know them. In our day, it often seems that we are still not one iota closer to having the answers to those questions. Thus, the burden of proof in the history of philosophy is to provide those answers for any claims that might be made in matters of fact or value. Socrates and Plato got off too a good start, but the defects in Plato's theory, misunderstood by his student Aristotle, immediately tangled up the issues in a way that still has never been properly untangled.
I will argue that the tension arises from a possible forgetfulness on the part of the reader about Hume’s aims as a philosopher, and that Hume’s Enquiry stands on its own without any need for a critic’s extrapolations. To understand Hume’s interpretation of causation and the arguments against it, we must first follow the steps Hume took to come to his conclusion. This requires brief consideration of Hume’s copy princi... ... middle of paper ... ...place. If both definitions of ‘cause’ are necessary for a full understanding of the word, and an absolute reading becomes problematic and unnecessary, then neither Robinson’s nor Garrett’s interpretations are correct. If my account of Hume’s mitigated skepticism is correct, then I see no need to go any further than the Enquiry to understand Hume’s theory of causation.
On Certainty In his essay “An Argument for Skepticism”, Peter Unger makes the case for the “universal form of the skeptical thesis”. He is arguing for the position that any type of knowledge is impossible for any person. His argument seems to be a simple one, derived from two very clear hypotheses, but that is not the case. This paper is an attempt to show that while philosophically interesting, Unger’s attack on knowledge is not nearly so damaging as he contends. I will argue that Unger mischaracterizes the nature of certainty as it is ordinarily used (something he says is important to his argument), and also that he has mischaracterized one of the sources he used to defend this definition.
The language Wittgenstein uses was necessitated by his project of giving a sharp account of the nature of description. It is thus ironic that Wittgenstein defends dualism in the Tractatus and does so in the only form in which he thought it could be defended. Along the way, I try to show that his treatment of thought, sense, and understanding is both a continuation and correction of treatments which Frege and Russell had previously given to these concepts. The world Wittgenstein describes in the Tractatus(1) excludes any traditional form of dualism, even to the extent of not differentiating types of objects. Neither does it allow for radically different kinds of external properties or "relations proper" [4.122] belonging to Tractarian objects, beyond the observable ones he mentions like space, color, degree of pitch, etc.
Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein ABSTRACT: Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to an empirical-verifiability criterion of mental or linguistic meaning. The acceptance of this criterion confronted them with the same problem: how to understand the Other as a subject with his own experience, if the existence and nature of the Other's experiences cannot be verified. Husserl tackled this problem in the Cartesian Meditations, but he could not reconcile the verifiability criterion with understanding the Other's feelings and sensations. Carnap's solution was to embrace behaviorism and eliminate the idea of private sensations, but behaviorism has well-known difficulties. Heidegger broke this impasse by suggesting that each person's being included being-with, an innate capacity for understanding the Other.
Values in Metaethics In John Ludwig Mackie’s book Inventing Right and Wrong, he claims that “in making moral judgments we are pointing to something objectively prescriptive, but that these judgments are all false”. By saying this, he supports his main point that there are no objective values. However, John McDowell will be against Mackie’s argument, for he suggests that besides primary qualities, there are also secondary qualities that can be objective. I hold the same viewpoint as McDowell’s. In this essay, I will firstly explain Mackie’s argument, then illustrate McDowell’s objections, and finally explore some potential responses by Mackie.
Pragmatism is described in the book as a method for settling philosophical disputes. It is based on the pragmatic theory of truth. This theory says that a 'proposition p is true if and only if the belief that 'p is true' works'; (Voices of Wisdom, 346). In order to get a better understanding of the pragmatic theory of truth, the theory is contrasted against two other theories, the correspondence theory of truth and the coherence theory of truth. James disagreed with these theories because 'they present truth as a static property existing prior to and independent of human experience and investigation';.
Descartes argues how can anyone be sure of something and that what we believe may not be entirely true or correct. He argues that the mind and body are two different aspects entirely, the mind is thinking and the body is extending and the two aspects are completely different.... ... middle of paper ... ...ves that our senses will determine our existence, how does having the ability to see or touch determine that we currently exist without thinking about it? It is the mere fact that we have thought about how we can see and touch determines our existence, because we used our minds doubting our senses as proof. I will also explain which of them is more relevant as a means to gain insight into local and contemporary life in general. The role of Professor McLaughlin's sceptic is to introduce certain 'sceptical hypotheses', hypotheses which imply the falsity of most of what we believe about the world.