A Survey on NEMO Security: Threats and Solutions

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If the mobile node moves out of its home network, it starts searching a new router called access router to provide service from the visited network. With the help of AR the mobile node will maintain connectivity with its home agent. But if the mobile node joins with a new network, topologically it’s not possible to maintain the address assigned by the home network. So a new address called Care of Address will be assigned by the AR, then the mobile node has to send an update to its home agent about its new care of address. The process of updating new care of address to the respective home agent or correspondent node is called as Binding Update (BU). This process is implemented once again if the mobile node performs hand off. The mobile nodes duty is to update the new binding always to home agent; it ensures the message integrity between these nodes and assures the home agent about the legitimate mobile node. Binding Acknowledgement (BA) message will be a reply from home agent for the update.

An attacker may claim spoofed information that a particular legitimate mobile node is in different location than where it really is. If home agent believes that information and works based on it, then the respective mobile node may not get the traffic at all. A malicious mobile node may use the home address of a victim legitimate node in forged binding update sent to a correspondent node. These kinds of attacks generate the threats against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the mobile nodes. An attacker may go through the contents of a packet destined to another node by redirecting the traffic to it. This leads to man in middle attack between mobile node and the correspondent node. An attacker may also send forged binding up...

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The use of Return Routability procedure provides good support to MIPv6 without any security issues. This procedure verifies the message exchange between the home agent and mobile node’s care of address to ensure if both the nodes are reachable. The Binding Update messages are exchanged cryptographically. When symmetric attack is used always the response is sent to the node from where the request has come, which avoids the reflection attack. The correspondent node must wait for authorized binding update form the mobile node. The encapsulation (tunnel) also carried out through encryption between home agent and mobile node with IPSec ESP. Nonse exchange through tunnel avoids the possibility of attackers to verify the nonse message, hence the attack from the visited network can also be prevented.

Works Cited

NEMO, Security, Threats, Attacks

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