A Critical Analysis Of The Dilemma Of Indeterminism

In either case, we do not have free will and hence should not be held morally responsible for our actions. However, the fault is this: it is unclear whether his idea of moral responsibility is the correct one as he fails to demonstrate this. This will therefore offset his argument, because of the possibility of many views of moral responsibility, which I will discuss

If there was no maxims, then there would be no universal morality in which we could uphold. Although Kant says this, he still stresses the importance of free will. Even if something is a Categorical imperative or a universal maxim, he says it is not forceful to follow it through and that we are free whether or not to do the morally right

I think that we have to look at the foundations first. And we have to look at the foundations that we know and if they’re where some reasons to doubt, then I will have to doubt the principles. And I think that knowledge does not depend upon things of whose existence I don’t have knowledge yet. So how can we say that if there isn’t enough evidence to support a claim, why is it considered wrong? I find it illogical because just because there still isn’t enough evidence, doesn’t mean its wrong, its just not considered right or wrong.

My response is that even if you are unable to interpret the speaker’s intention, by stating that there is no fact about meaning is fallible. Regardless of one being able to interpret the speaker’s intention does not necessarily mean that there is no meaning behind the utterance of, say for example “gavagai.” Whatever the meaning of “gavagai” may be is solely dependent upon the speaker’s use and intention. Hence, the argument of the skeptic will not go through, and so this line of response to my argument fails. In conclusion, I have argued that the skeptical claim of there being no fact about meaning is fallible In the accounts of both Kripke and Quine, Quine’s skeptical claim falls as a slightly more worrisome than that of Kripke’s and to dissolve his claim, I provided a possible suggestion that can assist him out of his own ditch.

Chisholm’s Freewill Argument on the Dilemma of Determinism In determining the free will of a human’s nature many philosophers want to solve the dilemma of determinism. The dilemma of determinism is as follows (Rowe, p.587): A.) If determinism is true, we are not responsible for our actions since our choices are determined by factors that we have no control over. B.) If indeterminism is true, we are not responsible since ever choice is a chance occurrence C.) Either determinism or indeterminism is true.

On the surface, this does not sound like it is possible. If a person's actions are causally determined, that means that they have no control over them; the action was determined without their knowledge or consent. If this is the case, then... ... middle of paper ... ...control. The claim that most who support determinism would make is "My actions are the products of pure chance….therefore, how can I be held responsible?" However, the rebuttal to that is that a person's actions are not products of chance, but of choice.

The basic premise of Harry G. Frankfurt’s, Alternate Possibilities and Morality argues against the idea of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, which states, that a person is only morally responsible for his or her said action if they could have done otherwise. Although many can agree that this constitutes for an astounding contradiction to the development of morality and choice, I do not believe that Frankfurt’s response constitutes as a genuine counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. According to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities the issues that arise is whether there is a presence of freewill and the effect that freewill plays on morality. This idea of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities complements the definition because according to Webster’s dictionary the definition states, ‘freewill is the freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention.’ According to this definition and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities it is agreed upon that freewill is a factor that must be taken into consideration when discussing the value of the actions committed by the individual. Human actions are the primary motives for wanting this concept of free will, and determining its validity as part of the issue of values and the morality of the individual.

Furthermore in advocating that one treat others in differently when there are no factual differences is unjustifiable and makes this an arbitrary doctrine. Since there is no relevant factual difference between oneself and others, thus no real logic or reason, then the needs of others are equally important, which goes against the main principle of conduct for ethical egoism. Yet still the theory would not see the need to regard other individuals who may be affected by one’s actions, which again fails the minimum

Similarly in the case of adopting subjectivism, as long as the person committing the action thought this action was morally permissible then that statement could not be made. If we adopted ethical nihilism, statements like this would not be able to have any truth value. Since ethical nihilism states that there are no correct answers whatsoever we could not state that something was wrong and give it a truth factor. In order to do this there must be some correct alternative but nihilism states there is no such

Skeptics believe that is impossible to verify truth, thus we can have no knowledge since do not have truth(Henry 2002,101-102). They do believe that we can have beliefs, as seen by the fact that they believe we cannot have ... ... middle of paper ... ...e was an agreement. But if it was only a second than it cannot be considered knowledge as knowledge is always a true and can be maintained as such. Therefore the agreement is not knowledge as it is not able to remain true, even if such an agreement had been made. Due to this Henry’s argument is incorrect.