U.T. Place, like all physicalist (or materialist), must confront the formidable task of explaining consciousness in terms of contemporary science. While (nearly) everyone, I assume, would accept the proposition that there is a connection, to a degree, between consciousness and the brain, a physicalist would appear to have to go one step further and assert that the two are one and the same thing. Now, the proposition that consciousness is identical to, and thus, nothing more than a brain process (or processes) may be impossible to prove—however, in Is Consciousness A Brain Process?, Place doesn’t attempt to establish this proposition. But Place does argue the identity theory, i.e., consciousness is a process(es) in the brain, cannot be “dismissed on logical grounds alone” (p.44). Subsequently, he cites an objection to the identity theory presented by Sir Charles Sherrington. My focus in this short paper will be to explain Sherrington’s objection and Place’s response to said objection.
Sir Charles Sherrington argues that there is a “self” always present and evaluating perceptions, whi...
The doctrine of physicalism is a widely discussed philosophical issue in which the mind-body problem is heavily explored. This controversial topic has left philosophers questioning the relationship between mind and matter, and more specifically, consciousness and the brain. There are a number of arguments supporting either side, but two that are rather compelling are Nagel’s What is it like to be a bat? and Jackson’s What Mary didn’t know. These two objections of physicalism use the subjective aspect of experience to suggest that the mind exists as something separate from the brain. Although both of these objections are a challenge physicalism, Nagel’s argument poses more of a threat to it because of his specific use of bats rather than humans. In this paper, I will be discussing how Nagel’s objection is more damaging to the doctrine of physicalism than Jackson’s.
Self means “of each person, individually”. In 1902, Charles Horton Cooley created the concept of the looking glass self, which explored how identity is formed. People shaping their identity based on the perception of others, which leads the people to reinforce other people’s perspectives on themselves. People shape themselves based on what other people perceived and confirm other people’s opinion of themselves. The three main phases of the looking- glass self are: first, we imagine the judgment of that appearance. Second, we imagine the judgment of that appearan...
1. William Wundt (late 1880’s) had subjects report contents of consciousness while working, falling asleep, and sitting still.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
According to Santrock (2011), the development of a sense of self, in which an individual starts “to sense a separate existence from others” (p. 185), begins in infancy. It is thought to have emerged as a result of sensory-motor and perceptual experiences, and contribute to a child’s interaction with others as well as his or her language skill development (Guardo, 1968). As stated by Wylie (1961), self has two chief meanings which include firstly, self as object, and secondly, self as subject. The first meaning, self as object, refers to the perception of an individual as an object by forming a conception of his or her abilities, weaknesses, and values (Wylie, 1961). As for the second meaning, self as subject, which will be focused on throughout this paper is one’s awareness and experience of his or her own being and functioning (Guardo & Bohan, 1971). This experience is equated with a sense of self-identity, which involves an individual’s experience of having certain characteristics which are important in experiencing himself or herself as a person with a unique identity (Guardo & Bohan, 1971).160
The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He examines the difficulties of the mind-body problem by investigating the conscious experience of an organism, which is usually ignored by the reductionists. Unfortunately, his arguments contain some flaws but they do shed some light as to why the physicalist view may never be able to solve the mind-body problem.
3. Schwarz, E. (2010). The 'Standard'. On the Nature of Consciousness-On Consciousness in Nature. AIP Conference Proceedings, 1303(1), 334-342.
To define such a universally experienced phenomena as consciousness may seem on the most superficial level rather unnecessary. Yet a more scientific, and at times philosophical, investigation into the phenomena demands some sort of confirmed interpretation which supercedes any such common understanding. For our purposes the content of consciousness may be deemed those things of which one is aware and thus can report. Thinking, as well, and the higher-level mechanisms associated there in may also be components of this consciousness. While additionally an individuals' conception that the way in which she experiences the world comes from more than just the neuronal activity of her brain can be understood as a contribution of said consciousness (2).
As Watts notes,65 the successful reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics in the world of physics has allowed for the emergence of both bottom-up and top-down accounts; consequently, our understanding of both has been considerably developed and restructured. He argues that such an approach is even more necessary in the realm of biology in order to facilitate the much-needed integration of the nervous system with consciousness – a similar revolutionizing of both concepts might very well ensue.66 This essay is arguing that it would be more constructive for contemporary psychology to incorporate the complexity, causal efficacy and thus the existence of human mental phenomena into its accounts of the human person. When understood as only one level of explanation among many others, psychological accounts of the human person are both compatible with traditional Abrahamic theological assumptions, and, as this essay has sought to demonstrate, of tremendous complementary value to
The ‘Sensation-Brain Process Identity Theory’ posed by J.J.C. Smart is the view that a sensation is a just a brain process. In the strict sense of identity a sensation and a brain processes are two names for one thing. Similarly, the one thing people refer to when they talk about ‘the morning star’ or ‘the evening star’ is Venus. There exists only one physical component to this world from which we derive other statements like ‘the morning star is the last star you can see in the morning.’ ‘The morning star’ happens to be Venus. A sensation happens to be a process. A brain process more obviously is also a process. When we talk about sensations or a brain process we are talking about the same process. The one particular process being referred to ‘is’ in the strict sense a single thing like Venus. When we talk about a sensation or a brain-process we do so to designate one and the same component of living humans.
With any person, trait, or object that varies, one variation is usually seen as better than another. An early bus is preferred over a late bus, a friend is viewed more positively when in a good mood instead of a bad mood, and intelligence is valued more in higher quantities opposed to lower quantities. These examples are assigned their higher values in contrast to their opposites. They are more appreciated because they are different from the variation that is less appreciated. These lesser variations typically cause more negative outcomes, in turn they are less appreciated. A late bus will cause you to arrive late, an early bus will not, an angry friend might end up yelling at you, a happy friend will not, lower intelligence could cause you
...n the indication of an independently existing self, Parfit challenges such perceptions. In challenging the significance of identity, Parfit relates too Locke’s form of a “psychological criterion”, as well as Hume’s stand against Butler and Reid that we don’t see ourselves as a steady subject of experience. If neither identity nor self, have any meaningful role or importance, Parfit’s view possibly frees us from the self. This makes my relation with my future selves more understanding and uncluttered. This also makes it so there is no longer rough limitations between my current, past, and future identities. I may perhaps even find it easier to identify with others across these boundaries of “psychological continuity” as well. It’s apparent that if in fact Parfit is right in his examination of identity and self, our preconceived hypothetical structures fall apart.
Consciousness is a very interesting aspect of brain study. While we sunbathe on a warm sunny day, we recognize sensations outside our body. The sun shining down, in addition to sensations we feel like muscles relaxation. Past this fundamental awareness, we are additionally aware of ourselves having these encounters. Analysts define consciousness as the awareness we have of nature’s domain and ourselves.
1.1 “A little bit about me”; An introduction to the notion of the self- concept.
Locke’s definition of self lends itself to a chain view of self. The chain view of self can be used to extend the persistent self even ...